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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the cognitive development of the
mentally handicapped infant in comparison with that of the normal
infant. It has been claimed that the course of cognitive
development in the infant with Down's Syndrome ('mongolism') can be
explained as a 'slowed down' version of the development exhibited by
the normal infant (as described by Piaget and others). In this
thesis criticism is made of this 'slow development' theory. It is
argued that such a formulation can, at best, offer a description of
certain differences in developmental outcome (namely the delayed
emergence of critical achievements on the part of the Dawn's Syndrome
infant). It cannot explain why such differences occur.
The necessity for analysis to proceed beyond a level of 'first
emergence' is demonstrated by the findings of a comparative
longitudinal study of cognitive development in the Down's Syndrome and
the normal infant. It is shown that the nature of both success and
failure on tasks relating to cognitive development is different between
the two populations. It is argued that such differences must be seen
as more fundamental than delays in outcome, and that an adequate
explanatory model must therefore concern itself with the former.
A theoretical account is presented which focuses attention on the
manner in which competence is acquired, rather than on the formal
properties of such competence. It is argued that for the Down's
Syndrome infant, in contrast to the normal infant, acquisition and
change cannot be posited to take place with respect to high levels of
organisation of response. On the basis of this account, a prediction
is derived concerning the efficacy of techniques designed to enhance
the performance of the Down's Syndrome infant. Evidence is
presented to show that enhancement can occur if appropriate
restructuring of task presentation is made. It is also demonstrated
that such enhancement is not exhibited by formally matched younger
normal infants, under the same conditions. This finding confirms the
view that the cognitive development of the Down's Syndrome infant must
be seen as different from the normal, rather than merely 'slower'.
General implications for both the normal and the handicapped
infant are discussed. With respect to the latter, particular
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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION
1. Cognitive Development and the Down's Syndrome Infant
1*1 Introduction
A large corpus of psychological experimentation with human
infants has taken its inspiration from the work of Piaget?first
reported in the 1930s (published in English as Flaget 1953, 1955).
This work concerns itself with the infant's perception and
understanding of his physical world, and of his active engagement
with it in the form of adaptive behaviour. Central assumptions of
this approach are that behaviour must be seen as organised (and
thus individual elements of behaviour can be neither random nor
totally independent)j that large scale changes in organisation
take place with timej that such changes cannot be adequately
explained in terms of changes in elements? and that such changes
are, in general, progressive, and tend to increase the infant's
degree of adaptation. The term 'cognitive development' is used to
refer to the substance of such an approach to infancy.
Generally, the cognitive-developmental approach seeks to
account for the behaviour of infants in naturalistic situations, in
which some form of intelligent activity is called into play. The
investigation of behaviour in more artificial contexts is a means
to this end. It is the general features of the organisation of
action, within the natural setting, which are of interest, and
especially the transformations which are observed in the forms of
organisation. The ethological nature of the approach demands that
all forms of organisation must be seen as possessing some degree of
- 2 -
adaptation to the salient environment. Development is not,
therefore, seen merely as an accretion of the skills or habits
characteristic of the mature individual. Etophasis is placed on
the structural integrity of behaviour at all points in the life¬
span. These features set the cognitive-developmental approach
apart frcm, for example, accounts of development derived from
learning theory which characteristically focus on single elements
of behaviour.
Research into cognitive development has concentrated almost
exclusively on the normal infant. With respect to handicapped
infants, the earliest comparative work might be said to be that of
Mcarie (1969), with infants phocomelic as a result of the drug
Thalidomide. This population was studied chiefly in order to
assess the universality of certain Piagetian predictions, rather
than as a contribution to an understanding of the development of
the handicapped infant as such. It will be argued below (1.5) that
research derived from the cognitive-developmental framework might in
fact make such a contribution. It will be argued that the general
end of understanding the nature of mental handicap in infancy should
be brought closer by research in this general framework. Before a
description of this framework is given, some characteristics of the
specific population under study will be presented.
1.2 Down's Syndrome
Down's Syndrome (henceforward DS), formerly known as 'mongolism*,
is the largest single condition contributing to the incidence of
mental handicap (Clarke & Clarke 197U). The condition is
- 3 -
identifiable at birth, chiefly by means of the physical stigmata
(Smith & Berg 1976). ES is characterised by the increased dosage
of specific chromosomal material. In over 95% of cases, the
increased dosage consists of a whole extra chromosome 21 in each
somatic cell. less frequently, a fraction only of this chromosomal
material is additional. Birth incidence is stable across cultures
and geographical areas, at some 1.5 per 1,000 live births (Smith 8c
Berg 1976).
It is unusual for gross physical handicaps to co-occur with ES,
but a range of minor handicaps are often associated. The most
commonly associated secondary handicap is congenital heart defect
(CHD) which is largely responsible for the relatively high mortality
rate in the first year. In addition, however, there are frequently
upper respiratory and immunological difficulties, and occasionally
auditory or visual handicaps.
The extent to which DS may be taken to represent mental
handicap in general is not clear. Anecdotal evidence for the
uniqueness of the DS population (with respect to behaviour) has not
been substantiated (Belmont 1971). In this thesis, DS will in
general be discussed as a distinct population. However, much of
the relevant literature has not considered DS separately from other
conditions. It will therefore be necessary to make certain
assumptions concerning the equivalence of different populations in
drawing inferences from such work.
1.3 The Piagetlan Approach
The Piagetian tradition presents probably the most cohesive system
- u -
available for the conceptualisation of behavioural development
in infancy. Piaget's original approach can best be seen in
contrast to classic procedures for assessing children's mental
development. For Piaget, a child's 'incorrect' reply to an adult's
question must be seen not as an end of investigation (when
transformed, for example, into a cross on an IQ form) but rather as
a beginning for further study. For Piaget, the child must have
had a rational reason for the nature of his answer. It could not
be seen merely as a random, 'trial and error' response. This
conviction led Piaget to question the child further about his
initial response. Thus a semi-structured 'interview' came to be
adopted as the chief means of investigation.
Piaget's subsequent work with (his own) infants (1953, 1955)
was prompted by a desire to trace the prelinguistic genesis of
certain aspects of intelligent behaviour. The method used was
strictly analogous to that employed with children. Instead of
verbal questions, physical problems were presented to the infant in
a semi-structured 'clinical' manner and the infants' responses
observed at different ages. The 'probing' aspect of this approach,
in response to Hie subject's behaviour, and the rejection of the
simple 'pass or fail' as a source of information all set Piaget's
approach apart from the contemporary approaches to the
psychological evaluation of the infant (e.g. Gesell & Amatruda 19ii7).
One school of research has remained very close to the
'clinical' aspects cf Piaget's methodology. This 'Genevan' school
has retained the theoretical approach and the methodology of
Piaget's own work, although various extensions and adaptations have
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been made. The Anglo-American tradition of experimental
psychology has also shown great interest in the phenomena
described by Piaget. However, they have been studied with a
different methodology. Further, Flaget's own theoretical account
has been seen as only one way of interpreting the observations
which he presents. Thus this second tradition has taken an
'operational* approach to the Piagetian findings. The observations
and the theory, once presented as an integrated whole (Piaget 1953,
1955) have been separated out (see Gratch 1975). It has been
argued that both advantages and disadvantages have resulted from
this procedure (Broughton 1970).
It should be stressed that both schools give an equal
emphasis to the centrality of the phenomena Piaget described. Both
consider it vital to obtain a complete understanding of the
development of mental abilities in the infant. Both stress that
such an understanding must transcend a mere comparison with the
adult mind. Both insist that it is the more general aspects of
intelligent behaviour which are of the greatest importance, rather
than isolated performance. It is these common features which will
generally be referred to as the 'Piagetian approach'.
1.1* Piaget's Account of Cognitive Development in Infancy
Piaget's original account is presented in the foim of two
parallel descriptions. First Piaget (1953) presents an account of
the infant's progressive construction of that 'practical' (non¬
verbal) intelligence which he demonstrates by the age of two years.
Piaget discerns six distinct stages of development, each
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characterised by a qualitatively different form of intelligent
action. The attainments of each of the six stages (Stages I -
VI) are described in terms of the increasing plasticity with which
different systems linking perception and action are co-ordinated.
These systems, or schemata, can finally be co-ordinated 'mentally',
without overt action being necessary. Such 'mental manipulation'
defines the end point of this whole ('sensorimotor') period of
development. This achievement enables the child to start using
language as an alternative to action. Thus this whole period may
be considered equivalent to that commonly referred to as 'infancy' t
the time before speech.
3h his second volume, Piaget (1955) describes the same six
stages with respect to specific domains of development, rather than
the global forms of intelligence. Each section presents a set of
observations of the developing infant's differential response to the
same or similar problem situations. The first section contains
perhaps the most striking observations, and perhaps it is partly for
this reason that it is the section given most attention by Anglo-
American psychologists. In this section, Piaget describes the
responses of infants to the movement and concealment of desired toys.
Far Piaget, the two year old's understanding of objects is
perhaps his greatest achievement. It is certainly the prototype of
cognitive structure at the culmination of infancy. For Piaget, the
two year old has achieved an understanding of the physical world
which ascribes 'permanence' to per-ceived objects. Thus the child
has created a universe populated by solid objects whose existence is
independent both of himself and of his actions. Such objects
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continue to exist even when concealed by another object, or when
sharing the motion of a second occluding object. This
achievement is described as the possession of the mature 'Object
Concept'.
All these features are, for Piaget, great achievements in
comparison to the newborn's conception of the physical universe.
Piaget presents an analysis of the gradual construction of the
•Object Concept'. Each of the six stages of sensorimotor
intelligence is shown to be associated with a different stage in
this construction.
A brief summary of the characteristic features of the six
stages, according to Piaget's (1955) analysis, will now be given.
Illustrative references to observations in Piaget (1955) are given
in brackets. The description of tasks designed to test for these
features is given below (Chapter III : 3.2).
Stages I & II s No special response to objects going
out of sight
Stage III : Retrieval of an object when partially
hidden by an occluder, but not when
completely hidden (0.23)
Stage IV : Retrieval of an object completely hidden
by an occluder. However, on the object's
subsequent concealment by a second
occluder (in a different location), search
at the first location only (0.1*0)
Stage V s Immediate retrieval of object from a series
of different occluders. However, when the
transportation of the object to the occluder -
and its release there - is performed with the
object concealed in a container, the infant
will search in the container only. Finding
it empty, he will cease searching (0.55)
- 8 -
Stage VI s In the above procedure, inspection of
the container is immediately followed
by retrieval of the object from the
occluder (0.61*)
Piaget emphasises the importance of the achievement indicated
by such behaviour. The responses diagnostic of 'Stage VI' of the
development of the Object Concept are seen to imply the mental
manipulation of the representations of objects. Thus a global
change in the infant's understanding of the universe has taken
placei
"... during the sixth stage, the co-ordination of
the schemata is internalized in the form of mental
combinations ... Thereafter deduction of the object
and of its spatial characteristics is achieved in
the construction of a collective universe in which
displacements that are merely indicated are inserted
among observed movements and complete them in a truly
coherent whole". (1955, p.96)
The culmination of infant development - as manifested in the
ability to deduce the location of an object after non-visible
displacement - can therefore be seen as the foundation for
subsequent achievements
"Thus may be seen the unity of the behaviour patterns
of the sixth stage: mental combination of schemata with
possibility of deduction surpassing actual
experimentation, invention, representative evocation by
image symbols, so many characteristics marking the
completion of sensori-motor intelligence and making it
henceforth capable of entering the framework of language
to be transformed ... into reflective intelligence".
(1953, P-356)
For Piaget, then, the changes which are observed in the infant's
response to displaced objects can be taken as an index of cognitive
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development as a whole. The level of understanding of the
physical world which is demonstrated by the infant, in solving the
problems with displaced objects, represents the highest
achievement of infant intelligence. At the same time, it represents
the beginning of the 'reflective' intelligence characteristic of the
child and adult: the most striking manifestation of which is the use
of language.
1.5 The Importance of Comparative Research into Cognitive
Development in the Down's Syndrome Infant
The area of research with which this thesis is concerned is of
importance for a number of reasons. In addition to the
significance for the study of mental handicap, both in infancy and
beyond, the comparative perspective offers a contribution to more
general issues of development.
With respect to the mentally handicapped infant, it is important
to assess the contribution of the Piagetian approach. This system
would seem, at present, to constitute the most complete and cohesive
account of infant development available. Moreover, it presents a
model of development in which attention is focused on cognitive and
intellective factors - in contrast, for example, to the emphasis of
Gesall on motor attainments. In principle, such a model should be
uniquely appropriate to the psychological investigation of mental
handicap in the infant. It is important to determine to what extent
this is the case.
At the least, it seams likely that the richness and detail of
the Piagetian approach will illuminate the development pattern of
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the DS infant. With the present emphasis on early intervention
with the DS infant (e.g. Brinkworth 1973J Hayden & Haring 1975),
a more complete understanding of their development is becoming
urgent. If 'stimulation' programmes are to be effective, thesy must
be designed and carried out in the context of such knowledge. The
setting of goals for intervention - as well as the rationale for the
practice itself - must be related to a detailed knowledge of the
processes of development in the handicapped infant.
In order for the investigation of the handicapped infant to
generate information relevant to these issues, it must be carried
out in a comparative framework. If it is carried out in isolation
from the study of normal development, there is a danger that inadequate
models of development may be adopted and, thereby, unproductive
questions posed. The comparative paradigm makes it possible to keep
in perspective both similarities to, as well as the differences from,
normal development. Such an approach also has more general advantages.
The study of development under the influence of a handicap gives an
important perspective on normal development. It offers the
possibility of separating out the characteristics of 'normal' - i.e.
non-handicapped - development from those common to sill populations
(and thereby characteristic of 'development' per se). Thus it will be
possible to account for 'normalcy' in development in ways which go
beyond the cataloguing of 'norms'.
The specific chromosomal anomaly in Down's Syndrome makes Its
study of significance to the problem of genotypic influence on
development. It is important to establish how direct a relation holds
between specific chromosomal dosages and behavioural outcomes. It
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must, of course, be borne in mind that for Down's Syndrome the
extra dosage is (generally) a whole extra chromosome per
somatic cell. It is important to determine whether differences
in developmental outcome may be described and accounted for in
simple terms. If so, some direct causal link may be posited
between the chromosomal anomaly and the course of development.
If, however, the differences from normal development are found to
be complex, then such a simple relationship could not hold. The
genetic anomaly will still be seen as the original cause of the
problem, but developmental outcome will be seen as mediated by
numerous interactive processes. In such a case, the role of
environmental manipulation is undetermined. More generally, such
a conclusion would suggest that genotype is only one of a number
of factors contributing to developmental outcome. Even where
major differences from the normal karyotype occur, a course of
development cannot be seen simply as the necessary 'expression' of
the genotype.
This section has discussed some general issues, some of which
will be taken up again following the presentation of the present
research. Next, however, the more specific concerns of this thesis
will be introduced.
2. Previous Research and the Theory of 'Slow Development'^
2.1 Introduction
Little information is yet available on the cognitive development
of the CS infant. However, a section of the literature is of
indirect relevance to this issue. Indeed implications drawn from it
- 12 -
have, so far, substituted for specific investigation. This work
consists first of other work with D8 infants, and second of work
with mentally handicapped children as a general population. As
will be shown, these two sources of information have converged on
a broad 'theory' of the cognitive development of the DS infant.
Since this theory will subsequently be criticised, it is necessary
to summarise the work and the conclusions which have been drawn from
it. Following the criticism, certain other work will be reviewed
which lies outside the two sources noted above, and which, it will
be argued, supports a different approach to the problem.
2.2 Research in the Psychometric Tradition
Psychometric studies of the DS infant evolved from the
experience of clinical assessment. Practices such as general
screening, the prediction of future attainment and the recommendation
of care or placement relied on the use of psychometric 'baby tests'
(e.g. Gesell & Amatruda 19ll-7)- It was assumed that determining the
characteristic pattern of results on these tests would facilitate these
practices and, further, would give rise to a clear understanding of the
development of the DS infant.
The psychometric account makes use of descriptive terms which are
of a highly derived nature, in comparison with the original data.
Such data consists of binary (pass or fail) scores on a set of items.
By comparison with scores obtained by a normative sample, the sum of
correct scores is transformed into an equivalent-age score (the
Mental Age, or MA). Dividing the MA by the subject's Chronological
Age (CA) yields a ratio score. When initial testing is carried out
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with an Intelligence Test, this ratio score is termed the
Intelligence Quotient (IQ). In the case of infancy, where
broader 'developmental' tests are administered, the ratio score -
obtained in an identical manner - is termed the Developmental
Quotient (DQ).
Studies in the psychometric tradition have evaluated DS
infants on 'developmental' tests such as those of Gesell (Gesell
& Amatruda 19h7) and Bayley (l969). Infants have been tested in
a longitudinal fashion in studies such as those of Dameron (1963),
Carr (1970) and Dicks-MLreaux (1972). The graph of MA results with
increasing CA has been found to have a positive slope, with a gradient
less than 1. That is to say, despite absolute increases in raw
score with CA, there is an increasing divergence from scores
determined to be norms for specific CA. Where testing has been
carried out with respect to different areas of development (e.g.
'mental' and 'motor' development as defined by Bayley's (1969)
Scale), similar results have been found in each area.
The construct of DQ, in terms of which these findings have
frequently been expressed, has been explicitly associated with
childhood IQ (e.g. Dameron 1963). However, DQ has been found to
be a poor predictor of childhood IQ (see Honzik 1976). Despite Its
analogous method of computation, then, (with respect to the raw data),
the construct of DQ, cannot be assigned validity on the basis of an
association with the IQ. Its value must be evaluated within the
context of infancy itself.
As noted above, level of achievement - that is, measured Mental
Age - falls further behind Chronological Age expectation as infancy
- lh -
progresses. Thus the ratio of the two (DO) exhibits a negative
slope with respect to time. This pattern has been interpreted
as a •progressive deterioration' (Dicks-Mireaux 1972). Thus the
negative slope exhibited by the DS infants is being compared
unfavourably with the constant value exhibited by the normal infant.
This latter pattern is, however, determined by the nature of the DQj
the normal infant must, by definition, have a constant DO since he
supplies the norms to which achievement is compared. Constancy of
DQ cannot, therefore, be seen as a constructive achievement of the
normal infant. As a corollary, it would not seem legitimate to
interpret a decline in calculated DQ as a substantial 'deterioration'.
Certainly such a conclusion would not seem to offer any advance in
terms of explanation. The decline in DO must be seen as a
reflection of the abnormality in development, rather than its
substantial cause.
It is not only with the derived measure of DQ that the
psychometric approach becomes unsatisfactory. The more fundamental
concept of Mental Age leads to the same problems. As noted by
Melyn & 'White (1973), when
"(use is made of) mental age as a standard for
evaluating other aspects of development ...
Differences between retarded and non-retarded
children are ... seen as quantitative and not
qualitative. Indeed, the mental age concept
cannot accommodate qualitative differences between
individuals, whether retarded or not". (p.i;2l)
The psychometric approach assumes that all differences are
'quantitative' (i.e. that they can be expressed by mapping between
MAs). It will be argued below that, on the contrary, it is
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'qualitative' differences which generally characterise the
mentally handicapped infant.
However, it should be emphasised that the psychometric
approach has been sensitive enough to demonstrate certain
differences among the IS population. For example, higher levels
of performance (at equivalent CA) have been shown for the home-
reared as against the institutionalised infant (Centerwall Si
Centerwall I960; Stedman & Fichorn 1961a) and for infants enrolled
in intervention programmes at the pre-school level (Ludlow & Allen
1979). Such findings clearly suggest a degree of plasticity in
the development of the IS infant with which the most radical forms
of the psychometric approach would appear to be incompatible (e.g.
Dicks-Mireaux 1972).
The comparison of different sections of the DS population, by
means of the psychometric approach, can therefore clearly provide
useful information. With respect to the DS population as a whole,
however, the approach might seem to be capable of little beyond a
demonstration of global inferiority of performance on the part of
the DS infant.
To summarise, the psychometric approach has shown that the DS
infant can be expected to achieve the 'milestones' of development
later than his normal peers. Since the norms of such achievement
are placed en a time-scale, this pattern may be described as
'slowness'. Attempts have been made to explain this pattern in terms
of constructs such as Mental Age and Developmental Quotient. It has
been argued above that such explanations have not in fact clarified
the phenomena.
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2.3 Research in the Piagetian Tradition
The earliest, and still the most influential study of the
mentally handicapped to be carried out within the Piagetian
approach is that of Inhelder (l968j first published 19k3). In
this study a large number of subjects, aged from 7 years to adult,
were assessed on tasks relating to 'concrete operations' (in the
terms of Fiaget's system). These tasks concern such features as
the conservation of quantity, which are acquired by the normal
child during late childhood (Piaget 197k, p..98).
Inhelder (1968) found that the performance of the retarded
subjects could, in general, be equated with that of younger, normal
subjects. Inhelder suggested that the 'level' of development
revealed by her analysis might be seen as the 'end-point' or
'ceiling' of the individual subject's development. Thus the subject
was 'fixated' at a certain lewer level of development.
Inhelder found that 'fixation' could occur at various levels of
development, including the 'intuitive' or 'pre-operational' level
characteristic of the normal young child (of 2 - 7 years). The
level of 'fixation' was found to be correlated with the degree of
handicap (as assessed by more traditional methods). In terms of the
then current system of classification, Inhelder claims that:
"the imbecile is capable of intuitive thought ...
the retardate is capable of operatory construction
which he is incapable of completing". (inhelder 1968, p.293).
Within the same formulation, it is claimed that:
"the idiot never outgrows the sensori-motor
compositions". (ibid., p.293).
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It should be noted that no evidence for this latter claim
is presented by Inhelder.
In view of the ability range of Inhelder's sample, it is
likely that subjects with HS were included (although no
confirmation of this is given). It is not possible to make ary
specific inferences concerning the DS population - and certainly
not ES infants - from Inhelder's results. It is the more general
findings which have been of influence. Of greatest significance
are the implications for the course of development" in the individual
which are drawn from the cross-sectional data. Inhelder has stated
that:
"The developmental sequence of stages (in the
retarded child) is ... the same as that of normal
children". (inhelder 1966, p.311).
In the absence of work with younger subjects, or longitudinal
study, this conclusion might best be seen as tentative. The
theoretical problems associated with such assertions will be
discussed below ( 2.ii). It should be noted at this point that the
conclusions of Inhelder have been of considerable influence, and have
been taken to be of general application to cognitive development in
the mentally handicapped (e.g. Odam-Brooks & Arnold 1976).
Inhelder's claim for equivalence between the mentally handicapped
and the younger, normal child rests on the analysis of performance in
terms of 'levels' of development. In general, subjects exhibited
'homogeneous fixation' at a level below that appropriate for
chronological age, and
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"(there was) no room for doubt as to the structural
identity of the intellectual reactions between the
retardate and ... young normal children".
(Inhelder 1968, p.285).
However, certain subjects could not be characterised in terms
of 'homogeneous fixation' at a certain level. In keeping with
Inhelder's intention to extend analysis
"far beyond assigning the retardate to a given level
of development" (ibid., p.325)
these subjects are given considerable attention.
These subjects are described as exhibiting 'disequilibrium'.
'Disequilibrium' is manifested by 'oscillation' (in a single session)
between 'the ordinary levels of development'. Two forms of
'disequilibrium' are of interest here. One is characterised by
'progressive oscillation' in which the subject appears to make real
progress during the session. This is explained by suggesting that
some factor had been holding the subject back from achieving his
'true' level (and that the interview enabled this to be overcome).
The second form is the 'true oscillation'. Here the subject
appears highly sensitive to suggestion by the experimenter, or other
transient environmental influences. Any apparent progress made by
such a subject must be deemed superficial. It should be emphasised
that this pattern, like the 'progressive oscillation', was
characteristic of only a fraction of Inhelder's sample and was not
seen as of general importance. Thus the occurrence of 'oscillations'
has not been given much attention, by later researchers. It has not
been seen to affect the nature of Ihhelder's major claims. The
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picture has emerged of the mentally handicapped child being
equivalent, in terras of cognitive development, to the younger
normal child.
Subsequent research has concentrated on the assignment of
individuals to stages or levels of development. A number of
studies will be briefly reviewed. In general, as will be noted,
the trend has been away from classical Piagetian analyses and
towards the operational approach embodied in such sets of scales as
those of Uzgiris & Hunt (1975)*
Woodward (1959), in a cross-sectional design, assessed two
groups of children and adolescents on both general sensori-motor
intelligence (problem-solving) and object permanence. Of the first
group, Ili% were DS (aged between 7-16 years), and of the second
group, 35% were DS (age range 7 months - 15 years). Results are
presented in terms of Piaget's sensori-motor stages and show an even
spread across these stages. Thus most of the children were
performing at levels functionally equivalent to the normal infant.
The quoted correlation (%"]%>) between the two measures is not analysed
for the contribution of CA. Evidence for the sequential nature of
the items is derived from the ranking of items ty relative number of
subjects passing. The obtained order for the set of items therefore
represents an overall order of difficulty at the time of assessment.
Such an order need not be identical to the order in which
achievements first emerged. The conclusion that
"severely subnormal children pass through these steps
in the same sequence as ... normal children up to the
age of two years" (Woodward & Stern 1963, p.10)
would not therefore seem to be justified.
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Rogers (1977) has clarified some of these points. In a
study which investigated a wider range of Piagetian 'categories',
to include Causality, Space and Imitation, a similar sample was
investigated. The maximum proportion DS (not precisely stated)
was 10$ (aged 8 - 1$ years). Again a spread of functional levels
(iniErms of sensori-motor stages) was observed. Ordinality of
responses in the different domains was found to be high, but the
predicted correspondence between domains was low. Correlation
between CA and functional level was non-significant.
All the above studies have been concerned with the mentally
handicapped as a general population. Even where the exact
proportion of DS subjects is stated, differential analysis is not
given. This procedure makes it difficult to draw inferences
concerning the DS population as such. One study which has
concentrated on DS subjects alone has been that reported in Moore
& Meltzoff (1978). As part of an investigation into the
relationships between cognitive development and language, eleven
young DS children (aged from 3«8 to 5:3 years) were given a single
assessment on a set of 'object permanence' tasks. The authors
report that an identical order of difficulty was obtained for the
DS children as for normal infants (but with delayed emergence on
the part of the DS infants).
This finding supports those reported above, and suggests that
it will not generally be inaccurate to assume that results obtained
for mentally handicapped children in general may be posited for the
DS population in particular. However, with its cross-sectional
design (further limited by the small age range) it does not avoid
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the problems noted above. It is not necessarily the case that
order of difficulty for a set of items, at a certain age, is
identical to ontogenetic order of acquisition. Even if this
identity does in fact hold, the practice of extrapolating from
cross-sectional data might prevent more subtle differences from
being revealed by longitudinal investigation.
One study has used the longitudinal design with respect to
performance on 'object permanence' tasks. Wohlheuter & Sindberg
(1975) followed the progress of 67 children (aged one to six years
old), a sample which included an unspecified number of DS subjects.
In general, the median ages of emergence of specific achievements
followed the order expected for the normal infant. However,
9
ranges were extremely large and it is not clear whether statistical
analysis would have revealed a significant correlation with
chronological age. Further, it is noted that a number of subjects
manifested highly variable performance across sessions (in addition
to a number who made no progress, and thus remained an a 'plateau').
'Reversals' - that is, failure to repeat a prior achievement - were
noted for a number of subjects, including some who demonstrated a
generally constructive pattern. No figures are available to
quantify this feature, and the implications of such findings are not
discussed in depth.
This study clearly indicates that the limitations of cross-
sectional studies (as presented above) are serious ones. When
subjects are investigated on a longitudinal design, deviations from
the normal pattern begin to appear. The support these findings
offer to the more detailed results of Inhelder (1968), as noted above,
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should be emphasised. They have not been seen as a challenge
to the view that, in general, cognitive development in the mentally-
handicapped child can be seen as 'slow'.
Experimental investigation has then clearly demonstrated that
the performance of BS children on tasks assessing cognitive
development falls far below that of their normal peers. This
finding has been most clearly demonstrated in the domain of 'object
permanence'. Order of difficulty for sets of tasks is broadly
equivalent to the normal case, and age of first emergence of
crit0rial achievement can be expected to parallel normal development,
at least to a first approximation. These findings have given
support to the view that, in a strong sense, the pattern of
development is identical in the B5 and the normal population. Many-
studies have not investigated performance in sufficient detail to
enable a precise evaluation of this proposition. The most detailed
investigations have revealed, or suggested, areas of difference
between the two populations. These differences have not, however,
been seen as sufficient to weaken the claim for fundamental identity
between the developmental patterns. The description of the
cognitive development of the BS infant as being 'slow* is generally
accepted.
There is clearly a convergence between the conclusion of the
literature derived from Piaget's studies, and that of the
psychometric tradition presented above (p.12 ). The BS infant is
seen as manifesting 'slow development'. Such a theory is taken to
explain the larger part of experimental.findings and clinical
observation. In the two following sections, criticism of this theory
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will be madej first on theoretical grounds, and second on
empirical grounds.
2.It The Theory of 'Slow Development'
(i) Theoretical Considerations
The concept of 'slow development' has emerged from two distinct
research traditions. The two theoretical systems concerned, the
psychometric and the Piagetian, express the concept in different terms.
Both versions, it will be argued, can be criticised on theoretical
grounds. The major criticism, which can apply to both versions of
the theory, is concerned with the problem of circularity. Since
this problem arises most clearly with respect to the psychometric
version of the theory, this will be discussed first.
The psychometric approach to development draws an analogy
between psychological change and physical growth (see Bower 1977a)•
By this analogy 'slow' development would correspond with slow physical
growth. The validity of this analogy might be seen to receive
support from the finding that physical growth (height and weight) is
retarded in the DS infant (Crank 1978). In this context, where growth
can be plotted against time in a quantitative fashion (in terms of cm.
or kg.) the term 'slow' can be used in a precise manner. Growth is,
here, a mathematical function of a metric quantity with respect to
time. Derivatives of the primary function (such as rate or
acceleration) can also be given a precise meaning. The validity of
these usages depends on the fact that the dependent variable can be
observed and measured independently of the independent variable.
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In drawing an analogy between psychological development and
physical growth, it is important to note that, whatever the
validity of the analogy, the level of description is not
transcended. If it is accepted that 'mental growth' can be
measured accurately, and independently of chronological age - by
means of tests - it would still only be possible to obtain a precise
description of observed changes. 'SLow mental growth' is
identified by measuring instances of retardation in performance.
It cannot, by itself, be taken to explain the occurrence of such
instances. In this respect, 'slow growth' or 'development' can be
taken only as a description, and not as an explanation. To use it
as an explanation would be to fall into circularity.
In its strongest form, the psychometric approach does not appeal
to any outside factor to explain measured changes. In this form,
then, it cannot be seen as offering an explanatory theory for the
phenomena of mental handicap in development. However, certain
approaches similar to the 'strong' psychometric approach have
recognised the necessity for positing the influence of other factors
on development. What must be considered is the extent to which these
approaches constitute an advance over the 'strong' psychometric
argument. If they can provide a means of anchoring 'mental growth'
within some independent framework, then such a modified version of
'slow development' might be more satisfactory.
The introduction of biological maturation into a theory of slow
development has been made by Lenneberg (Lenneberg et al. 1961;).
Lenneberg's empirical work is concerned with language use, and will not
be discussed in detail. However, it is important to consider the role
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which 'slow development' plays in this approach. For Lenneberg,
development can be broken down into different 'facets'. Slow
development occurs with respect to each 'facet', but to different
degrees. Thus a major change to the strong psychometric argument
has been made. The concept of unitary growth, which might be
indexed by a single measure, has been replaced by the more complex
picture of a set of domains with some degree of independence.
For Lenneberg, the different facets of development can be seen
as lying on a single dimension, with respect to the extent of
biological determination. Thus physical and motor development are
opposed to domains of development in which cultural factors are seen
to have a significant influence. Lenneberg argues that, in the case
of DS, development will be affected to a greater extent in those
domains less under the control of biological factors. In this
category he includes areas responsible for intelligence-test
performance.
This separation out of different domains of development, with
the associated prediction of differential retardation, might make it
appear that the problems of circularity with the psychometric approach
have been avoided. Explanation for developmental outcome is not
being given in terms of change in a unitary underlying variable.
However, unless it is possible to establish, independently, the
relative contributions of biological and cultural factors to outcome
in the various domains, the same problems will emerge. [Explanations
for outcome will still appeal to outcome itself. For example, the
location of language-use on the dimension of determination is,
essentially, determined by the results of empirical research with IB
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children. This location - on the 'biological* end of the
dimension - cannot, without circularity, be used to explain the
same empirical findings.
Lenneberg's analysis presents a general theory of development,
within which the case of 16 plays a certain part. In contrast to
such a general viewpoint, mental handicap itself may be seen as the
central issue. Explanation will then take the form of a 'theory'
of mental handicap. The approach of Zigler (1969, 1973) constitutes
a 'slow development theory' of mental handicap. For Zigler,
differences in intelligence-test performance between the handicapped
and the normal populations can be expressed in terms of 'developmental
delay' on the part of the former.
'Developmental level' (however measured) is taken as an adequate
explanation for such differences. It has been argued here that, on
the contrary, 'slowness' or 'delay' in development can only be a
description of outcome. As noted by Ellis (1969), in a criticism
of Zigler's theory,
"The statement that (children with differing 10 )
are at 'different developmental levels' does not
provide an explanation". (Ellis 1969, p.363).
Before concluding the discussion of those versions of the theory
of 'slow development' broadly derived from psychometric tradition, some
attention should be given to certain related approaches. If the
concept of 'slow development' as such gives rise to problems, it might
be possible to translate it into terms which enable empirical testing
to be carried out. Perhaps the most satisfactory such procedure would
concern itself with neurological correlates of behaviour. If
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developmental change in general could be explained by reference
to characteristics of the central nervous system, then 'slow
development' might be accounted for within the same theoretical
system. The necessarily complete neuro-behavioural model is not
however available. In its absence the concept of slow growth in
neural tissue (see Brinkworth 1973) cannot be considered sufficiently
precise to serve as an explanatory underpinning of 'slow development'.
It has been suggested (e.g. Benda 1969) that the influence of
neurological deficits should be sought in the process of neural
transmission taken to underlie learning. Thus performance in
learning situations might be used as an index of underlying
neurological deficit, and might thereby provide evidence independent
of the assessment of 'developmental level'. However, the most
rigorous work yet available shows that the learning of a choice-
discrimination is equally fast in the normal and the retarded subject,
once the appropriate dimension of differoice has been identified by
the subject (Zeaman & House 1963). Attempts to legitimise the term
'slew development' by an appeal to neurological processes would appear
to be, at best, premature. The fundamental problems of the
psychometric version of 'slow development' are not obviated by the
theoretical developments which these attempts represent.
When the Piagetian version of the theory is considered, it is
apparent that many of the above criticisms could also apply to it.
To the extent that the Piagetian account of development can be reduced
to a set of achievements at certain ages, it clearly resembles the
'milestone' approach of psychometrics. This problem arises, for
example, with the scales derived by Uzgiris & Hunt (1970). Here,
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sequences of criterial achievement in six areas of cognitive
development are presented. The instrument is intended to be used
for assessing cognitive status in infants in the context of research,
e.g. for the purposes of comparing the effects of different
caretaking environments (Paraskevopoulos & Hunt 1971). It is not
intended as an absolute measure of level of cognitive development
(Uzgiris, pers. comm. 1977). However, it is being seen as an
operationalised form of the Piagetian theory, and as essentially
equivalent to it (e.g. Cicchetti & Sroufe 1976). It was pointed
out above that Piaget's major impetus for investigating the cognitive
structure of children was his conviction that mere passes and fails
on a test gave very little information about the child. It is perhaps
unfortunate that an instrument using precisely this method is now
being seen as encapsulating the Piagetian approach.
It is from the structural aspects of the Piagetian tradition
that the way of avoiding the problems of the 'milestone' approach must
come. Piaget's (1933, 1955) accounts describe not only criterial
successes or achievements but also errors characteristic of specific
stages. The concept of 'stage' fundamentally insists that successes
or errors (as judged by the adult) result from the operation of
identical processes in the child. Thus there are coherent laws
describing behaviour in a wide range of situations at any one time.
The categorisation of the child's behaviour into 'passes' or 'fails'
is a secondary procedure.
If the Piagetian account is reduced to a set of criterial
achievements, then, it is vulnerable in the same fashion as is the
psychometric version of the theory. If, that is, the 'stages' are
- 29 -
reduced to 'sequences', what has been produced is a more refined
psychometric instrument, rather than one appropriate to cognitive
development. Instead it is necessary to consider behaviour in
problem situations in greater detail. Piaget makes very clear
statements of the characteristic errors associated with the stages
of sensorimotor development. These have been clearly summarised
(and further interpreted) by Bower (l97ka, pp.181-5). Thus, far
the strongest version of the Piagetian theory of slow development to
be correct, characteristic errors should be found in the mentally
handicapped infant associated with his current status in terms of
achievement. Since such evidence is largely independent of the
primary data - of slow achievement - its demonstration would give
substantial support to the theory.
It may be concluded that to the extent that 'slow development' is
expressed solely in terms of age-related achievement it has little
explanatory power. However, an 'enrichment' of the theory is possible
within the Piagetian framework, by means of which the theory might be
made more productive. In general, little progress can be made while
account is only given of 'quantitative' differences, that is to say
those differences which take the form of delays. For theoretical
purposes, it is necessary to incorporate other kinds of difference,
which may be termed 'qualitative differences'. The following section
will present the argument that, in terms of empirical evidence, such
'qualitative' differences must be considered fundamental.
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2.5 The Theory of 'Slow Development1
(ii) Empirical Considerations
Many attempts have been made to discern qualitative differences
between the mentally handicapped and the normal population. Here
a brief summary of some general results will be given. Following
this, research specifically with Down's Syndrome in childhood will
be considered in greater detail.
Classic accounts of mental handicap postulated such qualitative
differences as the slow conductivity of neural tissue (e.g. Benda 1969).
Specific anatomical differences in brain tissue have been found (see
Crome fie Stern 1972). For example, the reduced weight of the cerebellum
in DS has been related to such behavioural features as deficient fine
motor control (Frith fit Frith 197k).
Mfore recent work has considered the differences in the course of
learning in the mentally handicapped. As previously noted, Zeaman fit
House (1963) found that performance on a two-choice discrimination
problem could be described in terms of two components: the subject's
identification of the correct dimension of difference of stimuli, and
the subsequent learning of the appropriate discrimination on that
dimension. It was only on the first of these components that the
performance of the mentally handicapped was inferior to their peers.
Other work concerned with learning has expressed its results in
more general terms. Qualitative differences have been described in
terms such as a deficiency of spontaneous learning (Denny 196k) and
the need for deliberate structuring of the learning task by the
experimenter or caretaker (Clarke fit Clarke 197k).
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Such an emphasis is paralleled by the results of research
into short-term memory in the retarded subject. It has been
suggested (Belmont & Butterfield 1969) that observed deficiencies
in performance should be attributed to acquisition processes. It
is argued that the acquisition strategies employed by the retarded
subjects, in a memory task, are less efficient than those employed
by the normal subject.
Perhaps the strongest evidence against the single 'slow
development' theoiy is the demonstration of qualitative differences
between different populations of the mentally handicapped. If DS
children can be differentiated on behavioural criteria from other
mentally handicapped children of equivalent measured Mental Age, then
the purely quantitative account of the handicap cannot be adequate.
O'Connor & Hermelin (1961) presented evidence that such
differentiation could indeed be made. They found that when compared
to other mentally handicapped subjects of the same chronological age
and equivalent measured MA, the IS subjects demonstrated inferior
performance in a stereognostic (haptic) recognition task. The
relevance of such findings to cognitive development is not yet clear;
however they suggest that, at the least, there might be qualitative
differences in processes mediating performance on cognitive tasks.
It begins to appear unlikely, then, that the patterns of performance
on cognitive tasks will be accounted for by a 'slow development'
theory alone.
Certain studies will now be considered which are concerned
specifically with DS infants. It will be argued that the findings
support the contention that 'qualitative' differences in behaviour
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are of more central importance than 'quantitative' ones (i.e.
delays).
Serafica & Cicchetti (1976) studied the attachment behaviour
of 2\ year old DS infants. The procedure used was a standardised
one, in which the infant was introduced to a strange room with his
mother, who then left the child alone and subsequently re-appeared.
It was shown that, compared to age-matched controls, the DS infants
exhibited less distress at the mother's absence, and less positive
attachment behaviour at her re-appearance. Thus they appeared to
be manifesting lower levels of attachment behaviour (although of an
appropriate kind). The authors argued that the DS infants were not
acting like younger, normal infants (as a purely quantitative theory
would predict). The behavioural responses which the normal controls
made (e.g. locomotion to mother at her re-appearance) were within
the DS infants' repertoires. They were not however deployed in this
context. It is, perhaps, not possible to distinguish between
'strength of attachment' and 'intensity of manifestation of attachment'
within this paradigm. The exact locus of the difference cannot
therefore be identified. However the qualitative nature of this
difference is clear.
Qualitative differences in attachment behaviour have also been
established for the nature of crying. Freudenberg et al. (1978)
showed that the cry of the young DS infant can readily be discriminated
from that of the normal infant. The cry of the DS infant is perceived
as of less intensity, and thereby less demanding of the caretaker's
attention, than that of the normal infant. The findings of Jones
(1977), relating to the nature of pre-verbal communication in the
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mother-infant dyad, may also be seen to have relevance to
attachment. Jones (1977) found that there was less eye-contact
for the mother-PS infant pair than for the mother-normal infant
pair. In general, much less sophisticated communication skills
(such as turn-taking) were exhibited by the mother-I)S infant dyad.
The relationship between such communicational differences and those
related to affective behaviour is unknown. Either might, perhaps,
be posited as an antecedent of the other.
Cicchetti & Sroufe (1976) studied the development of smiling and
laughing (to a variety of stimuli) in seven DS infants. The authors
present data on infants' responses to each stimulus at each month of
age, from U — 18 months. The stimuli were divided into four
categories: auditory, tactile, social and visual. It was found
that DS infants were less likely to laugh at items eliciting laughter
in the normal infant, but would rather smile. Further, the likelihood
of a positive response to an item was always at least four times as
great for the normal infant, across the age-range. Against this
background of population differences, seme communality in
developmental pattern was found. The order in which different items
were first responded to in a positive fashion was, broadly, the same
for the two populations. In this respect, findings were analogous to
those resulting from the Piagetian approach (above 2.3). There, the
order of emergence of 'stages' was found to be similar between DS and
normal children. Thus, when development is defined in terms of age-
related achievement, it is found to be broadly similar across the two
populations. More precise investigation makes it possible to reveal
differences.
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Smiling in infancy has been taken as a manifestation of
cognitive processes (Watson 1972; Bower 1977b) as well as of
affective states. The convergence of findings concerned with
smiling, and those concerned with cognitive development as such,
must be seen as giving rise to a general conclusion. The
empirical justification for a theory of 'slow development' needs
to be much stronger than is the present evidence. Similarity
across populations in terms of gross aspects of development is not
an adequate demonstration. The fact that closer investigation
tends to find population differences must be seen as a challenge to
the theory. It would appear, then, that on empirical as well as
theoretical grounds a theory of 'slow development' is not adequate
to account for the effects of mental handicap in the DS infant.
3. Conclusions : Aims of the Study
It has been shown above that a 'slow development' theory of
cognitive development in the BS infant needs to be expressed in a •
finely detailed way to avoid circularity. Such fine detail is
available only within the Piagetian version of the theory. In the
psychometric version of the theory the account of development is
expressed in terms of sequences of criterial behaviour - i.e. of
•milestones'. Such an account - whether it be of motor, 'mental',
or cognitive development - can only be a description of the observed
phenomena of development at a certain level of analysis. It can,
therefore, describe only the effects, and not the causes, of deviance
in development.
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Complementary to the more positive nature of the Piagetian
account - in avoiding problems of circularity - is the necessity
for appropriately stronger evidence to support it. Thus the
demonstration of slow emergence of 'cognitive milestones' would not
be sufficient proof of the Piagetian position. It would merely
justify the descriptive use of the term 'slow'. If, however, in
addition, it could be shown that the context of such 'milestones'
is equivalent in the DS and the normal infant, then the strong and
non-trivial Piagetian position would be given support. A first
example of such equivalence of 'context' would be the same
association of criterial successes with characteristic errors as Is
the case with the normal infant. A second would be the demonstration
of equivalent 'representativeness' of the criterial passes for the DS
as for the normal infant, in the sense that specific criterial
behaviours, once observed to have emerged, would remain in the
behavioural repertoire. In general, there are a number of
qualitative aspects of behaviour on cognitive tasks which must be
shown not to differ between the DS and the normal in order for the
Piagetian version of the 'slow development' theory to be
substantiated. If the two populations are in fact equivalent in
these terms then the age of emergence of a sequence of achievements
can indeed be taken as an accurate index of cognitive development.
As was made clear above, there are reasons for doubting that the
two populations are equivalent on the qualitative aspects of behaviour
under consideration. If these doubts are substantiated, then it
would not be possible to accept the Piagetian version of the theory as
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anything more than a broad description of the phenomenal aspects
of deviant development. However, because of the detailed nature
of the Piagetian approach, it would be possible to proceed beyond
such a position. The empirical and conceptual richness of the
Piagetian account would enable further investigation of the obtained
qualitative differences to be carried out. A positive step would
then have been made.
Before giving an outline of experimental aims, consideration
should be given to the kind of theory which might replace 'slow
development' as an explanation of mental handicap in the infant.
Mention has been made (p. 26 ) of one approach to the problem of
mental handicap - that of Zigler (1969, 1973) which, it was argued,
shared the inadequacies of any 'slow development' theory. Zigler's
'developmental' theory is explicitly opposed to the more classical
'deficit' theories of mental handicap. These latter approaches
emphasised absolute differences between the handicapped and the normal
populations, frequently postulating neurological defects as their
basis (e.g. Benda 1969). Such approaches have no place for
developmental findings. The affected individual is, quite simply,
•defective', and the defect is seen to operate in a constant and
relatively straightforward manner throughout the life-span.
It would certainly be inaccurate to claim that present-day
'difference' theorists retain such a rigid approach (see Ellis 1969).
It is recognised that differences are complex, and require explanation
in precise behavioural terms. However, with respect to the developing
handicapped child the polarity between 'developmental' and 'difference'
theories remains. The conceptual inadequacies of the former have been
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outlined in this Introduction. It has been argued that
differences in development must have a place in an adequate
theory. The insights of modern developmental psychology must,
however, make an equal contribution. Population differences
must be expressed within the context of the cognitive development
of the infant and child. Behavioural outcome must be seen as
resulting from an interaction between the handicap and the common
processes underlying development. Within such a theoretical
approach - which might be termed a 'developmental difference'
theory - both similarities and differences in development would
have a place. It was hoped that the investigation of cognitive
development in the DS infant, to be undertaken in this thesis,
would make a contribution to such a theory.
On the basis of the above considerations, then, it was decided
to study the cognitive development of the infant with DS, with
specific reference to 'object permanence', in comparison with that
of the normal infant. This study was to be carried out, at least
partly, an a longitudinal basis. Analysis of performance was to
take account not only of criterial success on the tasks used for
assessment, but also the distribution and nature of failure. If
analysis were to reveal differences between the two populations, an
attempt would be made to investigate such differences further.
Before commencing this investigation, certain preliminary
experimentation with both populations was considered to be necessary.
This work is presented first, in the chapters which follow.
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CHAPTER II : PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTATION WITH DS INFANTS
(Experiment l)
1. Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, it was anticipated that
qualitative differences in behaviour might well be encountered
between the DS and the normal infant, in the context of cognitive
development. Before undertaking a large-scale study of DS infants,
therefore, it was decided to perform some initial, exploratory work
with one or two DS infants. It was hoped that such work would make
clear seme of the qualitative features of behaviour to which attention
would have to be given in subsequent work. It was also considered
possible that some initial data might be obtained which would address
itself to the evaluation of the Piagetian version of the 'slow
development' theory.
2. Subjects
Contact was made with the Welfare Officer of the Edinburgh branch
of the Scottish Society for the Mentally Handicapped. The mothers of
two young children with Down's Syndrome expressed willingness to make
a visit to the laboratory with their child.
Both children were boyss (aged 2 years 5 months) and S^
(aged 3 years 3 months). Neither child had secondary or associated
physical handicaps. S2 could not strictly be described as an infant,
in view of his age and his possession of a few words. However, a
review of the literature (Chapter 1) had suggested that DS children of
up to school-age might well be found to function within, and not beyond,
the sensorimotor period as defined by Piaget. The selection of these
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two children as subjects therefore seemed satisfactory.
3. Procedure
A description of apparatus and materials will be given first.
Then a description will be given of a selection of tasks designed to
make possible the assessment of the infant's performance in terms of
the Piagetian account. Both these sections are of general relevance
to the experimentation presented subsequently.
3»1 Apparatus and Materials
The child sat on his mother's knees at a table, overall
dimensions 87 cm. x 60 cm., from which a semicircle (radius 19 cm.)
had been removed on one side. The child was thus able to sit with
the tabletop surface to his left and right, as well as in front of
him. The tabletop was made of non-reflective matt chipboard.
Occluders consisted of white cardboard cups, height 8.0 cm. and
white cardboard screens, size 12.0 cm. x 10.5 cm. which were kept
upright by a ledge, folded back at the base, of width 2.5 cm.
Objects used were small, brightly coloured toys.
3.2 Standard Tasks
A summary of the behaviour patterns characteristic of Piaget's
six stages for the development of the 'Object Concept' was given above
(p. 7 ). Here standard tasks relating to these different stages will
be described. More complete procedural descriptions are given below
(Chapter III : 2) when the first large-scale study is presented.
Discussion will also be made below of various aspects of the tasks, in
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view of experimental findings. This set should be seen as an
operational form of the sequence described by Piaget (above, p.7).
The Piagetian stage appropriate to success in each task is given in
brackets.
1. Retrieval of object partially concealed by occluder (III)
2. Retrieval of object totally concealed by occluder (IV)
3. Retrieval of object from total occlusion at two
different locations ('A' and 'B') in the order AAB (V)
lw Retrieval of object from one of two identical occluders
following transposition of the two occluders (the
•Switching' task developed by Aronson and by McGoniglej
equivalent to VI)
£. Retrieval of object from total occlusion following non-
visible displacement. This displacement is carried out
by concealment of the object in a second occluder (e.g.
an inverted cup) which deposits the object behind the
first occluder and is returned empty. Its emptiness
prompts the infant's search which, if successful, is
argued to have involved a kind of 'deduction' (VI)
Several points should be noted concerning these tasks. Forms of
error response may be described which would be as infomative as the
success patterns given here. For Task 3» the search pattern of AAA
to the concealment pattern AAB is referred to as a 'KLace Error' (see
Bower 197k, p.l83). For Task U, consistent search for the object at
its location of concealment - without transposition being taken into
account - might be predicted for an infant in 'Stage V' (see below,
Chapter VI U.2.2).
3.3 Presentation
The four tasks indicated by 2 - *5 above were presented to both
infants. Tasks 2 and 3 were presented twice each, with both cups
and screens used as occluders. Task 1 was not presented since it was
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considered that, for the purposes of this pilot study, the results
of Task 2 could be taken to cover the problem represented by Task 1.
Retrials were given for loss of attention to the tasks. The tasks
were presented in the order given above (i.e. in order of assumed
increasing difficulty).
1*. Results
Results on the tasks are presented first (Table 1). Sorne
qualitative features of the infants' behaviour - against which
background the results must be seen - are discussed next.
TABLE 1 Results (Experiment l)
Task (see text) Trial/s S1 S2
2 (a) cup 1 pass pass
(b) screen 1 pass pass
3 (a) cups AA pass pass
(b)
B no response error
screens AA pass pass
B pass pass
k 1 error pass
2 (emitted) pass
5 1 no response pass
2 no response pass
3 pass (omitted)
Notes 'error' indicates search at incorrect occluder
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Results are presented in a 'raw' form. Little data reduction
or analysis can be performed on such raw data due to the small
number of subjects and of trials and the absence of normal controls.
However, certain features should be noted. Both and passed
the AAB task once with screens as occludersj both failed the
formally equivalent task with cups as occluders (S^ with the
characteristic 'place error'). At first glance, a direct
assignation to a 'stage1 would seem to present difficulties. Further,
passed two trials of Task ii after both a pass and an error on
Task 3. Again, a simple stage model would not predict such response
patterns.
The results of Task 5 confuse the picture further. gave one
correct response out of three, having committed an error on Task U.
S2 gave two correct responses out of twoj making even more difficult
the interpretation of his error on Task 3. (it should be re-
emphasised that this error was indeed a positive response - not a
failure to respond).
Clearly this data can only be taken as suggestive. It might
suggest, however, that the kind of cohesiveness in response assumed by
a 'stage' analysis is not in fact characteristic of the DS infant.
In this case, the assignment of infants to 'stages' on the basis of
their pattern of results might be problematical. Such assignment -
or 'diagnosis' in Piagetian terminology - would not then give an
adequate representation of the infant's behaviour. As was noted above
(p. 29) such factors would seriously challenge the adequacy of the
Piagetian version of the 'slow development' theory.
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The apparent lack of coherence in response was accompanied by further
striking features of behaviour. Considerable encouragement ins required
to elicit responses from the PS infants. Numerous retrials wore required
due to loss of attention durinr a trial. As may be seen from Table 1,
it was not found nossible in the 20-n.inute neriod to administer the full
number of trials. This wis not due to individual responses being; slow.
It imn found difficult to maintain the subject's interest in ft task over trials.
In general then, impressions pained from the administration of the
tasks complemented the tentative interpretation of the results, father
than the behaviour and performance of the DC infanta resembling that pre¬
dicted of normal infants (irrespective of absolute level of achievement)
there would seen to he qualitative differences. Such differences would
operate at a level of analysis prior to the assignment of infants to a
•stage*, and might therefore render such a nroceduro Inappropriate.
5, Discussion
The aim of this initial study was to establish whether it was reas¬
onable to predict qualitative differences in the performance of the DC
infant on cognitive—developmental tasks, in comparison with the normal
infant. In this study, as in much that follows, results were obtained
in the form of a mss or fail on a given task. It has been noted above
(n. 4) that, since Dinqet, such data cannot be considered completely
satisfactory. It was hoped that this methodology would be of sufficient
precision to reveal certain differences between J)S and normal infants.
If possible, further comparison would take account of surah features as
the nature and distribution of errors. It would seem that qualitative
differences are indeed to bo observed. Two areas of behaviour are
highlighted. First is the child's general orientation to the situation,
and his degree of attention and interest in the tasks. Such features are.
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though difficult to measure, of great significance when interpreting
the results of experimentation. They must also be taken into
account in designing appropriate experimentation. In particular,
any apparent difficulty in maintaining attention in the tasks must
demand flexibility in presentation on the part of the experimenter.
Further it is unlikely that long sequences of identical trials could
be presented to the infant within a practicable length of time.
These factors will be discussed further below (Chapter IV) in
describing the design of more extensive experimentation with DS infants.
The second area of behaviour is the pattern of responses elicited
from the infant, irrespective of the procedural difficulties in such
elicitation. It was argued that an evaluation of Piagetian
predictions for the development of the DS infant must be made on the
basis not of single results alone - i.e. of achievements - but on the
basis of the constellation of results on different tasks. If the
overall pattern of responses of the DS infant differed from that of the
normal infant, then an interpretation of a DS child's performance as
'equivalent' to that of a normal child at a certain younger age could
not be adequate. 'Slow development' could not then be a tenable theory
within the Piagetian framework; instead more detailed investigation of
the differences in performance would be required. The results
reported for this initial study suggest that there may indeed be major
deviations from the kinds of pattern predicted for the normal infant.
In view of this, it was decided that further investigation was justified.
- -
CHAPTER ITT ; FR*T,IHHPRY EXPERIMENTATION WTTH NORMAL INFANTS
(Experiment 2)
1. Introduction
1.1 Alms of the Experiment
The preliminary work with two DS infants suggested that certain
features of their cognitive development might well differ from the
normal case. It was decided that the findings justified further
investigation of these differences.
Before beginning a large-scale investigation of DS infants,
however, it was decided to conduct a further preliminary study, but
with normal infants. As will be explained below, certain aspects of
the design of the DS study - chiefly methodological ones - demanded
some prior investigation. First, the preliminary work had made it
clear that presentation of tasks to a DS subject would have to be
flexible. It might not be possible to follow a standard order of
presentation, without leading to attrition of responses. Usually, a
set of cognitive-developmental tasks is presented in increasing order
of difficulty (a practice derived from the psychometric tradition).
It might instead be necessary to deviate from this order. Certain
methodological problems arise from this, which are discussed below,
<
and some investigation of this feature was considered necessary.
Second, it was decided to test out the specific tasks which were
intended to be used subsequently with the DS infants. As will be
discussed below, several of these were variations on standard items, on
which normative data was not available. Further it was not known to
what extent these items formed an ordinal set, on which a developmental
pattern could be observed.
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Third, it was considered that autonomic responses mirfot usefully
be taken simultaneously with behavioural responses in the object perm¬
anence tasks. This procedure mirtht make it possible to disambiguate
behavioural responses. For example, behavioural inactivity miyht be
accompanied by autonomic indications of startle. The subject ni- jit
then be said to be surprised at some aspect of the presentation (such as
the non-appearance of an object where expected). As described below
(p, 50) the recording of heartrate has been employed for the purposes of
recording autonomic responses simultaneously with behavioural observ¬
ation, Such a procedure presents certain practical and methodological
problems. It was considered that a decision on its adoption for DS
infants should only be made after investigation with normal infants.
For these reasons, a short study with normal infants was designed,
1,2 Ordinality of Items assessing Object Permanence
As noted above, the first aim of the study was to assess the effect
of non-standard orders of presentation of items. The question of ord¬
inality in the sequences described for cognitive development is an imp¬
ortant one, Piamet (1972,p. 50) defines 'cons-tent order of succession*
as an essential characteristic of a step© sequence (that it in not a
sufficient condition for a stay© analysis has been noted above,p,20),
Several statistical techniques are available for the assessment of
ordinality. Most commonly used (e,y, by IJzyiris A Hunt 1975) is a ver¬
sion of Guttman'ss Scaloyram Analysis developed by Green (1955), This
technique takes the binary results of a number of subjects on a number
of items, and, havin.r established the overall order of difficulty of
tee itens, finds how completely this pattern accounts for responses.
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Thus if the order of difficulty is the same across all subjects,
then any subject's complete response profile may be obtained merely
from knowing the first item that was too difficult for that subject.
He would have passed all the easier items, and failed all the more
difficult ones. To the extent that the 'reproducibility' of the
data cannot be performed perfectly in this manner, perfect ordinality
has been departed from. Significance of the reproducibility of a
given order is ascertained by comparison with 'chance' reproducibility
of results (given the total passes for each item, but not the
association within subjects).
The application of this technique to developmental data presents
certain theoretical problems. If all subjects receive all items,
then a legitimate assessment of order of difficulty for those items
can be obtained. It should however be pointed out that such an order
cannot be identified with an order of emergence in a single infant
(although it may well be, in fact, the same). With a cross-sectional
sample at different ages it may perhaps be taken as a good
approximation of an order of emergence. The special nature of the
age variable in developmental research, emphasised by Wohlwill (1973)
must not be lost sight of. It cannot be assumed that for one item
to be 'harder' than others necessarily implies that its spontaneous
emergence will take place later.
Scalogram Analysis proceeds by assuming an overall sequence of
items, and assessing its power in terms of observed deviations from it.
An alternative approach is to build up a sequence from the relationships
between pairs of items. Such a procedure avoids the vulnerability of
Scalogram Analysis to inaccuracy with small numbers of items where the
- U8 -
reproducibility due to chance is often extremely high. Such a
small number of items is often unavoidable when testing infants
(since all responses are required within a single session).
Bart & Krus (1973) have described an extension of Guttman's
Scalogram Analysis which establishes scalability between pairs of
items rather than for the whole set of items at once. They point
out that the relationship between a pair of items, such that Item J
is never passed unless Item I is passed, may be interpreted as 'I is
prerequisite for J'. This type of relationship is of considerable
theoretical importance to the study of cognitive development (Flavell
& Wohlwill 1969).
Bart & Airasian (197k) have described the application of this
analysis to a set of items derived from Piagetian theory. They point
out that Scalogram Analysis is limited to the identification of
•linear hierarchies', in which items represent distinct points along
a single dimension. More complex relationships between items will
not be uncovered. With an Ordering Theory analysis, however, a
picture of the structure of the whole set of items is built up from
the relationships between pairs of items, and thus a more complete
description is possible.
For each pair of items, the number of subjects who responded
differentially to them is noted (divided into two cells according to
the direction of difference). If the values are markedly different,
e.g. many (l+, J-), few (I-, J+), then a prerequisite relationship
may be posited between the two items. The significance of such a
result may be assessed by calculating the lcwer of the two values (that
disconfirming the relationship in the posited direction) as a percentage
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of the number of subjects. Bart & Aurasian (197k) suggest a
value of 5$ as the criterion for significance.
Significant directional relationships may be plotted on a 'tree'
diagram. Where relationships between items are not significant in
either direction, the items are regarded as equivalent. To the
extent that relationships are congruent, a single 'tree' structure
showing the relationships amongst items may be constructed. In such
a structure, 'prerequisite' relationships will be transitive. Thus
(if this relationship is indicated by *), for I*J and J*K, it can be
asserted that I*K.
The most rigorous investigations of the ordinality of items in
the development of the Object Concept have been those of Miller et al.
(1970) and Kramer et al. (1975). The earlier stucty- selected 15 items
from the Object Permanence scale of Uzgiris & Hunt (I975)and
presented three groups of 8 items each (the first, middle and last 8)
to infants between 6-18 months. Miller et al. studied the degree
of ordinality obtaining within the set, both when presented in the
expected order of difficulty and when presented in a random order.
The latter condition is of interest since 'developmental' tests are
usually presented in 'developmental' order, and it might be argued
that high ordinality may be artificially enhanced by fatigue and lack
of interest during the presentation of later items.
Miller et al. found minimal evidence for ordinality in the 15 items
in either condition. The authors, however, noted that the results may
have been influenced by such factors as the specific selection of items
and their division into sets of 8 across different groups of subjects.
Kramer et al. (1975) improved the design by reducing the number of items
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to six, and presenting each to each subject. Presentation order
was balanced by means of a Latin Square design. No subject,
however, received items in the order of predicted difficulty. In
addition, a longitudinal component was included in the design.
With these modifications, high ordinality for the six items was
obtained across subjects.
It was decided to use a similar design to these studies in order
to investigate a slightly different set of tasks. The nature of the
items will be described below, and comparison with those of the
previous studies will be made as appropriate. In general, the items
were those which were hoped to be used in further work. In view of
the considerations expressed above concerning the constraints on the
design of items for a scaling analysis, certain modifications of the
items were made to increase the uniformity of situations and materials
across items. This will be made clear when the specific items are
discussed.
1*3 The Use of Heartrate Change as a Dependent Measure
The possibility of using autonomic responses as an objective
measure of behavioural change has always been an attractive one.
Cardiac changes have long been implicated in psychological states such
as startle and orientation. Classically, heartrate deceleration (HRP)
has been associated with the 'intake' of information, and heartrate
acceleration (HRA) with the 'rejection' of input. In relation to
Sokolov's analysis of autonomic function, the two types of changes have
been associated with the 'Orientation Reaction' and the 'Defence
Reaction' respectively (Graham & Clifton 1966). If the binary response
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is a reliable one, with respect to known environmental features,
then recording of heartrate would seem to offer a dependent measure
of great value to the study of infancy, with its relative paucity
of response modalities.
The kinds of cardiac change observed in neonates have so far
been exclusively HRAs (Graham & Jackson 1970). However, during the
first half-year HRDs begin to be observed, even substituting for
previous HRAs in identical situations in the neonate (Graham & Jackson
1970). For example, 6-month old infants respond with HRDs of 3 - 9
beats/min (bpm) to the onset of visual or auditory stimuli (Lewis &
Spaulding 1967), a response interpreted as 'orientation'.
Investigation of the HRP response in infants has been carried out by
Lewis (1975) who has traced developmental changes in the response to
onset and offset of presented stimuli. Despite noting the kinds of
event which might induce HRA (such as startle), Lewis offers no data
on this kind of response.
The importance of 'surprise' as a behavioural response has been
emphasised (Charlesworth 1969), and the apparent relationship between
'surprise' and 'startle' would seem to suggest the use of cardiac
response within the study °f cognitive development. This has been
done successfully by Bower (1971). In this study, as in those
interested in HRD, the infant was relatively passive while various
displays were presented. The possibility of using heartrate response
as a measure when the infant is active - as in a standardised testing
of Object Permanence - remains open. The effect of ongoing motor
activity on cardiac responses is not clear (Graham & Jackson 1970).
As these authors note, most experimentation has been carried out on
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•drowsy subjects'. However, in view of the importance of
judgements of surprise in the analysis of results of object-
permanence tasks, the possibility of using HRA as an objective
measure would seem to be worth investigating. This study was also
designed, then, to offer some tentative evidence on this possibility.
2. Items Selected for Presentation
As will be noted, the set of items was broadly similar to that
used in Experiment 1 (see p. lj.0 ). Where new items are introduced
or changes in presentation made, appropriate discussion is given.
For each item an operational description of procedure is given. In
this description, 'A', 'B1 refer to different positions without
specifying absolute location. 'L', *R• refer to locations (or
directions) to the infant's left and right, respectively. Where a
set of presentations is separated by '&', both were given in a random
order. The random choice between two orders is indicated by
•0' refers to the object used, *S' to the subject and 'E' to the
experimenter.
Item 1: The 'AAB' task described above (p. UO ) is concerned with the
infant's response to an object's being hidden in a new
location, after having been successfully retrieved from an
old one. The first two trials may be seen as tests of
Piaget's Stage IV of object construction (see p. 7 ), in
which a single location is used for concealment.
0 was moved by E, in full view of S, from the midline
position to a location behind one of two vertical screens where
it was left hidden for S to retrieve. Presentation : RRL.& LIE.
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Item 2i It was found by Miller et al. (1970) that the retrieval
of an object after a continuous sequence of visible
displacements was at a higher level of difficulty than
retrieval following a single non-visible displacement.
This finding contradicted the results of Piaget (1955).
It was decided to test this by employing a similar task
to that used by Miller et al.
0 was moved by F from a position to one side of S along a
path behind the first of two separate vertical screens,
appearing between them, and being left concealed behind the
second. Presentation ! 0 starting from RLLR/LKRL.
Item 3? The 'Switching' task in which two inverted cups (one of which
contains the object) are transposed, was described above (p. Ud).
In order to make the materials more consistent across tasks,
however, screens were used instead of cups, as occluders.
The ledge which supported the screen in an upright position
served also to carry the object, whoa the position of the
screens was transposed.
0 was placed on the supporting ledge of one screen and the two
screens transposed by F. Presentation : 0 starting from
RLLR/IRRL.
Item 1+; The 'deduction' task described above (p. liO ) was included,
using the same materials of an inverted cup and two screens
behind which objects were transported while inside the cup.
0 was placed in front of S, and an inverted cup placed over it.
I^r moving the cup, F deposited 0 behind one of two vertical
screens, and returned the cup to a position in front of S.
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It was then shown, empty, to S. Presentation : 0
deposited to LLR & RRL.
Item g: This item was designed following some observations of
Watson (pers.comm., 1976). He noted that, in certain
tasks concerning the use of 'deduction' infants'
interpretation of the picking up of an object by a
container during its trajectory (from a location behind a
screen) seemed to be such that the 'capture' was seen as
obligators'-, rather than optional. Further, it seemed
that 'capture' was predicted even when physically
impossible, for example when the moving container was
meraLy placed in contact with that containing the
stationary object. If such notions of 'obligatory
capture by contact' are indeed operative, then the
performance of the infant in a standard 'deduction' task
(such as Item h above) might well conceal important
deficiencies in understanding. Item $ was therefore
designed to test 'obligatory capture by contact'.
0 was placed behind a vertical screen in front of the
infant. An inverted cup was thai moved across from one
side. On two occasions it picked up 0 and was moved
further across and left at the new location. On the
third occasion, the cup was moved across to a position in
front of the screen. After a pause of 1 sec. the
trajectory was continued as on earlier steps. This
third step was therefore a 'catch'. Presentation s cup
starting RHR & ILL.
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General As can be seen from the descriptions of the items, the
materials and procedure were standardised as much as
possible, especially for Items 1 - It. Each of these
items includes the movement of the object (either visibly
or invisibly) and the use of similar occluders, namely
the vertical screens. The items are numbered in the
assumed order of difficulty} there is, however, little
evidence for the relative ranking of Items 3 and It, and
Item 5 is placed last because if the effect tested is




Subjects were 26 normal infants, 2 of each month of age from
6-18 months inclusive. These subjects were drawn frcm a pool
consisting of infants whose parents had expressed willingness for them
to participate in research studies. Some degree of selection must
operate on this pool, and the infants probably constitute a sample of
above average measured intelligence (as assessed at pre-school age}
see Wishart 1979). However, such deviation from representativeness of
the normal population was not considered significant.
3.2 Method
First the device for continuously recording S's heartrate was
set up. Two electrodes were applied to S, cne on the sternum and one
on the left side of the abdomen. These were connected to a transmitter
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taped down to S's chest. The signal was picked up by an FM
receiver, and recorded on tape. This apparatus eliminated the need
for leads connecting S to recording equipment, thus allowing greater
freedom of movement.
S was then seated on his mother's knees at a table as described
above (p. 39). The entire session was videotaped for subsequent
analysis.
The series of items was presented to S. For each pair of Ss in
a month of age, one was assigned to the 'Ordered' (0) and one to the
'Balanced' (B) condition. Ss in 0 were presented the items in the
order 1-5. For B, the order of items was balanced as follows!
2k orders were obtained, with Items 1 - U in all combinations, and
Item 5 distributed equally at all locations. 12 of these were
selected at random for B Ss.
Retrials were given if there was loss of attention on the part of
S. For each trial, S was allowed 10 sees, in which to make his
response.
3.3 Materials
Materials were identical to those described above (p. 39).
3.k Scoring
Criterial response for each trial was the direct retrieval of the
object by S, by removal of the appropriate occluder, within 10 seconds.
Data was reduced as follows for the purposes of analyses of
ordinality. A '+' score was given for an item if all trials were
passed. Otherwise, a '-' score was given. Such a binary score is
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necessary for these forms of analysis. Raw data (individual
responses for each trial) were retained for the purpose of further
analysis.
It. Results and 'Discussion
Since there were several distinct issues with which the
experiment was concerned, results and discussion will be presented
together for each issue. Following this, a general discussion will
summarise the overall findings.
li.l Ordinal ity
U.l.l Balanced versus Ordered Presentation
Overall results are presented in Table 2. It can be seen that,
under the Balanced and the Ordered conditions respectively, totals of
ll; and 11 passes were recorded. This difference is not
J)
statistically significant (X - 0.16, df ■ l). It is clearly not the
case that the Balanced presentation leads to a distortion of
performance. In view of this finding, results from subjects in the
two conditions will be pooled for subsequent analysis.
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TABLE 2 Overall Results (Experiment 2)
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item h Item 5 Total
Passes recorded!
Condition 0 7 k 0 0 0 11
Condition B 5 5 1 3 0 lU
Total
(Overall Preference) 12 9 1 3 0 25
Age (months) first
pass recorded 10 10 17 11
iul.2 Ordinality for the Set of Items
As was noted above, there are two available methods for assessing
ordinality - Scalogram Analysis and Ordering Theory Analysis. Both
were carried out. As may be seen from Table 2, the obtained order of
preference of items (in terms of total number of passes across subjects)
was the order 1, 2, h, 3, 5. It was with respect to this order that
Scalogram Analysis was applied. Infants in the age range 6-8 months
inclusive were emitted from the analysis, due to their total set of
scores. Including these results might have spuriously inflated the
value for reproducibility (by increasing sample size without making
possibLe instances of deviation from the tested order).
Reproducibility for this order of items was 0.97. It should be
noted that the reproducibility due to chance is high for small samples.
Green (1956) describes the estimation of significance by calculation of
the parameter 1I* from the values of both reproducibility figures. A
value of I greater than -jy is taken to indicate true ordinality on behalf
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of the items. In the present case, I = 0.58. The order of the
items as 1, 2, U, 3, 5 can therefore be said to accurately represent
the order of difficulty of these items across subjects.
Ordering Theory (Bart & Krus 1973) analyses the relationship
between pairs of items. Results are presented in Figure 1. Here a
single-headed arrow between two items indicates that, within the $%
level of significance, success on the 'origin' item was an operational
prerequisite for success on the 'insertion' item. It will be noted
that Items 1, 2|, 3, 5 form a continuous branch which, due to the
operation of transitivity, may be considered as a single linear
dimension. Clearly this finding corroborates that of the Scalograra
Analysis. However, Items 1 and 2 are found to be equivalent in terms
of prerequisite relationships with each other and the other items.






'prerequisite for' J (at level of significance)
'equivalent to' J (difference N.S. at %% level)
Ke^r:
I—> J : I
I <—> J : I
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4.1.3 Discussion
Both methods of analysis demonstrated that the order of diffi¬
culty of the five items was as originally predicted, 0«e->t that
the order of Tasks 3 and 4 was reverse.-,*. If the fundamental aspect
of Placet's Stage VI (Piaget 1955) is the ability to follow non-visible
displacements of an object, then Item 3 would seem to test this dir¬
ectly, while Iton 4 includes an extra element - the need to moke a
deduction, That the abilities assessed in the 'switching* task are
nrerequisite for deduction tasks has been assumed by Power (1974a,n,213),
A valid finding of a reversal of this ordering would therefore be of
same importance.
However, some of the video records showed clearly that some
infants credited with success on Item 4 had not, in fact, made use of
'deduction* from the erapty cup. Instead, such infants had reached
for the correct screen directly. At most, a glance had been given to
the cun. Ho search (either manual or visual) could be said to have
been made in the empty cum, it could not, therefore, be concluded
that the reach for a screen had been made on the basis of the object
being absent from the cup. Solution of the nroblen had not involved
the us© of deduction. Instead the abilities assessed by Items 1 and
2 would appear to have been adequate.
The fact that some subjects had employed 'deduction', and some
had not, gave rise to a heterogeneity in responses to the task. This
concealed heterogeneity in the responses for Item 4 my well account for
its placement (in the analysis) at a hi'her level of difficulty than 1
and 2. It is clear, however, that the theoretical, account given above,
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concerning the status of the 'deduction' task, is not seriously
challenged by these results.
Item 2 was designed on the basis of the proposal by Miller et
al. (1970) that a sequence of visible displacements would prove more
difficult than a single one (as in Item 1). The support for this
assumption given by the Scalogram Analysis of the whole set of items
must be qualified by considering the results of the analysis of
individual pairs of items. The status of Item 2 in relation to
Items 3, U, and $ is as predicted but no significant relationship can
be found with Item 1. It must therefore be considered to be
equivalent in terms of difficulty. No significant additional skill
appears to be required for its solution. The lower preference
obtained for this item must therefore be attributed to less central
factors. This conclusion agrees with that of Kramer et al. (1975)
in their failure to replicate the findings of Miller et al. (1970)
with respect to sequential visible displacements.
In assigning a predicted status to Item 5> it was argued that
error (the operational anticipation of 'capture by contact') would not
preclude success on the other items (notably Item li) and thus the item
should be placed highest in difficulty. Insofar as the analyses of
ordinality bore out this prediction, this argument can be said to have
been justified. Since this item was original and to some extent
distinct frcm the others, further consideration will be given to the
specific results below. First, however, some general points will be
made with respect to the procedure of the assessment of ordinality.
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In this study an attempt was made to demise a set of items
with as much similarity as possible amongst non-critical features
of presentation. The more it is the case that successive items
on a well-scalable series differ only in one critical feature, the
more justified is the inference of a single underlying dimension (see
Wohlwill 1973). In the present study then, such a conclusion could
be tentatively asserted.
With respect to the relationships between pairs of items, rather
than to the set of items as a whole, similar caveats apply. The
empirical finding that criterial performance on Item I always precedes
criterial performance on Item J cannot be said to prove a 'logical*
relationship between the two. Such an interpretation must be based
on further considerations (mainly of a theoretical nature). However,
it can be said that such evidence is of an essentially correlative
nature, and interpretation in terms of causation can only be tentative.
Such predictions from logical analysis need to be tested empirically
(e.g. by acceleration studies, as noted by Bower 197hb). The results
of 'order theory' analysis must therefore be considered in the same
light as those of the scaling analysis. Good evidence for the orderly
emergence of the behaviour is obtained. Explanation for such a
finding in terms of unitary underlying structure, can, however, only
be tentative.
Finally it should be noted that both of the analyses divided
responses in a binary fashion. Thus infants who made a positive error
of search on an item were grouped together with those who made no
response at all. Clearly this practice reduces the validity of these
kinds of analysis. The theoretical framework from which the items were
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taken typically specifies two kinds of response to an item. One
response characterises success, the other a specific form of
failure. This latter - the 'characteristic error' for the task -
is predicted for the subject not yet 'ready' to solve the task, who
thus applies an inappropriate strategy to it. An example of this
is the Stage IV Flace Error (described above, p. 1*0), in which a
strategy appropriate to previous stages is wrongly applied to a more
difficult task. A strong prediction is being made in such cases,
since the exact nature of both success and failure is being specified.
The crucial step in creating a 'test' is to retain the diagnostic
value of 'errors' and not to rely solely on the diagnostic value of
successes. To do the latter is to assume that any error will be of
the 'characteristic' form. Such an assumption may not be justified.
Validation of a scale of criterial success - i.e. achievement - can
only be considered weak evidence for the structural theory it attests
to test.
h.2 'Capture by Contact'
1*.2.1 Results
No infants passed this item twice out of 2 trials. Adequate
performance on the two preliminary steps of the item did not occur
before 11 months, after which just over half of the trials fulfilled
this condition. In the absence of the correct preliminary behaviour,
behaviour on the third (catch) step could not be unambiguously
interpreted. Only the 'meaningful' trials are considered below.
With the exception of one trial for a 12-month old, errors for
infants of 11 - 1$ months constituted a form of the predicted error,
— 6ii —
in that the cup was picked up after the catch step. However,
such responses were not followed by search of the cup, nor by-
subsequent search behind the screen. Above 15 months of age,
adequate preliminary steps (accounting for 9 out of 16 trials) were
followed on 7 occasions by picking up of the cup. This was
accompanied by such behaviour as visual or manual search of the cup,
'global' search of the surrounding areas, facial indications of
surprise or subsequent search behind the screen to retrieve the
object. Such responses were considered to demonstrate the strong
predicted error, in that behaviour suggested anticipation of the
object's presence in the cup. The other 2 out of the 9 adequate
trials included direct search behind the screen on the catch step,
thus constituting success. There was no clear age trend in the
distribution of these successes and errors.
it.2.2 Discussion
The predicted error was observed in the behaviour of a number of
older infants. With younger infants, where the preliminary steps in
a trial had been responded to adequately, response to the 'catch'
step of this item was frequently similar, in formal terms, to the
prediction. However, other evidence (from subsequent behaviour of
the infant) suggested that the inferences concerning 'understanding'
on the part of the infant - i.e. inferences to structural features of
cognition - would not be justified in these cases. In view of the
'expectancy' which can be assumed to have been induced (by the infant's
©
successfully retrieving the object twice from under the cup) the
response of picking up the cup was not considered adequate evidence
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for the predicted error. This example demonstrates the difficulty
of specifying precise behavioural responses which may then be
unambiguously interpreted in terms of 'cognitive structure'.
It appears from the results that the specific error cannot be
regarded as 'obligatory'. Both trials on which the item was
passed by a specific subject were paired with an error on a second
trial. It would seem more appropriate to interpret the results in
terms of an error which infants (of up to 18 months) may well makes
and thus that, for the infant, the physical conditions of the catch
trial are not sufficient to preclude the possibility of capture.
In other words, evidence has not been obtained that infants (e.g. of
a certain age) necessarily infer capture from physical configurations
in which it is not in fact possible. However, evidence of a slightly
weaker kind has certainly been obtained, to demonstrate that certain
features of a task which physically preclude certain results may not
be taken by the infant to do so. Therefore it would be erroneous
to infer from the successful performance on other tasks that a full
understanding of these features had necessarily been acquired.
Clearly such evidence is relevant to several areas of investigationJ
for example, the question of the infant's understanding of spatial
proximity and contact. More generally, it is of significance for the
ascription of 'understanding' on the evidence of success on specific
tasks. If such a task can be solved adequately, while the infant
simultaneously demonstrates lack of understanding of certain featural
aspects of the task situation, then clearly success cannot be taken
to indicate a global 'understanding' of that task. Correct (criterial)
solution may be possible on the basis of more task-specific information.
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U.3 Heartrate Change
It.3.1 Method of Analysis
It was hoped to obtain complete audio recordings of heartrate
for all the subjects. However, the physical activity of the infant
during the session created unanticipated technical problems with
recording. Transmission of the signal was frequently interrupted,
and interference occurred due to the changes in orientation of the
two electrode leads during motility (since these leads act as an
aerial). A complete analysis of the heartrate changes was not
possible. Sufficiently clear recordings were obtained to enable a
thorough analysis of two infants' records (one younger and one older
infant). Both subjects had been presented with the items in the
standard order ('0'). It was decided to carry out a full analysis
Of these two subjects before making a decision on further analysis.
First the heartrate record was transcribed to paper tape.
Puring this transcription, a manual marker was used to indicate the
location of specific events on the visual record, so that correlation
between the cardiac and behavioural records could subsequently be made.
Having obtained the cardiac trace for the whole session, the information
was converted into a series of instantaneous heartrates. This was
performed using a standard Dracard heartrate converter, which transforms
the linear distance between pairs of peaks into the equivalent
heartrate at that point. Behavioural 'landmarks' were transferred
onto this record of instantaneous heartrate.
There is no single method of transforming a series of heartrates
into 'accelerations' and 'decelerations'. Ruch analysis depends on
specific (quantitative) criteria chosen for such categorisation.
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Several alternatives are noted by Lewis (1975). Such factors
as the interval over which to measure, the location of this
measured segment with respect to the behavioural event of interest
and whether to use a constant time interval or a constant number of
peaks (i.e. beats) to specify the segment must all be taken into
consideration (Lewis 1975).
A common feature of the use of heartrate analysis as a dependent
measure has been the sampling of records on the basis of behavioural
events. Thus the record is examined specifically to see 'what
happened' as a result of the event. Clearly such procedure is open
to problems of control, if interpretation in terms of causality is
made. The kinds of change observed to co-vary with the behavioural
event (e.g. stimulus onset) may also occur in the absence of such
events, or to less specific features of such events. In fact, such
methodological problems are probably not great when the infant is
passive, and stimuli are (for example) being projected onto a screen
in front of him. Heartrate between presentations can be expected
to be reasonably stable, and inspection of the record is probably
adequate to check on this. However, when the infant is physically
active, as in the present study, and where the 'events' of interest
are being sampled from a complex stream of environmental changes, seme
methodological, control would seem to be essential. Further, the
description of clear relationships between kinds of environmental or
behavioural event, and kinds of cardiac activity, would by this means
be set on a more solid base.
Therefore, it was decided to perform an analysis of the heartrate
record which accessed all examples of specific kinds of change during
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the session. Within the limitation of the definition of what
would constitute a significant change, this procedure would give
rise to an independent list of the significant HRAs and HRBs.
This list could then be compared with the behavioural record to
enable controlled correlations to be made.
A program was written in PSYFOC (a version of FOCAL) for
operation by a Linc-8 computer. The input to the program was the
series of figures representing instantaneous heartrate. For each
consecutive set of 2n values (where n could be set by on-line input)
the program accessed those sets in which the difference between the
mean of values 1 to n, and the mean of values (n +1) to 2n was
greater than 5 bpm. Thus the program isolated points (specific
beats) around which a significant change of rate occurred. The
program printed out the whole set of figures concerned, together
with an index number to locate the set in the whole series, and gave
the exact value of the difference between means. The values of n
chosen were n = 2 and n = 3. Thus the program obtained and listed,
separately, those consecutive sets of It and 6 points in which the
first and second halves of the set differed significantly in mean
value. These specific values were selected after consideration of
the criteria! differences applied in other studies (e.g. Lewis 1975).
it.3.2 Results
Analysis was carried out on the records of two infants aged 7
months (S^) and lit months (Sg). Here a summary of obtained heartrate
changes will be presented. Next the manner in which behavioural and
stimulus events were categorised will be described. Correlations
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between these events and heartrate change will then be discussed.
Both records included both kinds of heartrate change, with
a greater incidence of decelerations (HRB) than accelerations (HRA).
There was, however, a considerable difference between the overall
incidence of significant changes in the two records: 15> (Sn) and
llll (Sg). One reason for this difference may well have been the
difference in heartrate baslines (approximately 70 and 120 bpm. for
the younger and the older subject, respectively). Since sampling
was taken over a fixed number of beats, the time period concerned was
different across the two subjects. Further, a higher baseline may
well be associated with larger absolute changes in heartrate.
Inspection of the records revealed that a number of significant
changes were merely 'returns' of the rate to the base level (after a
previous deviation in the opposite direction). These instances were
clearly identifiable, and were found to make up 1%% and 20^ of all
changes for the younger and older subject respectively. Such
instances were eliminated from further analysis. However it should
be noted that this phenomenon might be expected to affect heartrate
response in the present context, since a 'new' response might be
superimposed on the 'return' from an earlier one. Such problems
would not be expected to arise where discrete stimuli are presented
to a passive infant.
The record of stimulus and behavioural events was then examined
by inspection of the video-tape. For both subjects, this sequence of
events was categorised, first, into two broad groups: 'events' and
'activities'. The former included the appearance or disappearance of
an object (due to either the subject's or the experimenter's behaviour).
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The latter included prolonged regard or manipulation of the object
(by the subject). The video record was also examined for instances
of 'surprise' on the part of the subject. Judgement was made on
the basis of facial expression, with particular attention being given
to widening of the eyes and raising of the eyebrows (see Neilson 1977).
Obtained instances of heartrate change were then compared to the
categorised behavioural record. These results are presented in Table
3. Over both subjects, 65% of heartrate changes were associated with
behavioural or stimulus events (and were thus termed 'meaningful'
instances). This result suggests that it is justifiable to assume
that real relationships do obtain between environmental events and
heartrate changes, in this context. The temporal association of the
two kinds of data cannot be attributed to chance alcme. It is also
clear that such direct relationships do not always hold.
TABLE 3 Instances of Significant Heartrate Change for two Subjects
(Experiment 2)
Subject Direction
of Change •Meaningful Instances
i Other
Events Activity Total
S-^ (younger) HRA 3 0 3 2
HRD 1 5 6 h
Sg (older) HRA 0 8 8 25
HRD 18 h9 67 12+
TOTAL 22 62 82+ h5
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More detailed study of the relationships between the two
types of data was then made. For the younger infant, the small
number of obtained changes limited analysis. However, it may be
noted that only some 13% of 'events' as described above (relating
to the appearance or disappearance of an object) were associated
with changes. Of these changes three were HRA and one HRD. All
(five) of the changes relating to 'activities' such as manipulation
were HRHs. These numbers are of course too small for further
analysis, but they are distributed in the manner predicted, with HRA
as a possible 'startle' response to the unexpected appearance (or
non-appearance) of an object. However, it should be noted that the
one instance of facial 'surprise' during the session (to the sudden
appearance of an object) was not accompanied ty a significant cardiac
change. It might be tentatively suggested therefore that HRA and
behavioural surprise are both potential elements of a response to
certain events, but that they are not necessarily 'triggered' in a
determinate fashicn by the event nor are they necessarily related as
part of a unitary response.
For the older infant, considerably more data was available.
Here there appeared to be a clear distinction between the events to
which the two different types of heartrate change occurred. HRAs
were observed to co-occur only with the 'activities' such as object
manipulation or regard, and never with the 'events' related to object
appearance. This finding is clearly in opposition to the prediction
that HRA should accompany such 'cognitive' stimuli. It should be
noted here that the distribution of changes between 'events' and
'activities' cannot be attributed solely to the infant's physical
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movement; only 5C$ of removals of an occluder were accompanied by
a change. This fact is also of importance in considering the
instances of HRD which co-occurred with both kinds of stimuli.
Less than half the HRDs were related to the 'cognitive events' and
inspection showed that the pattern of response was similar to that
for the 'activities'. This latter finding is congruent with Sokolov's
identification of HRD with the 'increased receptivity to information'
as noted above (p. $0). Such an interpretation could be referred to
in simpler terms as 'interest'. Thus manipulation or prolonged
regard of an object may well be accompanied by HRD, and the response
to 'interesting' cognitive events may well be identical.
This interpretation is supported by the comparison of changes
accompanying facial surprise: HRD 3 times and HRA once (and one
instance only of no accompanying change). Thus the evidence from the
older infant strongly suggests that the heartrate change to be
anticipated when a 'surprising' event occurs is one of HRD, i.e. the
•orientation' or 'interest' response also accompanying visual or
manual exploration.
li.3.3 Discussion
The scanty results from the younger infant suggested that
acceleration of heartrate may accompany the sudden appearance or non¬
appearance of an object. Such occurrences may be seen as violating
the infant's expectancies (as posited by, e.g. Bower 197Ua, p.192).
Stronger evidence, from the older infant, suggested that, in this case,
HRA was not a common response to events which could be considered
•surprising'. Such instances rather resulted in the response of HRD,
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which from its frequent accompaniment of exploratory activities*
could be interpreted as an index of 'interest'.
If it is assumed that these results are generally
representative, the most obvious explanation would refer to the
difference in age of the two infants. The older infant would be
expected to have a more sophisticated understanding of the
behaviour of objects, and thus to be surprised or startled less
readily than the younger. The HRD response of the older infant to
potentially 'surprising' events might be seen as a more 'mature'
response than would be the startle. However, inspection of the
data revealed that, of the eleven occurrences of HHDs to 'cognitive
events', 9 took place in the context of items which the infant failed.
The infant could not be expected to have made correct anticipations
about the object during these trials, and indeed these 9 instances
might be seen as ideal examples of incorrect anticipation on the basis
of less mature cognitive structure. Therefore, the resulting HRDs
present strong evidence against the prediction of HRAs as an index of
'cognitive startle'.
As has been pointed out however, the fact that infants were
continuously active during the session had considerable influence on
the nature of the data obtained. It may well be that 'implicit' but
small HRAs were present in the response to certain situations, but that
they were concealed by larger HRDs. Inspection of some of the graphed
results of Lewis (1975?) suggest that a small HRA may precede a large
HRD as the response to the onset of a stimulus.
It x^ould seem then that the strong postulate, that HRA would
occur with sufficient reliability to disambiguate behavoural data has
not been substantiated. Da the basis of the available evidence
(on only two subjects) such autonomous responses would not seem
to offer the solution to these methodological problems 'thin the
semi-naturalistic context of the present study. Certainly the
value of the technique in more highly controlled situations - e.g.
with a passive infant and discrete stimuli - is not challenged by
the present study.
It should also be noted that there would appear to be definite
age-linked changes in the heartrate response to these situations.
How these are related (if at all) to the infant's level, of cognitive
development is not clear. The 'interest' response indicated by the
HRD would seem to be present from at least 7 mcnths, and dominant
at lii months. This finding is of interest in relation to the
general trend of the replacement of HRA. responses by HRD during the
infant's first 6 months (Graham & Jackson 1970)« More work would
clearly be required to delineate these changes. With respect to
♦cognitive startle' however, it would seem that the use of heartrate
as a dependent measure is more appropriate in the more controlled
situation than that which obtains in the assessment of cognitive
development. In such contexts therefore, the technique would not
seem to offer itself as an Instrument for disambiguation of
behavioural description. As in other contexts, it seems that
behavioural analysis must look after itself, and not seek for
validation from physiological measures.
In view of the conclusions derived from the results of the two
subjects, it was not considered justified to extend analysis to
further subjects. The issues encountered were not central to the
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overall alms of the thesis.
5>« Conclusions
extensive discussion has been made above of various aspects of
the study. Some of these points will now be summarised, especially
with regard to their implications for the design of further research.
There did not seem to be any effect on results from varying the
order of presentation of items. It was therefore concluded that any
flexibility in presentation which seemed necessary when working with
the B5 infants could be legitimately employed. In general, the items
selected were shown to exhibit a coherent range of difficulty across
subjects, throughout the age range studied. One item (item 2) was
found not to present any more difficulty than the more standard Item 1.
This task was therefore not used subsequently.
The exploration of heartrate change as an independent correlative
to behavioural events did not demonstrate sufficiently clear
associations to suggest its subsequent adoption. Especially with the
active infant, decelerative 'interest' changes, rather than the
accelerative 'startle' response, accompanied those events interpreted
as 'surprising'. Such association was not sufficiently reliable to
suggest its employment as an arbiter in cases where behavioural
evidence was ambiguous. It was therefore decided not to adopt
heartrate recording in further study (although it was clear that
further investigation could be carried into the relationships present,
and the patterns of developmental change). It should also be borne in
mind that a proportion of BS infants suffer from congenital heart
defect (p. 3 ). It is not known to what extent such a condition might
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affect the reliability of heartrate change measures.
Having carried out the preliminary work reported in this
chapter, more extensive investigation of DS infants was designed.
This is introduced in the next chapter.
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CHAFTER IV ; LOMGITUDIWAL STITT OF TS IKFARTS
(Experiment 3)
1. Introduction
The preliminary work reported in Chapter II suggested that
qualitative differences might be found between the cognitive
development of the IS and of the normal infant, over and above any
differences in attainment at matched CA. It was therefore decided
to carry out a larger scale investigation of the characteristics of
the IS population, with the hope of obtaining data on such features.
For several reasons it was decided to use a longitudinal design
for the investigation. First, the relatively low incidence of IS
made it unlikely that cross-sectional samples of sufficient size
could be obtained. Second, it was thought likely that certain
features of the cognitive development of the infants would only be
observed by means of repeated presentation of the items over time.
2. Subjects
As in the previous study, contact with parents was made through
appropriate voluntary agencies. In view of the low incidence for IB,
approaches were made to the agency covering Glasgow (the Strathclyde
branch of the Down's Children's Association) as well as to that
covering Edinburgh (Aid for Town's Babies, Edinburgh).
Members of the two agencies (chiefly parents, plus interested
professional workers) were first addressed as a group at an appropriate
General Meeting. At this time, the general purpose of the study was
explained. It was made clear that a series of visits to the laboratory
would be involved, over a period of some 8-10 months. It was also
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made clear that the stucfr" had a purely research purpose, and made
no claim to be of significant educational benefit to the individual-
child. Interested parents were asked to make contact. A similar
statement and invitation was contributed to the newsletters of the
two agencies.
Initially, the parents of twelve infants with DS expressed
interest. Since the assessments to be carried out required that the
infant retrieve objects and lift occluders from a table-top, a
behavioural criterion was introduced to select the sample. Only
those infants capable of picking up objects in this way were to be
included in the longitudinal stucfy.
Application of this criterion reduced the sample to 8 infants (see
Table I4). The subjects eliminated did not solely consist of the
youngest of the original 12, and therefore some defence of this
procedure should be given. It might be suggested that a more able
sub-group of DS infants was being selected. First it should be
pointed out that there was no reason to consider the original 12
unrepresentative. The elimination of four infants - including two of
under 10 months in age - should not have led to a total distortion of
the sample. Second, a point of more general importance should be made.
The purpose of experimentation was to look for differences between DS
infants and normal infants. If such differences were to be observed
with respect to a sample which omitted the most severely handicapped
of the ES population, extrapolation of results to this population as a
whole would still seem legitimate. It would seem likely that any
specification of handicap for the more able would be applicable - with
additions - to the less able.
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Karyotype information was available for all but one of the eipjht
infants. In all cases full trisomy was present.
TAPT.E 4' Cubjects with r'own1 s °yndro"',o in Longitudinal Dtudy
Subject sex Karyotype Date of Are (months) at Uo. of
no. Firth first visit visits
1 rirl Trisomy-01 21,11.78 12 6
2 rirl tl 24. 8.70 20 3
3 .rirl not available 24. 3.76 18 9
4 rirl Trisor^-21 20. 3.70 18 5
5 hoy tt 7. 1.76 18 9
r, yirl •« 14.11,75 20 12
7 boy 3.10.75 22 9
8 rirl H 22. 9.75 22 11
3# Procedure
3.1 Location and Organisation of Visits
Infants residing in or near Fdinburyh v/oro studied in the sane
facilities as employed for the research reported above# Facilities
wore also obtained in the Demrtnent of Psychology, University of
Olaspiow, for the our'or.oo of studying those infants residing in ttie
Creator Olasyov; area, In all respects, apparatus and materials were
identical in the two locations.
Cessions were penem11,y arranyed at 2 — 3 week intervals. In the
case of the Clnspot«-based infants, it was unfortunately not always
possible to rearrange visits if appointments could not be kent since
the author could only moke periodic (one-day) visits to Glasgow himself.
For this reason, attendence over the entire series of sessions was not
as complete as rnioht have been wished. A record of total sessions
attended is included in Table 4,
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3.2 Tasks Presented
The set of tasks used was broadly similar to that used in the
previous experiment (Chapter HI). Some changes were made on the
basis of methodological considerations and the results of the
previous experimentation. These changes are noted below.
As noted above, all the items were designed for the 8 infants
who would readily pick up small objects from the table-top.
Administration and results for infants not in this category will not
be considered here.
Tasks fall into three groups: (a) those concerned with a series
of visible displacements ('AAB'), (b) those concerned with non-visible
transposition ('switching'), (c) those concerned with a non-visible
displacement after which the object's absence must prompt the infant
to deduce its new location ('deduction' tasks).
(a) AAB task
The standard AAB task was retained. The task involving
continuous movement behind two separate screens (Item 2 in
Experiment 2) was not retained, since it had been found to be
equivalent in difficulty to the AAB task (p.S<? ). As noted
above, the AAB task is intended to differentiate between
Piaget's Stages IV and V (see Chapter HI: 3.2).
Presentation: LIE and RRL.
(b) 'Switching' task
In Fxperiment 2 this task had been presented using screens.
This was found to be inconvenient in presentation. It was
therefore decided to return to the more standard presentation
used in Experiment 1, and to use cups rather than, screens.
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In Experiment 1 the cups had always been used inverted
to conceal the object. It ws observed that attention to
the task was sometimes enhanced when the cups were kept upright
(but with the object still non—•visible). Hie 'switchinn' task
with cups upright wan therefore occasionally included in the
set of tanks, in addition to the standard presentation with
cups inverted, Presentation for both tasks: PI,PL / LRLR,
(c) 'Deduction' task
The standard Piagetinn 'deduction' task wan retained. It
was noted above (p.GO) that certain components of the task seemed
to be critical in determining the degree of difficulty of the task.
It appeared possible for infants to locate the object (follov/inc
its displacement by means of the cup, and its deposition behind a
screen) without making use of 'deduction' from the emptiness of the
cup. Search of the empty cup - either visual or manual - must,
clearly, be observed in order that correct retrieval could be att¬
ributed to 'deductive'processes. In view of the importance of
this inference for a test of Planet's Shape VI,careful attention wan
riven to this feature. Presentation! Object deposited LRLR/PLRL,
A second task concerned with deductive processes had been inc¬
luded In Experiment 8, This task focused on the phenomenon of
'capture by contact' as a possibility envisaged by the infant (see
p.54), However, as noted above (p.63), presentation of this task
to normal infants did not yield a clear pattern of achievement over
aye. Indeed, no subject registered a pass on both trials of the
task. It wan considered, therefore, that results on this task
could not be expected to be sufficiently clear-cut for meaningful
population differences to emerge by its employment, However, it was felt
that certain aspects of tee task night bo incorporated in a new task
which related more closely -to the other items employed. In the earl¬
ier task subjects were presented with a situation in which, in their eyes,
an object may, or may not have been picked un by a moving vessel during
the letter's trajectory. This feature of uncertainty appeared to have
encouraged subjects to continue searching for the object beyond a first
location. Corresponding uncertainty was therefore introduced into a task
directly concerned with such socondary search (i.e. with 'deduction').
The new task consisted of two steps. First the object was concealed
behind one of two screens. An inverted cup was brought across behind the
screen. It cantured the object and won brought to rent in front of the
infant, who was required to retrieve the object (either directly or after
first searching behind the first screen) • Second, tee none step was
repeated with the other screen except that the object wan not captured.
The infant war? required to search in the cun and then retrieve the object.
It should ho noted that, In this task, concealment of tee object (in its
final location) is performed visibly. The critical element for 'deduction'
tasks - search initiated by an absent object - is retained,
Presentations Object first concealed at HLLR/LRFL,
3.3 Administration
As noted above (n, 44) preliminary work with DS infants had made It
clear that flexibility in presentation would be unavoidable, Hie
findings of Experiment P. (p. 37) suggested that varying tee order of
presentation of tasks should not lead to artofactual variation in results.
It was felt to be Justified to vary presentation order in response to
tee subject's attention and orientation to the task situation as a whole.
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U. Results
As will be noted during this section - and as has been noted
above - several .features of the administration and of results were
felt to necessitate comparative information with normal infants. This
comparison study is described below (Chapter VI). Since many of the
results can only be evaluated in comparative terms, consideration will
be given to them at that point. Here, some of the more striking
results will be noted, and seme consideration will be given to their
implications.
First it should be noted that the general behaviour characteristics
observed in the preliminary work were also encountered in this
longitudinal study. As before, these characteristics (see p. 1*3) - such
as lapses of attention, or failure to orient to the task - are difficult
to quantify. They are, however, sufficiently striking in the
experimental context for recognition of them to be necessary.
The most generally reported index of development is the age of
first achievement. The mean chronological age at which subjects first
registered criterial success on the tasks is presented in Table ?.
Prior to the presentation of more precise comparative data (Chapter VI)
these values are compared to approximate norms derived from the
literature (Piaget 19??; Bower 19?Ua).
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TABLE ? Mean Age of First Achievement for DS infants (Experiment 3)
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Further analysis of the response patterns was carried out. It
was noted that initial success on a certain task was not followed by
consistent repetition of that success in subsequent sessions (see
Table 6). Such inconsistency could be expressed by the proportion of
sessions following that containing initial, success in which success was
repeated. Over all tasks and subjects, the average 'retest
reliability' or 'repeatability' was found to be 5>0.6f. Thus, having
demonstrated success on. a task, there was just over a. chance of the
subject demonstrating it again in a subsequent session. More detailed














Results of longitudinal Testing of PS Infants op Tliree Tasks
TScperlment~3)
Task Session
1 2 3 U 5 6 7 89 10 11 12
1 -
2 ------
3 - - + - - .
1 + +
2 - - -
3 + +
2 - + + + + -- - +
1 +• + + «•
2 +
3
1 + + -- - + + + -
2 - - + - + + +
3 - - + - + + -
1 — — + — + — — — -f — + —
2 - - + + - + + +
3 +
1 - -- + + + + + +
2 - -- -- - + + +
3 — — — — — + + + +
1 + + „ + + „
2 - -- + 0- + - + + +
3 — — — — — — — + + — +
1 'MB' task
2 'Switching' task (cups inverted)
3 Second 'deduction' task
For all of these, see text (p. 80)
+ : pass
- : fail
0 s not administered
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*>. Discussion
By comparison with normal expectations, the D5 infants present
a clear picture of delayed achievement. This finding is in keeping
with the theoretical accounts of 'slow development' currently
available. As was emphasised above, however, this result cannot be
seen as an adequate validation of the stronger forms of the available
accounts. The concept of 'slow development' entails considerably
more than the observation of delayed achievement. This first general
result must be seen as a necessary, but by no means a sufficient
condition for the 'slow development' theory. It has no bearing on
the more specific predictions of that theory, and it does not
illuminate the question of differences between the development of the
DS and the normal child.
The calculation of 'retest reliability' is a preliminary step in
the more detailed investigation of the developmental pattern.
Conclusions are commonly drawn from the observation of ages of
achievement. Such conclusions make assumptions about the representative
nature of these specific achievements. If it is the case that subjects
will consistently reproduce successes in subsequent sessions - that is,
that 'competence' must be either absent or present, and if present must
be manifested - then the results of any single assessment would
accurately represent the subject's ability. Reduction of the data into
the terms of first achievement would not distort the results. The
results would be 'reproducible' in a manner analogous to the rationale
of Scalogram Analysis (see p. U6).
It can be seen, therefore, that the extrapolation of results in terns
of specific achievements to yield an evaluation of development as a whole
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requires that these achievements are indeed representative. If,
however, this requirement is not fulfilled, the extrapolation is
not justified. The slowness of emergence of specific skills
cannot be taken ipso facto to explain the whole developmental
pattern. At the least, extra theoretical consideration would have
to be made, to explain the poor reproducibility of success.
Explanation would probably take the form of a 'difference' argument.
The 'slow development' theory would, therefore, be shown not to be
adequate.
The obtained value for reliability would seem, intuitively, to
present a serious challenge to the assumption that 'developmental
levels' may be equated, across subjects, on the basis of achievement
alone. Before any fiim conclusions can be reached on this point,
however, it is clearly essential to obtain comparative information
for the normal subject. If, for whatever reason, the reliability
for the normal infant were found to be no higher than that for the
DS infant, implications specific to the IS population would not be
justified. Comparative study was indicated for more positive
reasons, too. If differences in performance between the two
populations were to be investigated, information on the normal infant
would be required at a more finely detailed level than that of
'norms'. Precise data en the nature and distribution of errors
would be required. Meaningful comparison could then be made between
the two populations.
This comparative study, and the analysis of such population
differences, is presented below (Chapter VI). Before carrying out
this study, however, it was felt that seme clarification of the
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characteristics of the DS population might be made by a brief
assessment of children at pre-school age. Analysis of the
infant sample (aged up to 2^ years by completion of the study)
had shown that successful performance over sessions was extremely
inconsistent. Such a characteristic of performance could be
interpreted in two distinct ways. It might be seen as a
permanent state, and thus it would be predicted that performance
for these tasks would always exhibit similar inconsistency. This
interpretation would be in line with a 'deficit' approach to mental
handicap (see p. 36). Alternatively, it might be argued that
inconsistency per se was indeed a permanent characteristic, but that
the tasks on which it would be manifested would vary with CA. Thus
any given set of tasks - e.g. those concerned with sensorimotor
intelligence - would eventually become 'consolidated' and consistently
successful performance would be exhibited. (At such a point, it
might be predicted, tasks mere appropriate to CA might well manifest
similarly low levels of consistency as did the sensorimotor tasks
for infants). This interpretation would exemplify the
'developmental difference' approach outlined in the Introduction (p. 36).
To obtain some evidence on this issue, it was decided to carry
out a small study of CS children at the pre-school age before
commencing the comparative study with normal infants.
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CHAPTTR V : 5TTHT OF PRESCHOOL AGr DS fHTIDRT?
(Experiment 10
1. Introduction
As reported in Chapter TV it was found that ^S infants of up to
2f years of age could not be relied upon to demonstrate clear success
on the range of tasks presented. It was therefore of interest to
establish whether this state of affairs should be seen as an
enduring aspect of behaviour, or whether it was a state which would
be transcended during later development. If it were the case that
DS children's performance on these tasks always presented the same
picture, then explanation might be sought in terms of a general
behavioural deficit. In this case, nothing specific would have been
said about the cognitive development of the DS infant. It could
even, then, be argued that cognitive development per se is indeed
'slow', and that, in addition, its realisation in performance 1e
mediated by defective production processes.
If, on the other hand, it could be shown that by the pre-school
age of h - 5 years the DS child can perform adequately on these tasks,
then the lack of reliability in the younger subjects would have to be
seen as a developmental phenomenon,and as a central aspect of the
cognitive development of the DS infant. Since it is with the
achievements of infancy that this thesis is concerned, it was decided
not to attempt an evaluation of the prediction above (p.88 ),




Parents of DS children in the Edinburgh area were approached
as described above (p. 55). Four children (two boys, 2 girls) aged
from 3z - 5 years acted as subjects. Except for one subject, who
had taken part in the single session of Experiment 1 (12 month3
previously), all were naive subjects.
3. Procedure
Apparatus and materials were as described above (p.39 ).
Subjects visited the laboratory twice, with a week's gap in
between visits. Tasks presented consisted of those used during the
longitudinal studty. These consisted of the 'AA3' task, the 'switching'
task with cups inverted, and both forms of the 'deduction' ta3k (see
pp. 80-82).
ll. Results
Results are presented in Table 7. As can be seen, nearly perfect
success patterns were obtained. It was noted in presenting tasks that
attentiveness on the part of the subjects seemed to be generally higher
than with the younger infants in the longitudinal study.
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TAPLF 7 Pesults for "'rc-School Ago DC Children (Experiment 4)
Task and Criterion bossion 1 session
of success (see text) si s2 s3 o4 si 82 S3 s4
•AAH* tank RRL/LLR 444 4 + 4 4 0
•Switching* with cups
inverted PL - 4 4 + 4 4 4
*Seduction' /I RL 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 -
•Deduction* /? P/L «|» «j» + 4 4 4 4
Keys + : mass - : fail 0 : not administered
It is possible to compare present results with those obtained by
the younger infants in the longitudinal otudty. Coramrison may be made
with respect to performance on the next session following suvcess. From
Table o (p„05) it can be seen that , for the younger infants,out of a
total of 10 cases of first achievement success on the following session
van obtained in only 10 cases. An Table 7 shows, repeated testing was
carried out for 13 cnr.cn of initial success swith the older group, stat¬
istical coRpariaon of ih«» results nay be carried out by mam of
Fisher*s Thawst Probability tent, Exact • probability for the obtained
distribution of next-cession success is found to be rw0,0201. It can
therefore be concluded that the older PS infants are superior to the
younger with respect to the reproduction of successful achievement.
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5. Discussion
In general, then, it can be said that DS children can be
expected to perform successfully and fairly consistently on these
tasks by the pre-school age of U - $ years. Reliability contrasts
markedly with that in infancy. The change in this parameter Implies
that the level of consistency of success must be seen as an integral
part of the cognitive development of the DS infant and child. In
additdcn to the gradual achievement of specific criterial successes,
the infant is increasing the consistency and reliability with which
such successes can be repeated. They are thus increasingly
becoming part of a 'repertoire*. This latter developmental change
must be taken into account in formulating explanatory models.
The present finding might perhaps be interpreted as a dissolution
of the differences identified in the period of infancy. It could be
therefore argued that at this point in development there is indeed a
real equivalence between the (pre-school age) DS child and the normal
infant. Such equivalence relations are fundamental to the 'slow
development' theory (as well as to the general psychometric account
of development). Such a claim would have a certain formal validity.
However, it is strictly limited to a single comparison: to an
equivalence between two populations at fixed CA. It does not have a
developmental dimension. It would entail that equivalence does not
exist prior to the DS child's attainment of age h - 5 years.
The parameter of the reliability of success has been taken as an
indication of developmental change in the DS child more general than
the accretion of specific cognitive skills. However it is clearly,
still, a gross measure. It leaves open the question of what kind of
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response is made when a former success is not repeated. The
Piagetian foim of the 'slow development' theory postulates that
such failures will take the form of 'rational' errors,
characteristic of certain general, structural features of cognitive
'stage'. Such issues can only be studied in a comparative fashion,
as reported in the following chapter.
The short study reported here illustrates the importance of
looking beyond 'milestones' of development, even within a. population.
It therefore seems to point to the importance of such a practice when
investigating differences between populations. In this respect, as
well as adding to the descriptive picture of the course of development
in the D5 child, it has strengthened the tentative interpretations
drawn from the longitudinal study, and made imperative the acquisition
of comparative data on these issues.
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CHAPTER VI : COXT^^Vr J"-'TCrrUPX?TAL STURT 1JTTR "CEl"'.T. "'^"'TS
(~-:noriment 5)
1. Introduction
Chapter 17 reported the longitudinal study with "7 infants.
The results which, merged from that study showed that, in addition
to the delayed achievement of criterial responses, there seemed to be
more general aspects of the infants' performance on which differences
from normal expectation occurred. In particular, it was noted that
the 'reliability' of task successes (over sessions) was just over ?.
The small study of slightly older PS children, reported in Chapter V,
suggested that this feature was not a global and determinate aspect
of the child's behaviour, but that it was subject to developmental
change. The identification of this effect was not seen as the end
of enquiry, but rather as an illustration that the course of cognitive
development in the T Infant may well be different in nature to that
of the normal Infant.
Before proceeding with an investigation of such differences in
greater detail, it was clearly necessary to establish whether the
apparent difference in reliability was a real one. Tt was possible
that, rather than being a true population difference, it was caused by
the methodological procedure of varied order of presentation. Since
the reliability parameter is, by definition, appropriate only to
repeated measures, the conclusions of Experiment 2 (p. S7) that the
procedure does not influence results in a single session cannot be
adequate to discount this possibility.
The first major aim of this study was, therefore, to establish
the reliability over the set of tasks for normal infants. It was
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hoped that farther analysis of the responses to the tasks could
then be made, to make possible a precise comparison with those of
the DS infants.
For both practical and financial reasons, it was not feasible
to study a sample of normal infants over the same time-span as had
been done with the DS infants. In this connection it should be
emphasised that the present study should not be seen as a strict
'control' group for the IS sample. The methodological problems in
matching subjects from the two populations are extensive (see Clarke
& Clarke 1975)• Instead the study should be seen as an attempt to
obtain comparative information on certain specific aspects of
cognitive development.
With respect to the question of reliability, it was considered
that a series of four sessions, at 2 - 3 week intervals, should
provide an adequate set of comparative data.
2. Subjects
Subjects were obtained from a pool of normal infants (see p. 55 )
whose parents had expressed willingness for them to participate in
research studies. Twenty-six infants were selected (lij. boys, 12 girls).
e
Two infants represented each month of age from 9-21 months inclusive
at the start of the study. There were thus 13 pairs of infants, the




Subjects were scheduled to attend four sessions each, at two-
weekly intervals (but 3 weeks when a holiday period intervened).
One subject-session only was lost (due to hospitalisation).
3.2 Tasks
Choice of tasks was constrained by three factors. First there
was a need to establish certain general parameters of longitudinal
performance over a comparable range of tasks for the normal as for
the DS infants. Second, more specific information was needed on
certain tasks. Third,however, was the limitation that tasks must
all be administered readily within a single session (of 15 - 20 mins.)
As with the longitudinal study with DS infants, tasks fell Into
three groups.
(a) 'AAB' tasks
It has been suggested (Gratch et al. 197U) that a critical
feature of the presentation of this type of task is the time-lag
between presentation of the 'catch* trial and the onset of the
infant's response. The authors found that if a pause of 1 second
or more were imposed on the infant, the task proved more difficult
than in the absence of such a pause. In carrying out the study
with DS infants, it had not always been possible precisely to
control this feature. Restraint of the infant frequently led to
total inhibition of response. It was therefore decided to obtain
comparative information on this point, by administering the task
both with and without imposing such an additional pause (in
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addition, that is, to ensuring that the object had been
concealed and the experimenter's hand removed prior to the
infant's response).
These two variations therefore made up Tasks 1 and 2.
Each was presented twice: LLR & REL.
(b) 'Switching1 tasks
As noted above (p. 81 ), it had been found that DS infants
could on occasion be more readily interested in the
transposition task if the cups were used upright rather than
inverted. It was therefore necessary to obtain information
on the relation between these tasks for the normal infant.
These two tasks made up Tasks 3 and U. For each,
transposition was carried out It times: RLRL/LRLR.
(c) 'Deduction' tasks
The two 'deduction' tasks presented to DS infants (p.8l )
formed Tasks 5 and 6. Careful attention was given to the
requirement that the infant make a clear search (visual or
manual) of the empty cup prior to 'deductive' response. Task
5 (the standard task, derived from Piaget) was presented h times,
with the object being displaced to each side twice (thus RUffL/
LRLR). Task 6 was presented twice, with the 'catch' trial
occurring with the object concealed on each of the sides, thus:
RLLR/LRRL.
3.3 Balancing
There were 6 tasks, each to be presented to each infant at each of
four sessions. A Latin-square design was obtained from the study of
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Kramer et al (197?) which, similarly, presented six tasks in a
controlled set of orders. The Latin-square presents 6 different
orders for the six tasks, in which each task precedes each other
task once, and each task follows each other task once, in the six
different sequences. Immediate carry-over effects are therefore
balanced out.
The 2 infants frcrn each pair received between them, over the
four sessions, each of the orders A - F at least once and not more
than twice. Over all subjects and sessions, each different order
A - F was used at least 16, but not more than 18 times.
Presentation order was thus balanced both overall, and within pairs
(since carry-over effects might differ between pairs).
The initial starting side for the first trial on a task was
selected at random.
h. Results and Discussion
It .1 General Results
It.1.1 Results for the ?Tormal Infants
Table 8 presents findings on the mean ages of first achievement
for the various tasks. In some cases, ages are given for two
different levels of success in the same task.
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TABLE 6 Mean Age of First Achievement (months) for the Normal Infants
(Experiment 5)
Task (see text Criterion of success Mean age of first
p. 96 ) achievement (months)
1 RRL & LLR 12.0









R,L denotes side object initially concealed
Results of Ordering Theory analysis (see p. it'8 ) is presented in
Figure 2. Two 'trees' are given, owing to the nature of the present
design. The analysis is designed for a cross-sectional design in
which each subject is tested once. In the analysis of a (semi)
longitudinal design, it i3 necessary to make one of two assumptions
regarding the data. It may either be assumed that the results of
repeated testing can be pooled, as if different subjects had
participated in each session, or that success on an item in a previous
session may be counted in the comparison with another item in a later
session. Results for both procedures are presented (as 'a' and 'b'
respectively). It can be seen that the first procedure, which treats
each session as involving a new sample, gives rise to few significant
relationships (and none involving Tasks 3 or ii-). The second procedure,
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FIGURE 2 Results of Ordering Theory Analysis of Performance by
Normal Infants (Experiment *?)
5 <r- 6
1 <- ■> 2








(b) Where subject's success in previous sessions is taken into
account (see text)
Key: J I 'prerequisite' for J (at 5% level of significance)
I < > J I 'equivalent' to J (difference N.3. at level)
Note: Where a task falls to appear in a tree, it cannot be located
in any "prerequisite" relations
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which takes account of the repeated measures aspect of the design,
expands on this picture while retaining its significant features.
It should be noted that, with this enriched procedure, the results
are generally in agreement with previous assumptions. There is a
linear relationship between the three kinds of task, and, with the
exception of the first two, both tasks of a pair (i.e. 3 and l^and £
and 6) can be seen as equivalent. Some implications of these findings
will be introduced below, in discussing specific tasks.
li.l.2 Delay and 'Kate1 of "mergence
In Table 9, extracts from Tables 5 (following p. 83 ) and 8 are
combined to enable comparison between the DS and the normal infsuits to
be made. In addition, results for the DS infants on Task 2 is
included in Table 9. As can be seen, mean emergence is earlier for the
normal infants, across all tasks. The Mann-Whitney 1U* teBt was
carried out to determine whether the results frcra the two populations
were significantly distinct (and not overlapping with respect to
chronological age). As can be seen, differences were all significant
(p 'OS)* The DS infants were, therefore, clearly later in achieving
these successes, as a population, than the normal infants.
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TABLF 9 Comparative Results for PS and Normal Infants
(derived from Tables 5 and g)
Task Criterion Mean age of first Delay of Significance
of success achiev^aent (mo.) DS infants level of
DS N (mo.) population
difference *
prob. U=
1 RRL & IIR 21.0 12.0 9.0 p<.05 1
2 RRI&LLR 22.8 12.3 9.5 p<r.05 2
h RL 23.3 16.h 6.9 p<.05 2
5 RL 29.8 18.3 11.5 p <. 05 o
6 RL 27.0 17.8 9.2 p < - 05 3§
For the task order 1, 2, h, 6, 5 order of emergence is
identical across the two populations (see text, p. 102)
* Mann-Whitney U test
Correlation for the order of emergence of achievements across the
two populations was obtained using Kendall's tau. Order of emergence
was highly correlated (£ = 0.81, N = 7, p < .05).
The concept of 'rate' with respect to development has generally
been employed in the context of psychometric assessment, where a
quantified score is available for comparison across age. In the
present context, it is possible to compare the delay of first emergence
(on behalf of the DS infant) on a set of achievements. For a set of
tasks on which order of emergence is identical across the two
populations, it might be suggested that the sequence of delays
exhibited by the DS infant might show a regular trend.
As noted above, order of emergence was highly correlated between
the two populations. A set of five tasks for which order of emergence
was identical is presented in Table 9, The linear regression line for
this set of results has a slope of +0,25. Thus, on assumption of a
linear trend, it would be suggested that a relative increase in delay was
occurring with age in the DS infants. However, the assumption of lin¬
earity cannot be Justified, The product—moment correlation between size
of delay and chronological age (r=0,66) does not differ significantly
from zero (t»l,52#dfn3), A simple relationship between size of delay and
n^e cannot be assumed. The linear regression cannot be taken as an ad¬
equate representation of the data, and no straightforward pattern of
change in the series of delays can legitimately be asserted,
4,1,3 Overall Repeatability of Successes
For 03 infants the overall probability of reproducing success was
found to be equal to 50,OR (n,34). For the noma! infants in the present
study, this value was found to equal 71,9%, In order to compare perform¬
ance by the two groups, results for the 03 infants were re—analysed to
obtain reliability over the next three sessions only following initial
success. This value was found to equal 50.25??, Comparison of this val¬
ue with that obtained for the normal infants yields t=2.04, p<,05 (*t*
test for proportions; Guildford 1950), With respect to the reproduct¬
ion of success on subsequent sessions, then, significant superiority was
demonstrated for the normal infant over the DS infant,
4,1.4 Friof Discussion
The emergence of specific achievements was delayed to a statistically
significant extent in the 33 population. Order of emergence for
different tasks was, in genera]., the same for the TJfS and the normal
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infants. No clear pattern was observed in the degree of delay
across time. These findings are in accordance with the previous
literature and, to the sam~ extent, offer support to the 'slow
development' theoiy.
However, once having achieved a certain criterial performance on
a task, patterns of subsequent performance differ between the two
populations. DS infants are less likely to repeat a success, given
the opportunity to do so, than are normal infants. This difference
does not appear to be due to a simple 'deficit' on the part of the
DS infants, since the difference disappears when slightly older DS
children are tested (p. 91 ). Thus it must be seen as an integral
part of the pattern of cognitive development in the DS child.
It is not, therefore, possible to set up equivalence mappings
between the DS and the normal population on the basis of first
achievement alone. This parameter is not equivalent in the two
populations. The term 'slowness' is clearly accurate as a
description of patterns of emergence. It is not, however, adequate
as an explanation.
It must be stressed that the index of 'repeatability' is itself
a gross measure. The observation of differences in its value between
the two populations - a difference of degree rather than of kind - must
be seen as calling for explanation. It must be determined in what
manner the DS infants are failing to reproduce success. This
information must be related to their overall pattern of response. If
the phenomenon of slow emergence should be interpreted as merely one
aspect of the development of the DS infant, a similar status must be
assigned to the low repeatability of success. At the very least,
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investigation of the patterns of error in different tasks must
be carried out. P. methodology of analysis which limits itself
to dichotomising perfortanr ? into success or failure \s clearly
not adequate. The next section will therefore analyse response
patterns to specific tasks in greater detail.
It.2 Comparative Analysis of Specific Tasks
"s noted above ( ,96 the tasks administered in this
investigation fall into three broad categories. Results and
discussion of comparisons between the two populations - and, where
relevant, of characteristics of the normal population alone - will
be presented with respect to these categories.
ii.2.1 'AAB' Tasks
Analysis considered the nature of errors being made. In these
tasks, an error consists in an initial search at the location
previously occupied by the object (in earlier trials). It was
observed that such initial response was sometimes followed immediately
by search at the correct location. This second response frequently
appeared more as a continuation of the first, than as a distinct and
new one. "rrors could therefore be differentiated according to this
criterion. It might be suggested that (whatever the 'meaning1 of the
response) such correction reduces the strong diagnostic value of the
initial error. For these reasons, the non-corrected, and corrected
forms of the error are here referred to as 'real' and 'operational.'
errors, respectively.
- 106 -
For the purposes of analysis, error responses for both tasks
were pooled. The distribution of error types was uniform across
the two tasks. The relative occurrence of 'real' errors in the
DS and normal infants was $7% and 6C$ respectively. This difference
is not statistically significant ('t' test for proportions:
t = 0.23, NS). However, the distribution of types of error across
age is different between the two populations. For the normal
population, there is a clear separation between the 'real' error as
characteristic of the younger infant, and the 'operational' error
as characteristic of the older infant. This separation is
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney 'U' tests U = lf>.5, p-C.C#).
It should be noted that the age of the 'older' infant here (above llj -
1$ months) is well above the mean age of achievement of the task (12
months).
This difference clearly vindicates the procedure of making a
distinction between the two kinds of error. (it should be noted
that the cross-sectional design make3 it impossible to account for the
age trend simply in terms of individual learning across sessions).
Further, the direction of the trend adds weight to the theoretical
interpretation of the difference. Whatever causes the initial error
in the normal older infant (when it occurs), its immediate correction
indicates that it cannot be attributed the same representative function
as in the younger infant. Thus the error cannot unambiguously be
interpreted in terms of one specific cognitive structure.
The distribution of the two kinds of error is uniform for the
ES infants. An error occurring at any time has a probability of h3%
of being an 'operational' one. Piagnosis of cognitive structure -
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the use of such errors to assign an infant to a 'stage' of
development - cannot be a reliable procedure. The failure to
reproduce a previous success, in a given session, cannot be assumed
to necessitate the committal of a 'characteristic error' on the -task.
For the normal infant, errors committed earlier than the mean age of
first success at the task could confidently be assumed to be 'real'
errors. This assumption cannot be made with the DS infants. Thus
first achievement cannot be assigned the same representative function
in the DS as in the normal infant. In the IS infant it cannot be
seen as a firm achievement, arising subsequent to coherent and
•rational' error. Any theory which posits equivalence between the
two populations in terms of first achievement cannot be adequate.
Further, it should be stressed that the status of the IS infant prior
to first achievement cannot be equated with that of the normal infant
in a formally similar state. The DS infant may exhibit certain
responses apparently diagnostic of a greater 'sophistication' than his
formal peer (namely the 'operational' error). The whole pattern of
response and the status of those elements defined as 'success' must
be seen as different from that of the normal. Therefore the status
of any single parameter must also differ.
h.2.2 'Switching' Tasks
Results are presented in Table 8 (p.99 ), for these two tasks
(Nos. 3 and li) for the normal subjects. The mean ages of first
achievement are presented for two levels of success in the tasks (see
below). The small differences between age of achievement for the two
tasks (at equivalent levels of success) support the finding of Ordering
- 108 -
Analysis (Figure 2, p.100) that the two tasks are of equivalent
difficulty for the normal infant. It was noted above (p. 81)
that the version of the task with cups upright was occasionally
administered to the DS infants. Sufficient data is not available
however to enable complete comparison to be made on this version of
the task. In view of the differences emerging between the response
patterns of the two populations to identical tasks (li.2.1 above), it
was not felt justified to infer equivalence for the two tasks with
respect to the DS infants. In what follows, therefore, comparison
will be made on the basis of results with the standard version of
the task only (Task h, with cups inverted).
It may be noted from Table 5 (p. 81*) that for the DS infants, a
difference of some 5 months appears between the mean age of attainment
for two levels of success in Task h. This difference is
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney 'U' test: U - P< -&?)•
No such lag occurs for the normal infants (Table 8, p. 99) for whom
the difference in means Is one month (U - 1x9$ NS). This finding
emphasises the problem of 'representativeness' in the study of the DS
infant (see p. 86). For the normal population, achievement occurs in
a saltatory fashion and success at either level could be taken as
representative of attainment. This is not the case for the DS infants,
at least for this specific task. If there is a noticeable lag between
the achievements of lower and higher levels of a task, then neither
point can be interpreted unambiguously. The earlier point, if taken
as an index of 'achievement' would apparently overestimate current
ability. The latter point would underestimate the Infant's status
prior to achievement. It appears that certain assumptions about the
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general nature of response patterns which might be justified with
the normal population cannot be utilized in assessing the cognitive
status of the DS infant.
As with the tasks considered above, an analysis of error patterns
on the 'switching' tasks reveals differences between the DS and the
normal population. The 'characteristic' error on these tasks - i.e.
the response pattern with equivalent diagnostic value to success -
consists in the infant's consistent search for the object at the
location where it was seen to be hidden. This strategy is always
incorrect, since transposition of the occluders transfers the object
to the other side. In a simpler task (such as the 'AAB' task), where
no transposition takes place, this strategy would be the correct one.
It becomes erroneous when applied to the more difficult task. Since
task difficulty is held to reflect developmental changes in competence,
such a 'characteristic error' is diagnostic of a lower 'level' than
that defined by success an the task.
Analysis of error patterns in the normal infants shows that this
'characteristic error' strategy represents h6.9% of failures on the
task. For the DS infants, this value is 25.8#. This difference is
significant ('t' test for proportions: t « 2.23, p < .05). Thus
failures on this task are much less likely, with the DS infant, to take
the form of the strategy appropriate to the 'cognitive level' below
that defined by success on the task. A failure to pass cannot be
interpreted as diagnostic of the 'next lowest' level below that of a
pass. Clearly, the informational value of the test - in presenting a
binary 'choice' between two levels or stages - does not hold up for the
DS infant.
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It should be stressed that occurrences of the error patterns
under investigation overlap with occurrences of success. Thus
the successes must be seen against such a background - rather than
as emerging from a former state of consistent and •developmental'
error. As before, the relationship between specific achievements
and the general patterns of response to that task do not appear to
be the same for the IS as for the normal population. Hence it would
not seem legitimate to isolate such successes from their general
context in order to set up mappings of equivalence between the two
populations.
it.2.3 'Deduction' Tasks
As with the other tasks presented to both populations, an analysis
of error patterns was carried out. For both these tasks, the
'characteristic' error consists in the infant's failure to search for
the object, having noted its absence where previously seen (inside
the cup) (see Bower 197ha, p.187). This response is consistent with
the theoretical interpretation that infants have no understanding of
the behaviour of the object, beyond an expectation for it to re-appear
where previously seen. The Infant should have no strategy of search
available.
Analysis of errors was made over both tasks. The 'characteristic
error' predominated for the normal infants. Frequently the absence of
any search of occluders was accompanied by the infant's looking around
to his side, or below the table. This behaviour was interpreted as
an undifferentiated, 'global.' search, but entirely consistent with the
'characteristic error'. For the DS infant, however, errors were more
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likely to consist of search of (incorrect) occluders, following
the initial search of the empty cup. Comparison was made of the
occurrence of such 'errors of commission'. The frequency of such
error for the normal and DS infants had values of 32.1% and 53.3$,
respectively. This difference is significant ('t' testibr
proportions: t = 2.09, p< .05). Thus, in general, a failure
on behalf of the DS infant was less likely to consist in the
•characteristic error' of lower stages of development, than was the
case with the normal infant. Indeed, it could be argued that the
'error of commission' in these tasks is indicative of higher levels
of 'cognitive structure' than is the 'characteristic error'. The
infant would appear to be demonstrating some operational understanding
of the possibilities for non-observed behaviour in the object. If
this is the case, then the methodological procedure of equating lack
of success with a specific kind of error would seem particularly mistaken
in this case. Certainly the general pattern of response - from, which
successes emerge in these tasks - would appear to differ between the two
populations. It is unlikely that processes postulated for the
developmental changes in the normal infant would be applicable, without
at least some alteration, to the case of the DS infant.
As with the other kinds of task discussed above, then, the
diagnostic value of single results on a task seem to be severely limited
for the DS population. Success on a task does not emerge from an
equivalent 'lower' state as in the normal population, and initial
achievement does not represent transition to a new state in which success
is consistent. As before, the interpretation which can be placed on
success or failure is not homogeneous across the two populations. Any
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The theoretical positions under consideration should be restated
before discussing the significance of the present results. The
strong form of the 'slow development' theory states that the behaviour
of the DS infant at a certain age can always be described in terms of
equivalence with that of a younger, normal infant. The developmental
pattern is seen as a linear series of such equivalence mappings. Thus,
simultaneously, models of both the normal and the atypical developmental
patterns are being set up. The model for normal development consists
of a sequence of specific behavioural achievements, which are attained
in a fixed order. Empirically determined age norms for these
achievements are incorporated into the theory. The model for the
mentally handicapped infant is a transform of the 'normal' model, such
that some (significant) delay is introduced for each achievement. Thus
the normal model is transformed by a linear expansion over
chronological age.
It was argued above (p. 2U) that such a model, as it stands, has no
explanatory power (either for the normal or the atypical case). Such
power can only be achieved by incorporating within the theory a more
sophisticated model of normal development - while retaining the
procedure for deriving the secondary model of atypical development.
If the model of normal development is filled out to include the
behaviour associated with lack of success at specific tasks, than the
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possibllitj emerges for explanations of the changes associated with
age. The account is not limited to describing the emergence of
certain achievements at certain times. The derived model for the
DS infant is, in a corresponding fashion, rendered more complete.
The equivalence mappings which are set up between the two populations
are specified in terns of specific patterns of response. Such an
•enriched* version of the theory is of value for several reasons. It
permits testing, since it makes predictions which go beyond the data
from which it was femulated. If substantiated, it would present a
complete and cohesive model for the development of the PS infant, and
one from which clear implications for manipulative intervention, for
example, could be drawn. If shown to be untenable it would demonstrate
the very limited use of the 'slew development* terminology. Further,
it would bring to light deviations from equivalence, which would thus
constitute differences in development between the two populations.
Such differences would stand in need of explanation, which, if adequately
accomplished, would considerably further understanding of the handicap.
The late emergence of 'milestones' in development is a general
empirical finding for the PS infant (e.g. Carr 197!?). It should be
noted that some of the tasks utilised in the present study bear some
resemblance to certain items employed within psychometric assessment.
For example, tasks concerning 'unwrapping' objects and otherwise
retrieving them from occlusion can be found in the instruments of
Bayley (1969) and Gesell (Gesell & Amatruda 19^7). Such similarity in
tasks might be expected to give rise to some similarity in findings, at
a first level of analysis. At such a level - that of first emergence -
this expectation is confirmed. For the reasons given above, however,
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this finding offers no additional support to the theory of 'slow
development*. It is in analysis at greater depth that the
information is to be sought which will enable an evaluation of the
theory to be made.
5.2 Theoretical Significance of Ffresent Findings
In keeping with general findings on longitudinal assessment, it
was found that the emergence of success on the tasks presented was
always delayed in the DS infant, relative to the normal infant. The
order in which such emergence occurred was generally identical between
the two populations. Thus the kind of result on which current theory
has been constructed is extended from the kinds of achievement
assessed in the psychometric tradition, to the more finely specified
area of cognitive development in the infant. As a description of
the chronological course of initial, criterial achievement, the term
•slow* is clearly legitimate.
Closer analysis revealed, however, that the nature of both
achievement and of failure seemed to be different between the two
populations. In general, normal infants will repeat success in
subsequent sessions; the initial achievement can, therefore, be taken
to represent a solid 'competence' for the task. The infant can be
seen as moving from a state of not-being-able to perform the task, to
a state of being-able to perform it. This kind of saltatory change is
the empirical basis for 'stage* theories of development (although such
theories, of course, have significant theoretical origins too). The
DS infant demonstrates a much lower 'repeatability' of success. In
this respect, such successes - whether initial, or subsequent - cannot
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be given the unambiguous 1nterpretatian that is justified in the
normal case. If th initial achievement is credited as an
indication of 'competence' thai it is difficult to explain
subsequent failure. \n achievement that 'comes and goes' cannot
be equated with one that appears to represent a change of state
at a 'high level' (see b"low, 5.3 for an expansion of this
interpretation).
The state from which successes emerge - and to which response
frequently returns - is not the same across the two populations.
In general, the nature of error patterns in normal infants is
consistent with a developmentally prior state of cognitive structure.
Such error patterns can be used to make diagnosis of cognitive
process, together with which the changes associated with subsequent
achievements may be seen as coherent. Thus the state from which the
(relatively permanent) achievements emerge may be seen as consistent
with a general, high-level description of cognitive structure at that
time. The theoretical accounts of normal development make equal use
(and give equal diagnostic weight) to characteristic successes and to
characteristic errors (Piaget 1955? Bower 197iia). For the DS
infant, in contrast, the nature of error cannot be predicted on the
basis of a status expressed in terms of achievements. differences
occur in diverse ways. The pattern of error may not consistently
manifest the active strategy of search which, it is argued, should
result from the infant's previous achievement. Thus the interpretation
of this previous achievement is called into question. Alternatively,
active search may be exhibited when total inhibition of search is
predicted. In this case, the subsequent achievement of this task -
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in which search Is immediately correct - might seem to be less of
an advance than if it emerges 'complete', as the first kind of
search strategy for the task. Finally, even when the occurrence
of a characteristic error is comparable in the two populations,
there may be differences within the finer structure of the error.
If immediate correction of an error can be seen as an indication of
developmental advance (and analysis of the normal infant would suggest
that it can) then the recording of an error without further analysis
may well lead to under-evaluation of the DS infant.
Both in terms of successes and failures, then - that is, across
response patterns as a whole - differences emerge between the DS and
the normal infant. Only at the most superficial level of analysis -
that of emergence of initial success - can isomorphism be found
between the two populations. Clearly, the 'slow development* theory
fails to predict such differences as have been described. It
assumes that the general fabric of behaviour in the developmental
context is homogeneous across the two populations. Fran a
theoretical point of view, the description of the development of the DS
infant as being 'slow' must be seen as superficial.
It was noted above that the observation of differences would be a
positive result. If the development of the DS infant is not Just 'slow'
but rather 'different' then the nature of such differences must be
examined. It was argued above (p. 36) that an adequate theory of
mental handicap in infancy must be a 'developmental difference' theory,
rather than either a 'pure developmental' (e.g. 'slow development') or
a 'pure difference' (i.e. deficit) theory. It must now be considered
to what extent the current findings contribute to such a 'developmental
difference' theory.
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5.3 Outline of a 'Bevelomental Difference'
Interpretation
Findings presented here have emphasised the differences between
the cognitive development of the DS and the normal infant. This
approach has demonstrated that a 'pure developmental' theory of the
handicap - one which describes differences only in terms of a unitary
'rate' of development - cannot be tenable. At the same time, it is
clear that differences are not absolute. At a first level of analysis,
developmental progress is highly congruent between the two populations.
'Pure difference' theories, which postulate absolute deficiency in the
DS population, are clearly not an acceptable alternative. Both
similarities and differences must be given adequate recognition.
VJhat is required, then, is some framework for theoretically relating
the observed differences. Such a framework should offer some
interpretation for the general difference between the two populations;
it must, however, make it clear that any such general difference is
manifested differently during the course of development. Further it
must emphasise that development is not merely a forum for such
differences to be expressed, but that the differences must also be seen
as an integral part of the developmental process: both contributing to
it, and being affected by it.
Such an approach would emphasise the processes by which development
occurs, rather than the state into which its course may be divided. If
population differences could be expressed in terms of such processes, it
might then be possible to account for the changing manner in which
population differences are expressed with development.
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The Piagetian approach has, In general, emphasised 'state'
analysis. In the present context, this is typified by Inhelder's
(1968) finding that abnormal development could be described using
the 'stage' as a unit of analysis. Findings presented in this
thesis suggest that, at least for the infant with DS, such a 'state'
analysis is not adequate. Frror patterns are not consistent with a
•lower' stage than that associated with success on the same task.
The heuristic properties of the concept of 'stage' are not evident in
this context. On empirical grounds, then, in addition to the
theoretical grounds outlined above, it is clear that a shift of
emphasis from 'states' to 'processes' must be made.
Such a procedure would concentrate on the acquisition of cognitive
processes, rather than their formal properties. This should not be
seen as a complete departure from the Fiagetian approach. Piaget
(1953, 1955) presents an account of acquisition alongside the
descriptions of states. This account is a highly technical one,
which makes use of specifically Piagetian concepts. In what follows,
it is hoped to employ distinctions which do not rely on any one
theoretical system. In this way, a more general account will emerge.
Consistency with the Piagetian approach will, however, be noted when
appropriate.
The distinction to be employed is one between 'high level' and 'low
level' organisation of response. The Piagetian 'schemata' may be seen
as general response systems. Thus:
"In the domain of sensorimotor acquisitions ... actions
become generalised as 'schemata', the organisation of
which crystallizes in a relatively constant form".
(Piaget 1971, p.150)
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Further, the organisation of action may be seen to consist of
different levels of control:
"... the nearest approach of these sensorimotor schemata
to the structure of logical thinking is the differentiation
of schemata into sub-schemata, with a resultant
hierarchical organisation".
(Inhelder & Piaget 196U, p.15)
The concept of hierarchical organisation in the control of action
is a familiar one. Miller et al (i960) note that:
"behaviour is organised simultaneously at several levels
of complexity" (p.l5)
and argue that
"the hierarchical nature of the organisation of behaviour
can be taken as axiomatic" (p.16).
Hierarchical structure has been seen as a major tenet of any theory
of organisation in development (Sroufe 1977). It has been employed
with most precision in the domain of skilled action (Miller et al. I960),
and has been introduced into the study of developmental aspects of skill
(Connolly 1970). It is not proposed to follow any of these approaches
closely. Rather it is being argued that the dimension of 'level of
organisation1 is one that has at least face validity in the present
context.
Piagetian 'stages' may be seen as 'high level' systems of
organisation of response. Thus to interpret behaviour in terms of
'stages' is to emplcy a 'high level' analysis. It has been argued here
that this kind of analysis cannot be adequately performed in the study
of the DS infant. It is now possible to discuss this finding in terms
of the framework of 'levels of organisation'.
- 120 -
There are certain general characteristics of the normal
infant's behaviour in the developmental context which make it
possible to employ 'high level' descriptions. The learning or
acquisition of cognitive skills appears to take place in a
'holistic' fashion. The infant moves from a state of inaccurate
understanding (of certain behaviour in the physical world) to a
state of relatively complete understanding. Learning appears to be
'complete' in that repeated assessment will usually elicit repeated
success, and thus reveal the infant's 'command' of the problem
situation. Moreover, performance on tasks not yet 'understood' will
manifest the consistent and coherent application of strategies
appropriate to a general state or 'stage' of development. Thus,
from the point of view of learning, it seems that the presence of a
coherent and 'rational' error strategy contributes to progress, since
such strategies can rapidly be replaced by equally coherent
successful strategies. The substitution of strategies at a high level
therefore enhances the acquisition of permanent, successful strategies -
i.e. 'achievements'.
In contrast, the manner in which the TS infants acquire the
cognitive skills appears much less to be governed by 'high level'
factors. An initial success on a task is often not repeated on a
subsequent assessment. It would seem necessary to describe learning
in such a case to be 'less complete' than in the normal case. The
initial success must be seen in more limited terms, as a specific
success on a particular occasion, rather than as an indication of a
general 'understanding'. Further, the pattern of response during
failure at a task does not constitute the kind of coherent 'hypothesis'
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which could be readily tested by the infant, and readily replaced
by a more successful!, one. The pattern of response prior to
achievement does not seem such as to increase the probability of
the emergence of such achievement by 'preparing the way' for it.
The delayed emergence of specific achievements is therefore seen as
a secondary phenomenon. It is seen as the result of the general
manner in which acquisition and learning takes place.
The interpretation presented here focusses on general processes
of acquisition rather than on formal features of development. The
empirical work reported here has consisted of the repeated assessment
of performance on certain tasks. No direct stucftr cf learning
processes has been made. The paradigm employed is designed to enable
'diagnosis' or identification of cognitive structure. As such the
limitations on its value with the BS population are implicit in the
above analysis. If the PS infants do not satisfy the behavioural
assumptions fundamental to an analysis of high-level structures, then
a different approach is required in any further investigation. A
more direct, manipulative paradipi would seem to be necessary. Such
a procedure is also called for by the theoretical interpretation
outlined above (p.109). Preliminary consideration should be given
to the kind of manipulative investigation which would be pursued. It
should be possible to identify which specific approaches are likely to
be of value, and, perhaps, to make some prediction as to the efficacy
of different methods of manipulation.
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S.u Implications for ?fcnipulative experimentation
An interpretation of the pattern of cognitive development of
the 16 infant has been presented above. This interpretation gives
central importance to the manner in which the infant learns, and sees
the observed patterns of achievement - including its general
retardation - as being a resultant. Such an orientation clearly
calls for more direct experimental investigation of such postulated
learning processes, rather than mere inference. Further, it has been
argued that such direct, manipulative experimentation is required to
avoid the limitations of the 'clinical' assessment approach.
There are a number of different theoretical approaches to
learning in the context of cognitive development. Bach gives a
different analysis of the natural contribution of learning and, as a
corollary, makes a prediction about the relative efficacy of different
methods of experimental intervention. The approaches range from
'strict behaviourist' interpretations, which concentrate on the
specific responses which constitute success in a given situation, to
cognitive-structural, approaches which concentrate on high-level
strategies of response characterising behaviour in a range of situations.
Corresponding to this range in level of analysis is a distinction
between favoured approaches to intervention. The former 'strict
behaviourist' approach (see Bricker & Bricker 1973) emphasises the
training of specific responses. Learning is seen to arise from the
repeatedly successful (or otherwise reinforced) employment of such
responses. The latter (cognitive-structural) approach predicts that
permanent acquisition will only take place if changes occur at a high
level. Such changes can take place in a manner largely independent of
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specific responses. The most effective method of intervention
should, therefore, operate at the level of general 'schemes'. The
cohesion of such 'schemes' mates it possible to set up 'conflict'
situations between rival schemes, as a result of which the more
adequate scheme will be adopted. Such a high-level change will
then necessarily lead to response changes at the level of behaviour.
The interpretation presented here for cognitive development in
the DS infant (p. 120) can be seen to have implications for
intervention, in view of the above distinctions. It would not favour
the kind of 'high-level' approach described above, since it claims
that the behaviour of the PS infant does not justify such interpretation.
It would predict that a technique aimed at creating 'conflict' at high
levels of cognitive functioning would be unsuccessful. It would,
indeed, claim that such conflict situations are unlikely to arise or to
be easily evoked.
To the extent that stronger forms of the cognitive-structural
approach are not compatible with the overall interpretation presented,
the emphasis must be towards more 'behaviourist' approaches. However,
there are reasons why the stronger foims of this system would also
appear inappropriate. It is not being claimed that there is no order
or structure within the responses of the ES infant. It is not
necessary to conclude that each single achievement must be constructed
out of a series of random responses. The overall similarity of the
results of development - in terms of a sequence of achievements -
indicates that a total absence of structure cannot be postulated. Mhat
is being claimed is that structure must be seen at a lower level with
the IS infants: i.e. at a level less far removed from specific
responses than is appropriate for the normal infant.
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A 'pure' training approach is therefore not seen as an
implication of the interpretation presented here. As will be
discussed in the next chapter, there are also methodological
limitations on such an approach, in the context of cognitive
development. The strongest forms of 'cognitive-structural.'
approaches however - those which make the strongest assumptions
'about the degree of organisation of response - are also, clearly, not
indicated. What seems to be required is an approach which can
transcend specific responses, but which does not overestimate the
degree of organisation in the DS infant's response system. Such an
approach, if found, should offer an appropriate technique for
enhancing performance in the DS infant and, at the same time, give an
insight into the actual process of learning in these infants.
The following chapter presents an investigation of this
possibility. Before experimental work is described, a more detailed
account of the background to manipulative intervention with cognitive
development is given.
- 12$ -
SgjLPTBt VII : KAAIIPtJLATTV'7 ^FRIMgiTATIPN WITH PS INFANTS
(Experiment 6)
1. Introduction
1.1 Manipulative Investigation of Cognitive Pevelom'nent In Infancy
The experimentation reported thus far has taken the form of the
assessment of development. It has therefore been relatively non-
manipulative. It could be argued, of course, that any direct assessment -
and especially repeated testing - must inevitably have some influence on
the subject's development. In general however, it has been assumed that
the results of experimentation can be taken to represent the 'spontaneous'
or natural status of the infant, at that time. For the reasons presented
above (p.l2l) it was decided that more direct, manipulative experimentation
was required to carry forward the study of cognitive development in the DS
infant.
Since 'piaget's (19$3, 19$$) original studies, the impact of specific
environmental effects has been seen to be strictly limited by the infant's
general 'level' of development (as defined by Piagetian procedures).
This standpoint is not conducive to the prosecution of manipulative research.
Such research, however, began to be carried out at certain centres,
following the *r°discovery' of Piaget by Anglo-American psychology (Ripple
& Rockcastle 196k). Partly as a response to this experimental activity,
manipulative studies began to achieve more prominence in the Genevan
literature (e.g. Inhelder & Sinclair 1969; Inhelder et al. 197k).
Fundamentally, these studies have restated the original position but
with the support of experimental evldence. Various methods of short-term
intervention have been applied to children at a certain diagnosed level,
and any associated changes in performance analysed. Most of this work
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has been concerned with school-age children. The results and
methodological issues are held to be general however. The findings
of this work, and, of equal importance, the critical issues in
methodology, will therefore be presented before considering the
contribution of other (non-Genevan) sources.
It has been strongly emphasised that the structural approach to
cognitive development is not concerned with the performance of specific
acts as such. It is general structures, as indexed by such behaviour,
that are of interest. The latter cannot be reduced to the former.
Hence the demonstration that children can be led to exhibit some
specific act as a result of deliberate manipulation is not held to be
of interest. In such a case, the specific act will have lost its
character of representativeness of the global structure. Instead it
is considered necessary to demonstrate at least a minimal degree of
generality for what has been acquired. This may involve the
investigation of transfer to other tasks or situations which are held
to be analogous to that on which training took place. Successful
results of training for which such effects cannot be demonstrated -
i.e. which cannot be shown to have the 'natural' relationship to the
rest of development - are held to be artefactual.
In line with this reasoning, it has been considered legitimate to
use a 'train and transfer' paradigm, in which some kind of concentrated
intervention on one aspect of behaviour has been evaluated by testing
for transfer. Hithin this paradigm, Genevan research has found that
training methods derived from a 'strict behaviourist' methodology have
not been effective in leading to 'true' advancement (inhelder & Sinclair
1969). Any positive, direct results of training have remained .isolated
- 127 -
from cognitive structure as a whole. These methodological
considerations must be seen as a background to any manipulative
experimentation with cognitive development.
1.2 Constraints and Possibilities for Present Study
It is clearly desirable for manipulative experimentation to be
concerned with similar tasks to those employed in the previous studies.
Considerable information is available on the range of performance on
these tasks. Further, any findings related to learning or training
should be seen in the broader context of the conclusions of the
previous studies. However, it is equally important to avoid the
procedure of training the precise skills which are subsequently assessed.
Such procedures (see e.g. Brassell & Punst 1976, 1978) do not meet the
methodological requirements outlined above.
It is to be expected that the general findings of the longitudinal
study will have implications for the design of manipulative
experimentation. It was noted above that the phenomenon of transfer
is of central, importance to the cognitive-structural analysis of the role
of learning. It has, however, been argued (p.120) that the features of
cognitive structure which make such transfer possible in the normal
infant may not be characteristic of the PS infant. The presence of
high-level organisation of responses is taken to be a prerequisite for
transfer. If the proposed interpretation of the behaviour of the PS
infant is correct, then the generality of response patterns would be
predicted to be low. The ready transfer of learning would not be
predicted to be a characteristic of the spontaneous cognitive activity
of the PI infant. Such transfer could not, therefore, be used as an
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independent measure of induced learning. Its absence (for example)
after a programme of training could not be taken as an indication
that meaningful learning had not occurred, since such transfer might
not occur, either, in the 'natural' context of spontaneous
development.
There seems, therefore, to be a conflict between the demands of
theory and the constraints of the population characteristics. Some
degree of transfer, or generality of task responses is necessary in
order that valid interpretations of experimentation can be made.
However, the possibility for such transfer seems to be severely limited
in the population under study.
In considering the limitations of the population, however, it
should be reiterated that an absolute deficit is not being proposed
for the BS population. Rather, it is argued that the degree of
organisation of response is less in the DS infant than in the normal
infant. On this basis it should be possible for a minimal degree of
•transferability' to be demonstrated. ^uch a minimum must be adequate
for the theoretical requirements to be met. In the present chapter,
several different candidates for such a 'minima], transfer' paradigm will
be presented and discussed. Clearly the issue is not merely
methodological. If the general nature of responses (especially of
correct solutions to problems) is an essential part of achievement, then
any limitation of such generality is an important feature of the
behaviour of the DS infant.
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1.3 Approaches to Training
Techniques for training a subject on a task fall into two broad
categories: those in which the subject has a generally passive role,
and those in which he has a more active role. The 'passive'
techniques include the provision of extensive 'experience' of the
task, including the 'revelation' of its solution (e.g. the location
of a hidden object) by the experimenter. The subject may also be
passively guided into making the 'correct' physical response on the
task, and given extrinsic reward subsequently.
It was argued that the subjects in the present study had already
considerable experience of the more 'passive' aspects of task
solution. For example, during the longitudinal study subjects had
frequently been exposed to the experimenter 'solving' the task
(following an error). Such a procedure did not, therefore, seem to
recommend itself as a short-term training technique. Passive
'shaping' had not been employed. However, since the tasks concerned
required spontaneous responses, it was not felt desirable to employ
a procedure which might lead to the inhibition of active behaviour on
the part of the subject. It was anticipated that some degree of
physical involvement by the experimenter might be necessary. It was
not however considered appropriate for this to replace spontaneous
behaviour on the part of the subject.
It was therefore considered desirable to select seme technique
which retained the active role of the subject, but which included
experimental control over certain stimulus features. Terrace (1963)
has reported the technique of 'errorless learning' in. the context of
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discrimination learning in pigeons. The classical procedure
presents to the subject two stimuli to be discriminated.
Presentation is at full intensity, and is simultaneous, from the
start of the learning trials. Response to one stimulus is
subsequently rewarded, and to the other either punished or not
contingently reinforced in any way. Terrace (1963) reported that
learning proceeded faster (took less trials to criterion) when, by
contrast to the classical paradigm, subjects were initially
introduced only to the positive stimulus (response to which was
rewarded). The negative stimulus was introduced subsequently at
low intensity. This stimulus was gradually 'faded' up to an equal
intensity with the positive stimulus. Correct discrimination was
retained during this procedure.
A modification of this procedure has been used successfully in
teaching mentally handicapped children to discriminate colours and
weights (Cullen 1976). Response to one stimulus (e.g. one colour)
is first established on its own. The second stimulus is then 'faded
in' (e.g. by increase in the intensity of hue). During this period,
incorrect responses may be physically prevented by the experimenter.
Response preference for the positive stimulus is retained during
presentation of the complete discrimination problem. The employment
of this procedure has attractive features in the context of the mentally
handicapped child. The 'errorless' nature of learning in which no
'mistakes' are made contrasts strongly with the child's more usual
experience of failure in everyday prohLem-solving situations (see
Zigler, 1973).
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It was decided, therefore, to employ certain features of this
approach in a training technique for tasks assessing cognitive
development. It should however be emphasised that the kinds of
tasks concerned differ markedly from the discrimination-learning
paradigm. In the cognitive-developmental tasks retrieval of an
object is seen as a valid and meaningful act, and one which is
presumed to have certain intrinsic reward value (whatever status such
reward plays in a given theoretical system). With the discrimination-
learning paradigm, selective preference is only meaningful in the
context of contingent, extrinsic reinforcement.
Without neglecting these important differences, there would seem
to be certain general features of the 'errorless learning' technique
which could be applied in the present context. It is possible that
errorless performance might be obtained (and maintained) if additional
featural information were to be provided to the Infant in a certain
task. Some physical restraint might be necessary to prevent incorrect
responses. The transition from the 'training' version of the task to
the 'testing' version (i.e. from one with enhanced featural information
to the standard version) might be seen as a kind of 'fading' in of the
standard version of the task. The next section describes the design of
a specific training procedure.
2. 'Switching' Task
2.1 resign of Training Procedure
It was decided to first devise a training procedure for the
'switching' task, in which an object, concealed beneath one of two
opaque cups is moved non-visibly by transposition of the cups. It has
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been found (Neilson 1977) that a task of similar difficulty is
created by using transparent plastic cups instead of opaque ones.
It might be anticipated that, despite such an initial equivalence
between the two versions, the extra perceptual information present
for the 'transparent1 version might become available to the subject
after a number of trials. That this is the case is suggested by the
earlier emergence of cognitive skills (on longitudinal testing) when
transparent cups are used (Neilson 1977). Frrorless performance
might be obtained on this task, perhaps with some physical restraint
on incorrect responses. A transition from the transparent to the
opaque condition might then be seen as a 'fading' in of the full
version of the task (since direct perceptual cues to correct response
would no longer be present).
In view of the limitations on the use of transfer across tasks
as an experimental procedure, however, it was decided to search for a
less demanding level of generalisation. It was observed that patterns
of incorrect response on the 'switching' task often took the form of a
'side' preference for this task: i.e. that all responses were to the
same side (left or right to the infant), irrespective of the side of
origin of the object. This pattern could not be attributed to a
simple 'handedness', since, first, it usually survived restraint of
the preferred hand, and, second, it was not consistent across other
tasks in the same session.
It was reasoned that the transparent-cup version of the task might
be used to train the infant against this side-bias. If training were
only conducted with respect to this one direction of transposition (e.g.
object starts left, is retrieved right) then subsequent success on the
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standard task (involving both directions of transposition) might be
seen as sufficient generalisation for methodological purposes. This
'side-to-side' generalisation might be seen as a 'minimal transfer'
situation.
One infant was selected from the subjects of the larger 16
study (S^ of that sample). This subject had only once demonstrated
success on the task (to the criterion of consecutive responses for the
two directions of transposition). In general, response patterns were
all to one side (the left) although incorrect responses were frequently
corrected spontaneously. It was decided to test out the technique
with this one subject and consider the results before proceeding.
2.2 Procedure
In addition to standard apparatus and materials, two transparent
plastic cups, of the same dimensions as the opaque cups, were used.
The subject was first given h trials of the standard task, with
opaque cups (with the object starting from alternate sides), RLRL.
Using the transparent cups, the task was then presented for the
direction left-to-right only. After two initial trials (to establish
spontaneous performance) sane restraint was used to prevent or
discourage errors (see Results). In general this consisted of the
restraint of one arm of the subject, thus discouraging (but not
preventing) responses to that side.
When spontaneous correct response had been achieved, retesting
was performed on the standard task. Subsequently (for reasons noted
below) the subject was presented with the task in which the object was
placed beneath the left-hand cup, but in which no transposition took place.
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2.3 Results
Performance on the standard task initially consisted of
responses all to the left-hand cup (after transposition), with
spontaneous correction of errors. For the two unconstrained trials
with the transparent cup, the same response as above was made to the
left-right transposition. For seven training trials, with some degree
of restraint, correct response was made. Finally, for three trials,
the correct response was made immediately without any restraint.
On retesting with the standard task, all responses were made to
the right-hand cup. Those incorrect were immediately corrected. In
view of this reversal of side-preference, the object was hidden twice
on the left without any transposition. Response was made to the right-
hand cup both times, and immediately corrected.
2.U Discussion
It seems clear that a simple reversal of side-preference was created
with respect to this task. Correct response in the training condition
was achieved with relatively few trials. On testing with the standard
task, however, this specific response was employed for both directions
of transposition. Indeed, even when transposition was omitted from the
task, concealment at the left position was responded to with search at
the right. The brief training session appeared, therefore, to have
created a general preference for the other side from that initially
favoured. Thus a substitution of preference occurred, rather than any
generalisation of the successful retrieval of transposed objects.
It would seem that the 'switching1 task, with its simple left-to-
right and right-to-left structure, might be vulnerable to the operation
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of side preferences (whether spontaneous, or brought about by-
manipulation). This does not mean that the paradigm of training
'on one side' might not be, in principle, a useful one. Certainly
the requirements of 'minimal transfer' would seem to be fulfilled
within such a paradigm. However, it probably- requires a more complex
task for the principle to be tested adequately.
It should be noted that short-term modifiability of response
pattern was clearly demonstrated. The apparent plasticity of response
should be seen as a promising indication for manipulation. What was
learned, however, as a result of the brief training schedule, appeared
to be simply a single response. This should be considered in the
light of the predictions made above (p.122).
It was argued above that intervention could not be made at the level
of the kind of general response strategy posited for the normal infant
(p.123). It was also noted, however, that care should be taken to avoid
the training of a single response. It was argued that sane intermediate
level must be found, and that it was at such a level that effective
manipulation would be possible. It would appear that the present
technique failed to avoid the training of a single response. It had
been hoped that a brief training programme might avoid this result, and
retain generality for the response, but this was not the case. It would
clearly be preferable for a training programme to include several
different responses. A more sophisticated design for training wa3
clearly called for.
Finally it should be noted that the obtained generalisation of the
single response in this present case has certain implications. The
erroneous application of this strategy to a more simple task, following
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its adoption in the context of a more difficult one suggests, as
noted above (p. 88) that it is hazardous to assume consolidation for
a task previously achieved. (it should be noted that the subject had
previously registered success on this simpler task). The formerly
successful solution strategy for a task may remain labile and
vulnerable to interference when more difficult tasks are being
approached with a training system. The possibility of disturbing
former acquisition should be borne in mind during any attempted
intervention. More generally, it is clear that the transfer of some
kind of response strategy can, and does take place across tasks for the
DS infant. His behaviour cannot be seen as a sequence of independent
responses. Some degree of organisation must be posited, even if it is
considerably less sophisticated than that of the normal infant.
The pilot study reported here was clearly not successful in its
overall aim. However, it enabled an evaluation of various aspects of
the manipulative approach to be made. In view of this evaluation, it
was decided to design a second training technique, for a different task.
This is reported in the next section.
3. 'Deduction* Task
3.1 Design of Training Procedure
One conclusion of the pilot study reported above was that a task of
more complexity than the 'switching' task should offer more scope for
facilitative training. The standard 'deduction' task fulfils this
requirement, in that it can be seen as consisting of several steps. The
object is first concealed under a cup. It is then displaced to a
position behind one of two screens, by movement of the cup, and the cup is
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returned, still inverted, to its original position. The subject
is required to make a clear search of the cup, followed by direct
retrieval of the object (see p. 81 ).
It is necessary for the infant to initiate search on the
discovery that the object is absent from the cup. The cognitive
status of an 'expectation' that the object will be in a specific
place is not yet clear. However, it might be predicted that the
raising of such an expectancy might enhance the likelihood both of
initial search of the cup, and of any subsequent search. The nature
of such subsequent search - whether 'global' and undifferentiated, or
directed to occluders - would not be expected to be altered by such
increased expectancy. Any raising of expectancy for the object to
be under the cup should not, therefore, be expected to increase the
likelihood of correct search simply as an artefactual result of
training. It will be recalled that, during the longitudinal study,
the DS infant was more likely than the normal infant to make an
incorrect search at occluders (see p.111). For the DS infant,
therefore, any raising of expectancy for the object to be under the cup
might be expected to Increase the occurrence of search at occluders,
but not of correct search per se.
The task involves the retrieval of an object from behind a screen,
following the 'visit* of the cup to that screen during its trajectory.
Clearly the infant must attend closely to the trajectory of the cup,
and use this information in subsequent search. If a task could be
devised which included these features, and which the infant were able
to perform, its inclusion might enable transfer of this strategy across
to the complete task.
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Two 'training steps' were devised on the basis of these
demands. In the first, the cup would go through its standard
trajectory, but without leaving the object behind the screen.
This step would return the object to its initial position, inside
the cup. In the second training step, the cup would be taken
through the first part of its trajectory only. It would remain
behind the screen, with the object still inside it. Since both
steps lead to the object remaining in the cup, the successive
solution of these steps by the subject might be predicted to result
in an enhanced expectancy for the object to be found there. The
second step would also, specifically, call for close attention by
the subject to the cup's trajectory, since the cup could remain behind
one of the two screens. It was hoped that these aspects of the
training steps would, in some sense, transfer to the standard task.
It should be noted that transfer at a high level of generality was not
being predicted.
It was necessary to design a procedure for presentation of the
training steps and the standard task, such that methodological
requirements would be met, but also that any transfer would be within
the limitations of the subject. In the pilot study noted above, it
was attempted to employ 'side to side' transfer. It was decided to
make further use of this procedure, but in a way which avoided the
problems encountered in the pilot study. If the two training steps
were presented with respect to the same side - that is, if the cup
first returned from, and then remained behind, the same screen - then
a single trial of the standard task might be given with respect to the
other side. In that case, a correct response - with the removal of
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the screen on this 'new* side - would be novel with respect to imed¬
iately nrior responses. It could therefore be seen as a valid single
trial of 14ie task. The series of *training steps' and single task
trials could he extended to generate a sequence vtiioh contained as many
single trials of tie standard task as were normally employed. In the
new sequence, however, such individual trials would he separatee! from
each other by the 'training stems'. It should he noted that the ortho¬
dox design of pre—test and post—test with a training period in between -
commonly employed in studies of learning and cognitive development - was
not adopted here. Training and most—testing were, effectively, inter-
woven instead of being presented in sequence. Interest wan centred on
nerfomance during the course of the manipulative procedure, not on nerf--
ormance following its completion (concerning which no prediction was made).
3.2 nrocedure
Subjects wore four of the DS infants who had participated in the
longitudinal study. Mean nge v/as 29.0 months. Subjects had either
shown no success at all on the standard deduction task during the long¬
itudinal study, or, following some earlier success, had not demonstrated
success in the most recent sessions. Two subjects fell into each
category.
Subjects were first presented with the standard task in its usual
form (with a maximum of four trials). The special sequence was then
administered as follows:
Trial ?k>, 123456789 10 11 12 13 14
subject's left: tl t2 S tl t2 s til fcl
subject's right: tl t2 S tl t2 3
(tl,t2 =3 training steps 1,2; 3= single trial of standard tank)
- 1.40
Following the special sequence, the usual (four-trial) fom of the stan¬
dard task vas r,resented again. Fine© "the single trials in the sequence
constituted 'post-tests', thin presentation was termed the 'final post-test',
3.3 Penults
As can be soon from Table 10, all subjects failed the pre—test.
All subjects succeeded in performing the training steps in the sequence.
It should be noted that these steps themselves constituted problem-solving
situations. Three of the four subjects succeeded on the single trials
of tho deduction task within the sequence. Hue to fatigue and inattent¬
ion, only two subjects were presented with the final mst-test. Of
these two, one registered success and one failure.

















;S1 10 - + + - +
32 22 mm + + + —
33 26 mm + + 0 —
37 33 mm + mm 0 -f
Keyi + 8 pass - : fail 0 : not administered
3,4 Discussion
Taking tho overall results on the four DS infanta who participated,
it can be seen that the technique was generally successful. That is,
most infants who failed the pre—test on the task were able to demonstrate
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success on identical trials when these trials were embedded in a
certain sequence of training trials. The design of the procedure
ensured that correct response to a trial of the task could not be
made merely on the basis of a single, previously rewarded response.
Instead more general features of the 'training* trials must have
contributed to success. It should be emphasised that special
training was not given to the subjects to enable them to perform
the 'training steps'. It was, apparently, in the performance of
these steps - and in the contiguity of presentation with the standard
task - that training or transfer effects occurred. Thus it was the
context in which the task was administered that must be credited with
the enhancing effect. Some interaction between the cognitive skills
of the infant and the actual performance of certain tasks facilitated
the performance of the deduction task when presentation of the two
tasks was intercalated. Enhancement of performance was therefore
achieved by the manipulation of the form of presentation, not by
direct training.
U. General Piscussion
Following the longitudinal assessment of cognitive development in
the DS infant, it was argued (p.120) that response could not be seen as
organised on as high a level as in the case of the normal infant.
Response patterns could not satisfactorily be summarised in terms of
general 'stages'. Rather, much lower-level - or local - features of
organisation were posited. The unreliable nature of specific
achievements reduced the status of such achievements as parameters of
development. It clearly became illegitimate to isolate specific
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achievements from the overall context of response pattern, and to
construct a model of development on such data.
It was argued that these characteristics imposed severe
limitations on the paradign of non-manipulative assessment. The
stucty- of controlled manipulation of response was therefore needed
to pursue the analysis of cognitive development in these infants.
Further, the results of different methods of manipulative intervention
might enable the posited characteristics to be described with greater
precision. The postuLation of meaningful levels of organisation
between the single response and the 'stage' of development stands in
need of clarification.
The first method attempted clearly failed to transcend the level
of the specific response. No information was obtained with respect
to the proposed model. The second technique, however, produced
positive results. Instead of presenting some training sequence, and
subsequently re-presenting the test task, these two elements were
integrated within a single sequence. Under these conditions, and
without the necessity for repeated experience on the training elements,
successful transfer to the standard task occurred for three out of
four subjects.
The absence of training on the 'training' elements is a crucial
factor. The 'training' elements were merely performed (successfully)
by the infant, not subjected to prolonged training. The state of
affairs required for transfer to the standard task did not have to be
constructed by manipulation: it already existed. The paradigm merely
placed the different tasks in a certain temporal relationship. It
presented the task within a structured environment, designed to exploit
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the subject's present abilities. In this context, success was
achieved.
The absence of success on subsequent presentation of the
standard task emphasises that the manipulation had not led to high-
level permanent changes. It had enhanced performance by eliciting
it within a certain context. Thus, as argued previously, the
successful performance en a task cannot be interpreted in terms of
•competence'. It cannot be assumed that some general stage has now
been reached. Such success may be highly dependent on support of
the ambient environment. As before, also, the corollary applies:
the state prior to a specific achievement may be capable of supporting
success, given a certain structure in the administration of the task.
The nature of the transfer must still be considered, whatever the
status of success achieved with its assistance. It was argued, in
discussing the design of the training elements, that the expectancy for
the object to be found in the cup should be increased for the standard
task, when presented in the training sequence. This appears to have
been the case. The influence of the training element in which the cup
remained behind a screen was, perhaps of greater significance. It
appeared that performance on this task demanded attention to the specific
trajectory of the cup, and that some transfer of this process
subsequently occurred.
Further consideration will be given to these points below, in
comparing the performance of the DS infant with that of the normal infant
in the same manipulative context.
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CHAPTER VIII : COMPARATIVE MANIPULATION STUDY IflTH NORMAL INFANTS
(Experiment 7)
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, an account was given of a manipulative
procedure which enhanced the performance of DS infants on a certain
task. The manner in which this enhancement might have taken place
was considered. It was emphasised that the procedure should not be
seen as a training programme for the specific task. Rather, it
should be seen as a technique for harnessing certain skills and making
than available in the task situation.
So far, then, consideration has been given to the manipulative
technique as a means of clarifying the cognitive functioning of the DS
infant. Consideration has not been given to the ways in which
differences between DS and normal infants might be illuminated by the
employment of this technique. This possibility is explored in the
current chapter, in which comparative results are presented for the use
of the technique with normal infants. It should be emphasised, however,
that such a comparative analysis is to some extent independent of the
within-population analysis presented earlier. The results obtained for
the DS infants (albeit preliminary) are of interest irrespective of the
results for normal infants.
The most striking result for the DS infants was the finding that
infants who registered failure on a pre-test of the 'deduction* task
might pass equivalent trials of this task when these were embedded in a
certain sequence of related trials. The major question for a
comparative investigation, therefore, concerns the extent to which such
•enhancement' of performance is possible with the normal infant. Infants
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from the two populations may be matched in terms of failure on the
pre-test of the specific task. In view of the general findings of
this thesis, such matching must be seen, of course, as of limited
accuracy. Given initial failure, performance on the standard
sequence may be compared.
It has been argued throughout this thesis that the cognitive
development of the DS infant must be seen as different from that of
the normal infant. In the present context, such a difference would
be sought between the responses to the manipulative programme (given
equivalence in terms of specific achievement). The mean age of the
four DS infants who participated in the study was 2f>.0 months.
Normal infants equated with the DS infants on the basis of failure on
the specific task would be younger. From the evidence of the earlier
comparative study (Chapter VI) normal infants matched in this fashion
would be expected to be aged between ll* - 18 months. If any
differences were to be found with respect to the response to a training
programme, they would be predicted to favour the older group. The
straightforward nature of this prediction should not be obscured by the
fact that, in the present case, the older group consists of handicapped
infants.
In the present case, the DS group generally showed a positive
response to the programme. It might be predicted that the younger,
normal group - equated on initial performance - would fail to show such
a response. Instead, performance on the trials of the task presented
in the sequence would not be higher than that on the initial testing.
If this prediction were validated, then the positive response of
the BS infants would have greater implications than have so far been
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discussed. A clear difference in the cognitive status of the DfS
infant and the normal infant v»uld have been demonstrated. If. on
the other hand, it were found that normal infants* performance could
be enhanced as readily as that of the 06 infants, then ouch conclus¬
ions about population differences could not be drawn. The implic¬
ations for the hf! infant considered above (p. 142) would need to be
re-considered.
An noted above (a. 126) it has generally been armed that perf¬
ormance inappropriate to a child's cvtrrerrfc cognitive structure
cannot be elicited e?®ent by specific training of sinrle responses.
As has been emphasised, the present technique avoids such a procedure.
Therefore only infants who can pass the task in its standard form
should be able to pass it within the context of the special proced¬
ure. This prediction that the special procedure will not affect the
level of performance of the normal infant would seem to be consistent
with the Piapetian approach to the relative status of cognitive struct¬
ure and learning (see Inhelder et al,, 1074), If, ayainst current
prediction, enhancement were to occur for the normal infant, careful
consideration would have to be riven to the theoretical implications
of such a result.
So far it has been assumed that normal infants will perform
successfully on the two 'training steps'. It is the performance on
the 'deduction* trials which has heen the focus of attention. It is
possible, however, that infants will in fact require training on these
steps — that is, they may not spontaneously register immediate success
on them. If so, the decree of equivalence with the DS sample — and
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therefore the validity of comparison - will be reduced. However,
even if this were to be the case, it would still be valuable to
compare the effect of the 'enhancement' procedure. If normal
subjects were to demonstrate enhanced performance within the special
sequence, but only following training on the other steps, then this
factor would have to be taken into account in comparing the two
populations. It was clearly necessary to recognise this possibility
in designing the experimental procedure.
In conclusion then, it was predicted that - in contrast to the DS
subjects - normal infants would not manifest enhanced performance
within the context of the procedure under consideration. Failure at
an initial testing would be associated with failure within the training
sequence. No specific prediction was made concerning performance on a
re-testing of the task, following the presentation of the 'training'
sequence. It should be emphasised that it was performance during this
sequence - not after it - that was of greatest interest. Discussion
will, however, be made of the findings on this point.
2. Subjects
It was hoped to investigate the behaviour of a number of normal
infants for whom a clear failure on the initial task could be demonstrated.
It was clearly necessary, however, to avoid subjects too young for the
task to be meaningful. This requirement was to be met partially by
behavioural criteria in performance. Js an additional precaution,
however, it was decided to select a preliminary sample of whom the
majority would be expected to fail on the task. The anticipated presence
of some infants demonstrating initial success on the task would suggest
- UU8 -
that the remaining infants constituted a valid sample for the
investigation.
Inspection of the results of the earlier comparative study
(Chapter VI) showed that for infants between the ages of lit - 19
months, some 20% might be predicted to register success on the task.
The remaining proportion would consist of subjects appropriate for
present purposes.
Twelve infants were therefore selected from the subject pool
described above (p. ?5>)j two for each month of age fran lit months to
19 months inclusive. There were six infants of each sex in the sample.
3. Procedure
Subjects made a single visit to the laboratory. Apparatus and
material were the same as described above for previous experimentation.
The session was videotaped for subsequent analysis.
Each subject was given the same series of tasks and trials, with
the proviso that in the case of failure at a certain point (described
below) certain additional trials were introduced before continuing.
First subjects were given the 'AAB' task as described above (p.UO ).
This was done to provide evidence on the cognitive status of the infant,
but also to serve as a 'warming-up' procedure. It was hoped thereby
that any failure on the pre-test attributable to non-cognitive factors
would be avoided.
The standard version of the 'deduction task' was thai given (p.136).
Subjects were given a maximum of four trials (on alternate sides) in
which to register two successive passes on this task. If they did not,
a 'fail' was recorded.
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The sequence of trials which was to include individual trials
of the 'deduction' task was then administered. The sequence was
the same as that described above (p.139) for the DS sample. Thus
the two different 'training steps' were both presented to each side
of the subject. A single trial of the 'deduction' task was then
presented. Thereafter such trials alternated with the presentation
of the 'training steps' such that 'testing' was made with respect to
the opposite side than that on which 'training' had just taken place,
A maximum of four separate trials of the 'deduction' task - embedded
in the sequence - were given.
If the infant's initial response to the 'training steps' was not
successful, additional training was given. Since both 'training
steps' culminated with the object being located underneath the inverted
cup, training on these steps consisted of giving additional cues
concerning this location. The cup was either tapped on its base, or,
if necessary, partially lifted to reveal the object. Such additional
training was carried out with respect to both sides (left-hand and
right-hand-side). It was continued until the step was successfully
performed without such additional cues, after which the standard
sequence was continued. In subsequent analysis, a clear record was
taken of such additional training. It will be noted that such a
procedure was not required with the PS sample (p.lU2).
Having completed the sequence of trials, including up to four trials
of the 'deduction' task, re-testing on the standard version of the task
was made. This final set of trials was, however, not always
administered, due to subject fatigue.
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2*. Results
Results are summarised in Table 11. It can be seen that three
out of the twelve subjects registered a pass on the pre-test. This
proportion is in reasonable accord with the expectation of a 20$ pass
rate. In terns of the sampling precautions described above, then,
it was considered that the remaining nine infants constituted a valid
sample.
Of those infants who failed the 'deduction' task in the pre-test,
two succeeded on the task within the sequence. The mean age of these
two infants was marginally below the mean age of the nine infants.
On this basis, the general expectation that the normal infant's
performance would not be enhanced by the present technique received
support.
In addition to the initial sampling criteria, several behavioural
features were observed in order to assess the cognitive status of the
infants. Two infants failed to achieve any success on the initial 'MB'
task. These infants might be described, in formal terms, as 'not
ready' for the deduction task (Piaget 1955). This was in contrast to
the BS infants in Experiment 6, all of whom had (previously) registered
success. The same two normal infants (only) required extra training
on the individual steps in the sequence. For the purposes of obtaining
comparative data, for subjects formally matching the BS infants, it was
considered legitimate to eliminate these two subjects from analysis.
Having done so, it was found that one subject out of seven had succeeded
on the task within the sequence, following initial (pre-test) failure.
This finding enabled a comparison to be made with the BS infants,
of whom 3 out of 2| were successful on the trials within the sequence
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following nre-test failure. Fisher'b Exact Probability test «5S
carried out to determine whether the difference in performance
enhancement between the two croups could be considered significant*
Exact probability was found to be p=«0.0B5 (one-tailed). The observed
difference therefore fails to reach significance. The result is
however suyyestive of a superiority on behalf of the EE infants.
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TABLE 11 Results of Manipulation with •Deduction' Task for
Normal Infants ("xperiment 7)
Subjeot Age
(mths)





si 18 + + + + +
S2 19 + - + -
S3 15 + - + - -
SU 17 - - 0
% 16 + + + + -
S6 15 + - + -
17 + - + + -
S8 18 + - + - 0
S9 1h + + + - 0
orH
CO Ih + + - -
S11 19 + - + - 0






In contrast to the DS infants, normal subjects generally failed
to respond positively to the procedure designed to enhance performance
on the •deduction' task. Numbers of subjects were small, and the
level of significance achieved by the difference was minimal. This
result should therefore be seen as a suggestive, rather than a
conclusive one. Discussion of the implications of this comparison
will be presented following a brief consideration of the behaviour of
the normal infants as such.
In keeping with expectation derived from the literature, it was
predicted that normal infants' performance on the given task would not
be enhanced by the simple procedure applied. This prediction received
support. One implication of this finding is that the individual trials
of the 'deduction' task set within the sequence could indeed be seen as
valid trials. That is, the design of the presentation was not such as
to alter the character of the task to the extent that it could no longer
be regarded as an adequate test. Any enhanced performance within the
sequence could not be attributed to purely artefactual causes. Rather,
it would have to be attributed to population differences between the
cognitive status of the infants.
Most of the norma], infants performed adequately on the intermediary
steps in the procedure, without specific training. It should be noted
that the first of these steps consists of the retrieval of an object from
multiple occlusion (a cup behind a screen). In terms of the six stages
of sensorimotor development, Piaget (1955* p.81) describes such a task as
representative of the same stage (Stage PI) as the 'deduction' task
itself. It is therefore of interest that such a clear difference in
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achievement was observed for these two tasks. This point will not
be discussed further. However it should be noted that the
discrepancy between the two tasks is of importance for the evaluation
of the DS infants' performance. It could not be argued that their
success at this 'multiple occlusion' task indicates a 'dormant'
competence for the 'deduction' task. Such an explanation would make
an erroneous assumption about the equivalence of the two tasks. "
The small size of the present sample precludes further statistical
analysis. However it might be noted that only one normal subject out
of four passed the final re-test, following a pass within the sequence.
This finding emphasises that it is performance within the sequence that
is of interest. The sequence is not to be seen in toto as a training
condition, for which subsequent performance would be the criterion of
effectivenes s.
With respect to the normal infant, then, it can be seen that
performance on a pre-test constitutes a valid index of the infant's
competence. Current cognitive structure is generally stable, and
resistant to manipulation. Performance cannot be enhanced merely by
presenting a trial of the 1ask in a certain temporal relationship to
trials of other tasks which are already in the repertoire.
It is now possible to consider the implications of the differences
in results obtained for the DS and the normal subjects. First the
posited equivalence between the two samples should be discussed. Formal
matching was achieved by selecting those infants who failed the initial
testing of the 'deduction' task. It was argued above (p.lQli) that such
a procedure cannot in fact be legitimate, and that such formal equivalence
is relatively superficial. Indeed, it is in the deviation from
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equivalence that population differences, by their very nature, must
be sought. However, it is possible that a failure of matching had
occurred which was of a merely procedural nature, and which therefore
has no relevance for population differences. If this were the case,
then little would have been said about the differences between DS and
normal infants.
Two of the DS infants had exhibited success on the 'deduction' task
prior to the experimental session (of whom one was successful during the
special sequence). It was assumed that the normal infants would not
have exhibited such success, if prior assessment had been carried out.
If such previous success should be seen as an indication of a stage-like
transformation of cognitive structure, then more stringent attention
should have been paid to this feature in initial matching. It has been
argued strongly, however, that single successes (on the part of the DS
infant) cannot be seen in such terms. That is, this feature should not
be seen in formal terms as a characteristic on which simple matching can
take place. The status of such successes is, it was argued, different
for the two populations. Further, it should be noted that both DS
infants who had shown no such prior success were successful within the
special sequence.
A second area in which formal matching might be argued to have been
inadequate is with respect to the current status of the infants in terms
of achievement (rather than of failure). It might be assumed (with
Piaget 1955) that the 'deduction' task could not be tackled if the 'MB'
task were still to elicit 'place errors' (see p. kO). In comparing the
contemporary (same-session) performance of the normal infants with prior
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achievement of the DS infants (who were not assessed on this task
during the experimental session) a similar pattern is found. For
both samples, all infants but one demonstrated success on the task,
and the remaining infant demonstrated sub-criterial success (i.e.
success for one direction, e.g. left/left/right). Thus, whatever the
true role of capacity for this task, no straightforward error in matching
took place with respect to it. Thus there is no reason to believe that
any simple error in initial matching was responsible for the observed
superiority of the DS sample. Even if single previous success on the
part of the DS infant were to be interpreted as a 'competence' for that
task - an assumption which cannot be Justified - no evidence for formal
superiority of the DS sample could be found. It must therefore be
concluded that the difference observed in results is one which reflects
underlying differences between the two populations.
The major variable on which the samples differed was chronological
age. This is the variable which the technique of 'equivalent-age'
matching attempts to control. It may be concluded, therefore, that the
employment of this technique is not legitimate with the present populations.
Chronological age cannot be controlled for in a straightforward manner.
Neither, however, can it be seen as an explanation in itself for observed
differences. Having observed an age-related difference in performance
following matching on formal criteria, consideration must be given to the
possible causes of such a difference.
In discussing the results of the longitudinal study with IS infants,
it was suggested that the observed pattern of achievement might be seen as
reflecting processes of acquisition (p.118). If successes appeared
relatively isolated - and not integrated into a coherent response strategy -
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then it would seem likely that acquisition was taking place in a
similar piecemeal fashion. It was argued above (pJ-23 ) that it was
not likely that successful intervention could take the form of the
elicitation of 'conflict' at high levels of cognitive functioning.
This argument could be extended to suggest that such a process is an
unlikely candidate for the mechanism of spontaneous acquisition. In
general, it is Implied that the pattern of spontaneous high-level
acquisition observed in the normal infant should not be expected in
the DS infant. The findings of the present manipulative study should
be seen against this background.
In one sense the results can be seen as positive for the IS
infants. They were shown to be capable of acquiring a certain
competence when formally equivalent normal infants were not. However,
the results can be seen from a different point of view, when the more
general comparative findings are taken into account. The fact that
the IB infants responded positively to the highly-structured programme
makes it necessary to account for their failure to acquire the
equivalent competence spontaneously. If successful performance could
be elicited so readily then the previous - or rather, contemporary -
failure during standard presentation is all the more striking. This
contrast would seem to emphasise the problems resulting from the
procedure of matching on formal grounds. The co-existence of the two
kinds of response to the same task - contingent on the context of
presentation - is not consistent with the picture of coherent, high-
level structure. Formal equivalence would appear to be relatively
superficial.
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The relative handicap of the DS infants, in spontaneous
development, is therefore emphasised by the present results. If
developmental outcome had not already been adversely affected, the
achievement under consideration would alreacty" have taken place. The
problem of deliberately eliciting it would not have arisen. It is
only because of the population differences in the context of cognitive
development that a situation arises in which the DS infants may
demonstrate relative superiority. More generally, it is clearly not
possible to say that the DS infants are 'better' or 'worse' than the
matched normal subjects. The differences cannot be reduced to such
a dimension.
The purpose of the present comparative study was to extend the
investigation of differences between the two populations by employing
a more direct, manipulative approach. This method has revealed
differences which are consistent with those found during longitudinal
assessment.
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CHAPTER IX : CONCLUSIONS
1. Beyond 'Slow Development1
It has been argued in this thesis that a theory of 'slow
development' - whether couched in psychometric or in Piagetian
terms - cannot be adequate to explain the phenomenon of mental
handicap in infancy and early childhood. First it was shown that
problems of circularity are associated with the theory, with respect
to its claim to explanatory status. Two approaches make it possible,
in principle, to avoid these problems. A precise underpinning of
neurophysiological evidence would provide a more fundamental level of
explanation, and thus avoid circularity at the level of behaviour.
The necessary degree of precision is not yet available for such a
step to be undertaken. The second approach has been given considerable
attention in this thesis. It consists in enriching the behavioural
account in the theory such that real predictions can be made. In this
form empirical testing may be carried out. It has been demonstrated
that such testing fails to support the strong claims made by the theory.
The theory can only be seen as expressing certain aspects of the effect
of mental handicap on developmental outcome. 'Slow development' is
therefore a description, and not an explanation.
It should be noted that varying degrees of status may be accorded
'slow development' within a broader theoretical account. Thus if
'developmental level' is seen as the determinant of behaviour then a
theory of 'slow development' will, correspondingly, be seen as a
complete explanation of abnormal behaviour. This position is implicit
in the Piagetian approach (but see lis 2, below). If, instead,
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development is seen as a general pattern which influences
behaviour (rather than determining it) then a theory of 'slow
development' can co-exist with theories more directly related to
performance. Thus an overall theory of 'slow development' may be
seen as compatible with a lower-level account of 'learning
difficulties' (e.g. Cunningham 197U). Such an eclectic approach is,
in all likelihood, the most appropriate for the immediate concerns
of caretaking and education. However, it is unsatisfactory from a
theoretical point of view. If a high-level theory of development is
found to be inadequate in its predictions to behaviour, then allowing
such a theory to retain authority must be counter-productive. If it
is tacitly accepted that explanation at a much lower level is
necessary, then the problem of accounting for more general aspects of
developmental change must be recognised.
Having rejected a theoiy of 'slow development', it might be thought
necessary to account for those similarities which do emerge between the
populations. This question transcends the present context: it should
be seen as an aspect of the general problem of the uniformity of
development. That is, an explanation for the similarities in
developmental pattern between the DS and the normal child cannot be
separated from the explanation for regularity - or 'canalization' - in
normal development (Waddington 1957). Moreover, it should be
emphasised that the genotypic difference in Down's Syndrome represents
only a fraction of the total chromosomal material. Total differences
would not be predicted: the genotype is still that of a human infant.
This thesis has enphasised the occurrence of differences, in order
to demonstrate the inadequacy of an approach which ignores them.
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However, it should be made clear that the approach being advocated
is not a simple 'deficit* model. As noted above (p. 36 ) neither
simple 'deficit' nor simple 'developmental' models have proved
adequate in attempting to account for the phenomenon of mental
handicap across the life-span. Any differences must be thought of
a3 differences of degree, rather than absolute ones. Further, they
cannot be seen as determining the characteristies of mature behaviour
but rather as one influence on developmental outcome. The
differences will be manifested in differait ways during development,
since they only contribute to outcome (and do not solely determine
it). This approach, then, is the framework of a 'developmental
difference' theory. Such a theory does not, like the 'slow
development' model, tend to discourage investigation (by the
maintenance of a 'Null Hypothesis' of the absence of differences).
On the contrary, it immediately leads to questions concerning the
nature and varying role of these differences. Further, it encourages
the investigation of the contribution of ambient environment to
behaviour and to developmental outcome - with the prospect of designing
techniques of practical intervention. These implications will be
discussed at greater length below (IX: 5).
2. The Contribution of the Piagetian Approach
Arguments have been presented above (p. 9 ) for the importance of
the Piagetian approach to the problem of mental handicap in infancy.
Some of these arguments concern the status of the Piagetian system with
respect to developmental psychology as a whole. These issues - such
as the significance of Piaget's 'Object Concept' for other areas of
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development - are beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate.
Some conclusions can be drawn, however, with respect to more
specific aspects of the Fiagetian approach. On this basis, an
assessment of the value and the limitations of the Piagetian
contribution can be made. For such an assessment to be adequate,
it will be necessary to discuss certain aspects of the system in
greater depth than has been appropriate in presenting experimental
results.
Certain findings of this thesis have been presented as
contradictory to a Piagetian model of development. The apparent
lack of coherence in the performance of the two initial subjects
(p. 1x2 ) and, more significantly, the low repeatability of achievement
in the larger sample (p. 86 ) were contrasted with certain assumptions
about consistency in development. The form of the Piagetian system
employed here was one in which all behaviour is seen as totally
determined by high-level * cognitive structures' to the extent that
performance must manifest such structure without distortion by other
factors. Further, it was taken that behavioural achievement must
reflect high-level change, which could be seen as of a permanent
nature (until transcended by further high-level change). Once
attained, therefore, such behavioural achievement should be maintained
perfectly.
Such an 'ideal' version of the Fiagetian system is certainly
inaccurate. Piaget (1953, p. 21ii) notes that behaviour patterns may
appear sporadically prior to the stage of which they will be
characteristic. Behaviour patterns may be 'transitional' with respect
to two clear stagesj this term is of most methodological importance in
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connection with 'concrete operations' (e.g. Fiaget & InhaLder 1969),
but is also discussed with respect to sensori-motor (i.e. infant)
development (Piaget 193#). Thus the Piagetian model is much less
rigid than has been assumed at certain points in this thesis. For
this reason, the findings reported here should not be seen, in
themselves, as a challenge to Piagetian theory. In this connection,
however, they aaphasise the importance of avoiding the employment of
over-simplified versions of the Piagetian system. This point will
be developed further below.
The fact that present findings cannot be seen as the
'falsification' of Piagetian claims does not diminish their potential
importance. The findings on which most weight has been placed
demonstrate differences between the BS and the normal population.
These differences do not rely on any specific reading of Piagetian
theory. In general, they concern features which are recognised, but
not emphasised, by the Piagetian approach. On a range of such
features - concerning the nature of error patterns, and the longitudinal
pattern of achievement - it has been shown that deviations from an
'ideal' pattern are significantly greater for the PS population. In
investigating such 'deviations' it is clear that a step outside
Piagetian theory has been taken. While recognising the presence of
'noise' in the system, and taking it into account when analysing
behaviour, it is with the 'signal' of development - as expressed in
i -v x ' ' ' ;'VC ' . ' Xrt
formal terms - that Piaget is always most concerned. Where differences
are observed, they must be accounted for in terms of formal structure.
This approach has not been adopted in this thesis.
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However, in view of the possibility that a somewhat
impoverished version of Piagetian theoiy may have been employed,
this issue requires more detailed consideration. The clearest
examples of these problems in interpretation occur in considering
the findings of Inhelder (1968). As noted above (p. 18 ) it is
claimed by Inhelder that:
"(there is) no room for doubt as to the structural
identity of the intellectual reactions (between
retarded and non-retarded subjects)" (p.280).
If the findings of this thesis can be expressed in terms of
'structural* differences, a clear conflict with the position of
Inhelder will have emerged. Such an interpretation would hinge on
the definition of the term 'structural'. For Inhelder, its use
indicates that the behaviour of all the retarded subjects could be
accounted for in terms of the 'normal levels' of development - even
if 'oscillation' between different levels had to be postulated. It
is this specific usage - in the context of 'disequilibrium' (see p. 18
above) - that must be examined. It is possible that the manner in
which Inhelder accounts for apparent deviance - from the pattern of
'homogeneous fixation' at a certain level - is also appropriate to
the findings in this thesis. If such were the case then, since
'disequilibrium' does not exclude 'structural identity', 'structural'
•
differences would not have been obtained ty this thesis. If, on the
other hand, present findings cannot adequately be subsumed under
Inhelder's 'disequilibrium' it would be justified to claim that
structural differences had indeed been found.
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For Inhelder, 'disequilibrium1 as a characteristic of mental
structure is manifested ty oscillation between different levels of
reasoning during a single session. The most direct comparison with
present findings therefore concerns the manipulative study (Chapter
VII) in which enhancement of performance was demonstrated in a
single session. Inhelder (1968) describes subjects who exhibit
progress between two levels of reasoning, during a session, as
demonstrating 'progressive' oscillation (see above p. 18 ). The
achievement gained during the session is seen as a relatively
permanent one (as assessed by the subject's verbal justification of
his decisions). To the extent that transfer of the DS infants'
success (within the special sequence) to a re-test was not demonstrated,
It could not be concluded that real and permanent achievement had been
made. 'Progressive oscillation' would not appear to be an adequate
explanation of the present findings with DS infants.
Inhelder also discusses 'true oscillation', a form of
'disequilibrium' In which the subject demonstrates excessive sensitivity
to environmental influences. If the structured presentation of a
sensori-motor task can be considered analogous to suggestion in a verbal
interview - in that environmental influences are being deliberately
controlled - then 'true oscillation' migjit be invoked as a common
explanation. It should be emphasised that this feature was seen as
characteristic of only a fraction of Inhelder's (1968) sample. To the
extent that the findings of this thesis are being presented as general,
the explanation would appear to be less satisfactory. Further,
Inhelder's claim for the sufficiency of 'structural' explanations would
appear to be weakened by the specific account offered for 'true
- im
oscillations'• This account emphasises the role of non-Intellectual
factors. For those subjects who exhibit 'true oscillations'
"the ... need for approval in so incorporated in their
way of thinking that they cannot decide on any sol¬
ution. To attribute this trouble to reasoning (fees
not explain it. It isn't sufficient to analyse the
intellectual development of the subject? it is also
necessary to analyse his affective relationships"«
(Inhelder i960, r. 267)
If this specific account were invoked to explain the current findings,
then the inadequacy of the 'analysis of intellectual development*
would have to be seen as of general application. Hie Piayetian emph¬
asis on 'structural' or 'formal' features would then have little force.
Even if formal considerations are not adequate to explain every
kind of response in the mentally retarded, they are certainly seen as
the basis for a description of the problem. Thus Inhelder's (1968)
major claim might be expressed as the sufficiency of a stare theory of
development to describe responses. That Is, any subject may he
described as either 'fixed* at one sta.ee, or as oscillating between
several stapes {in a variety of ways). However, if single achievements
are used to assign subjects to a stage the resulting analysis will be
relatively superficial. It is in connection with such usage that the
concent of 'oscillation' has boon reintroduced (Vtohlheutor f Sindberg
1979) to refer to variability in performance across noonions.
Use concept of 'stage' must however go beyond single achievements.
Those aspects of behaviour which guarantee the legitimacy of 'structural'
models must be taken into account. It is with respect to these feat¬
ures that, it has '.Teen argued, the DP infant differs from the normal infant.
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Clearly, the criteria for assigning a subject to a certain 'stage1
or 'level' are different for the infant and for the verbally
competent subject. To the extent that some analogy can be drawn
between the assessment of sensori-motor and of 'operational'
activity, and to the extent that the rejection of a 'stage' analysis
is justified for the former, a challenge to the generality of
Inhelder's (1968) claim for the sufficiency of a structural analysis
is made.
It may be concluded tiat the results presented in this thesis
cannot be adequately explained by reference to the findings of
Inhelder (1968). In view of the recognition of 'non-intellectual'
factors by Inhelder, however, it is possible that certain aspects of
her account should be given attention, independently of the general
conclusions. Inhelder, it appears, does not take a 'stage' theory
to be a complete explanation. The question of why normal progress
is not made is seen as a real problems
"It is as though (the retardate) lacked the interest,
the curiosity, and the general activity which, in the
normal child lead the subject to ask new questions and
to find the solutions, both of which lead him to
superior levels". (p.291)
The stage approach is, here, clearly seen as a form of description
which does not pre-empt the need for explanation. Such a view is
consistent with that presented in this thesis.
Some general points may be made in conclusion, in evaluating the
contribution of the Piagetian approach to mental handicap. First it
must be emphasised that the Piagetian system is a most sophisticated
one, which cannot be reduced to a simple formula. The theoretical
- 168 -
position which was outlined in the Introduction (p. 23) as a
'Piagetian version of the Slow Development theory' must be seen
as a relatively impoverished one, in comparison with the richness
of Inhelder's (1968) account. It might almost be seen as a
classic psychometric version of 'slow development', but couched in
Piagetian terminology. To this extent, the inadequacy of such a
position might be seen as incidental to a valid assessment of the
Piagetian approach. Criticism has also been offered, however, of
claims more central to the Piagetian system. Overall, it is clear
that the Piagetian approach cannot offer a complete explanation of
the development of the infant with mental handicap. The sections
of InhaLder's (1968) account which are most consistent with the
present findings are those which are least concerned with purely
formal features. An emphasis on such features is perhaps the most
characteristic aspect of the Piagetian approach. To this extent,
the Piagetian contribution must be seen to be limited.
Positive aspects of the Piagetian approach must also be
emphasised. The concern for the behavioural context of specific
achievements makes it possible to avoid the circularity of, for
example, the 'strong psychometric' approach (see p. 2h ). This
advantage is not negated by the inadequacy of any single account of
developmental change. The problems which arise from a simplistic
integration of Piagetian and more classical approaches must not
prevent the real contributions of the former from being recognised.
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3. The Nature of Mental Handicap
In the Introduction (p.36 ) some consideration was given to
different theoretical approaches to mental handicap. There, the
implications of such approaches for the investigation of development
in the DS infant were considered. Here, the results of the present
study will be discussed against the background of available accounts.
It will be shown that the findings are compatible with the kinds of
result obtained with the older child and adult. To this extent,
the present thesis will have extended back to infancy the range of
applicability of such descriptions.
In summarising the results of experimental studies with the (post
infant) mentally handicapped, Clarke & Clarke (l97h) postulate:
"either a lack of a firmly based, well-ordered
repertoire of response tendencies enabling the
subject to select an appropriate strategy when
confronted with a task, or fluctuating motivation
to succeed, or both in oorabination" (p.311)
The findings of the present study could perhaps be summed up by this
formula. Certainly the structural component of this analysis
corresponds closely with the interpretation given to the present
results. It was argued that DS infants had not acquired the kind of
cohesive, consolidated response system far cognitive tasks which
characterises the normal infant. Therefore the performance of the DS
infant could not be accounted for in terms of high-level strategies
or rules. Explanation needed to be made in terms of lower-level or
•local* degrees of organisation.
The analysis of Clarke & Clarke goes beyond a purely structural
interpretation. This thesis has not considered the role of
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motivation, beyond discussing some general features which influenced
the design of experimentation (see p. U3 ). It was noted that
orientation and attention to the task was often hard to maintain in
the BS infant. For this reason, tasks were not presented in a
rigid order. A more specific aspect of motivation was taken into
account in designing the manipulative studies. Here Zigler's (1973)
emphasis on the deleterious effect of continual failure ty the
mentally handicapped child was noted in the context of 'errorless
learning' (p. 130). Motivational features have not however been
considered in discussing findings.
It might be suggested that a purely motivational explanation
might be available for the findings presented here. Low values for
the reproducibility of successes might be attributed to 'fluctuating
motivation to succeed'. The inadequacy of this explanation as a
complete alternative is, however, indicated by the nature of error
responses. These frequently included 'searching on' after an initial
error (that is, correcting) (see p. 106). Such behaviour does not
suggest that lack of motivation to succeed could, alone, be responsible
for patterns of error. Intuitively, general orientation and interest
did not appear to differ markedly between success and error.
Further, the findings of the manipulative study - in which performance
was enhanced when the task was presented in a certain manner -
support the structural interpretation. There seems no prima facie
reason why such a great enhancement of motivation might have occurred
as to lead to the observed change in behaviour.
A solely motivational explanation would not seem to be adequate.
Motivational factors must clearly, however, be conceded seme influence.
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Such influence cannot be seen as independent of cognitive processes.
Those characteristics of behaviour which might be seen as an index
of motivational processes are themselves subject to developmental
change. For example, with respect to the 'AAB' task there is a
clear-cut ontogenetic emergence of the spontaneous correction of
error by the normal infant (see p. 10$. Such 'correction'
behaviour cannot, then, be taken by itself as an index of 'high
motivation'. In general, the Piagetian approach has emphasised the
integrated nature of 'intelligence' and 'affectivity' (e.g. Piaget
19510. Such an interdependence is clearly supported by Clarke &
Clarke (above). Certainly the impact of motivational features should
not be underestimated. They cannot, however, be seen as a
straightforward alternative to a cognitive or structural explanation.
Most theoretical accounts of mental handicap would assume that
broadly similar features characterise the whole of the life-span.
In this regard, the arguments of Denny (19610 concerning 'spontaneous*
learning in the adult would, like those of Clarke & Clarke (above) be
expected to be relevant to the infant. Denny (19610 suggested that
the mentally handicapped adult experiences difficulty in 'spontaneous'
or 'incidental' learning from the environment. The present findings
on the effect of specific manipulation of presentation format are
consistent with this view. They suggest that the IS infant, while
in some sense 'capable' of acquiring an understanding of the task, had
failed to do so spontaneously. Thus the kind of everyday experience
sufficient to support the normal infant's acquisition has not been
adequate for the DS infant. (The question of whether such an
equivalence of 'everyday experience' can be meaningful will not be
pursudd here).
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One process by which the more 'incidental' aspects of
learning might be expected to take place is 'transfer'. It was
argued above (p. 127) that transfer should not generally be
predicted for the DS infant. To scane extent, the broad, high-
level structures characterising the normal infant may be seen as a
reflection of the ready transfer between different response systems.
The results of learning in one context might be expected to lead
fairly rapidly to more general changes in performance. If this
were not the case for the DS infant, then a retardation in
spontaneous achievements - of the kind described by Fiaget - might
well be predicted.
With respect to transfer processes, Luria (1963) has noted that!
"when he has assimilated some rule, the mentally
retarded child can apply it under new conditions only
with considerable difficulty and can only accomplish
the operation of transfer of experience ... very
laboriously" (p.9jauthor's italics).
This view supports the present argument. However, it should be pointed
out that (in contrast to the approaches outlined above) Luria's account
is strictly cone emed with the child who possesses language. The above
phenomenon is, therefore, presented as an effect of deficient language
use. Luria (1963) argues explicitly that the handicap should not be
evident in the practical activity of the infant. To the extent that
'sensorimotor' activity has been shown in the present thesis to exhibit
differences related to the genetic syndrome, Luria's view is challenged.
It would not seem legitimate to exclude the infant from a theoretical
account of mental handicap, especially when the findings of research with
infants are consistent with those obtained with the older child and adult.
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The relevance of the present findings to the theoretical
approach derived from Piaget has been discussed above (p. 161).
It was concluded that such an approach could not be adequate in
isolation. It could describe certain features of developmental
outcome in mental handicap, but could not give a complete
explanation of them. Performance on tasks designed to assess
cognitive development must be analysed in the same way as other
behaviourj it cannot be taken as a straightforward parameter of
cognitive structure. The general characteristics of behaviour
summarised here must be expected to apply equally to performance on
'Piagetian' tasks. The investigation of performance on such tasks
must be brought into the 'mainstream' of research into mental
handicap, rather than being regarded as an independent approach with
its own criteria. Such an integration should be seen as a challenge
for both the Piagetian and the more classical experimental schools.
From the 'developmental' contribution of the former and the
'difference' contribution of the latter perhaps a comprehensive
'developmental difference' theory might emerge.
li. The Normal Infant
So far, conclusions have been presented which mainly concern the
handicapped infant. Consistent with the approach of the thesis,
such conclusions have usually been of a comparative nature, and have
to some extent held implications for the non-handicapped population.
It is now possible to bring together seme of these points in
considering certain theoretical and methodological implications of the
overall results.
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The criticism of a 'slow development' theory entails
criticism of a certain' approach to normal development. If the
characteristics of the handicapped population cannot (with any
explanatory power) be accounted for by positing a 'slowed-down'
version of 'normal development' then the model of normal development
implied must also be inadequate. This model explains development
as a series of states or steps, through which progress is made at a
certain rate in time, A critical extra element in this 'state-series'
model is the assumption that the normal child's progress can be taken
as a parameter of 'normality' itself. Thus the normal infant is said
to manifest normality ty 'steady progress through the stages'.
Clearly, such an argument is circular. The pattern by which
'normality' is diagnosed is itself defined by the pattern of the
'normal' child.
As with the handicapped infant, then, an account of normal
development which is expressed solely in terms of characteristic
achievement at certain ages cannot be seen as having any explanatory
power. The same argument would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the case of
the child with superior intelligence. A satisfactory theory must
attempt to explain how and why changes occur. The search for
'universals' in development - e.g. in the context of Piagetian theory -
cannot be seen as a solution to this problem. Unless such an
approach allows its hypotheses to be 'falsified' by single counter¬
examples (a procedure whose formal rigour is philosophically attractive)
it will merely build up a catalogue of the general incidence of certain
phenomena. Such a catalogue could furnish the basis for an enquiry
into why such generality exists (for example, in a range of cultures).
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The notion, of 'universality' would, however, he of little import.
It might well be argued that no established theoretical system
relies solely on such 'normative' data. However, it is a model to
which various theoretical approaches are often reduced. 'Maturation'
theories of development avoid circularity by appealing to changes in
the central nervous system which are, in principle, observable
independent!;'- of behavioural change. To the extent that such
independent observation is unavailable - or fails to lead to precise
correlation - the problems of circularity arise.
Similarly, it is possible to express many of the Piagetian
findings in terms of age-characteristic behaviour. Such a procedure
ignores the significance of the framework into which the life-span is
divided in the Piagetian system. This is done in a hierarchical
fashion, so that, for example, changes between 'periods' are of greater
significance than changes between 'sub-periods' or 'stages' (e.g.
Piaget 1972, p.56). Further, an explanatory apparatus is set up for
the mechanism of transition between states, with which the account of
successive states is integrated (e.g. Piaget 1953). However, partly
owing, perhaps, to Piaget's own emphasis on the importance of the
constant order of succession of stages (e.g. Piaget 1972, p.50), this
feature is often seen as the essence of the theory. To the extent
that this reducticm in complexity is made, the general criticisms of
the 'state-series' model must be applicable.
Turning to more concrete issues, the analysis presented here of
handicapped development leads to a re-evaluation of certain aspects of
normal development. A model of development which assumes a high order
of organisation in response s;rstems was found not to be appropriate for
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the handicapped population. In terras of certain features which,
it was argued, index such organisation, clear differences were shown
in favour of the normal population. It might appear from this that
a theoretical model which assumes the presence of such organisation
in the normal infant would be given support. However the resulting
position would be unsatisfactory. Two different theoretical approaches -
making very different sets of assumptions - would be co-existing, one
dealing with normal and the other with (certain) handicapped development.
In view of the present emphasis that population differences are to be
seen as differences of degree (p. 117) such a dichotomy could not be
justified.
Instead, it is necessary to see the presence of a high degree of
organisation in the responses of the normal infant as a positive
characteristic. Rather than being included in the theory as a 'given' -
as a necessary feature of behaviour in development - the substance of
such organisation should be seen as a phenomenon of normal development.
As such, it demands investigation in its own right. The differences
obtained between PS and normal infants must be seen not only as an
indication of the degree of handicap of the former, but also of the
remarkable achievement of the latter. One of the major achievements of
Piaget has been to demonstrate the developmental (or 'genetic')
dimension to children's cognitive structures: that is, the inadequacy
of an 'all-or-ncme' analysis. Piaget argued (195?) that the most
fundamental concepts of space and time must themselves be constructed
over a period of years. The same argument must be applied to
assumptions concerning 'organisation' in infant development. Such a
feature cannot be seen as monolithic. Rather, 'organisation' must be
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seen as depending on a complex set of processes, including many
which are usually considered as 'learning' processes. When clear
differences are found between two populations, with respect to
these processes, questions are raised about both populations. Thus
the perspective derived from a comparative investigation of handicap
highlights the complexity and efficiency of the 'normal' system, and
focuses attention on those processes which support normal development.
5. General Implications
Discussion of the nature of the handicap in Down's Syndrome has,
so far, been concerned specifically with the area of cognitive
development. It is possible, however, to consider more global
aspects of the handicap. The findings related to cognitive development
may be extrapolated to development as a whole. In this way, a more
general picture of the DS infant will emerge and implications for
intervention in development may be considered.
With respect to cognitive development, the picture emerged of an
infant acquiring skills in a laborious fashion. Specific experience
would lead to low-level, local change, rather than to global re¬
organisation of response systems. Development at such levels would
therefore take place more slowly than with the normal infant. Further,
individual achievements would not immediately enter a 'repertoire' of
behaviour. They would remain labile and not fully integrated into a
coherent system. The establishment of a consolidated system of
responses, within which specific achievements would have a place, would
be a later attainment.
- 178 -
This picture of handicaps on learning could be applied to any
area of development. In this respect the handicap might almost be
seen as a 'physical' one, in that 'mental' development would be only
one area influenced by it. The concept of a generalised handicap
in learning has been explored by Watson (1966) in the context of the
normal, young infant. Watson argued that the young infant could be
seen as undergoing 'natural deprivation' in that certain functional
limitations prevent him from learning about contingent relations in
his environment. These limitations concern such factors as the
length of time for response recovery, preventing the young infant from
emitting responses quickly enough to enable him to test out different
possiblities for contingent relationships. Such a 'handicap' might
well be described as 'physical' rather than 'mental'. Without
adopting Watson's analysis of the precise nature of the 'handicap' in
the normal, young infant, his model of physical or structural
constraints on the normal learning process is of considerable relevance
to the present discussion. It might be argued that the infant and
child with Down's Syndrome is in a permanent state of 'natural
deprivation', in which his ability to learn from this environment is
severely curtailed. Developmental outcome might be seen as the
resultant of such a process operating over time.
Certain features of motor development might be illuminated by this
approach. By analogy with mental development, it might be argued that
the slow emergence of motor 'milestones' (Carr 1971?J Melyn & White 1973)
cannot be explained simply by positing 'slow development'. In this
area of development, as in any other, delayed achievement must be taken
as an effect of handicaps on development. The hypotonia and general
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weakness of reflexes at birth in ^cwn's Syndrome (Cowie 1970) and
the later deficiencies in fine motor control (Frith & Frith 197k)
suggest strongly that there are important differences from the normal
case with respect to processes influencing motor development. Such
differences are also implied by the advocacy of physiotherapy for
mentally handicapped infants (e.g. Hughes 1971). Against this
background, it would seem reasonable to assert that one influence on
developmental outcome in this area might be a general handicap on
learning. In the absence of empirical evidence, it is only possible
to speculate on some ways in which the handicap might be manifested
in this context.
First the 'uncertain' nature of developmental progress would be
expected to apply to such behaviour as locomotion. That is, rather
than the child steadily acquiring new skills contributing to independent
locomotion, each quickly being used as a foundation for the next, a
much less coherent pattern would be expected. The various achievements
related to locomotion would be expected to be 'unreliable' in
performance long after first attainment. That is, the child would
sometimes exhibit, and sometimes not exhibit the behaviour of which
he was known to be 'capable'. The extensive 'plateaus' of achievement
noted by Carr (197?), in which some apparently well-established ability
fails to lead on to new attainments, parallels the way in which
cognitive skills apparently fail to become integrated into systems of
response.
A second, related prediction concerns the role of the caretaking
environment. It would be predicted that enhancement of performance
would be achieved by careful manipulation of the environment. In the
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context of locomotor development, this might consist of amplifying
•reward1 aspects of the situation, either by increasing praise and
encouragement or by providing attractive toys to be obtained by the
appropriate behaviour. Personal observation suggests that such an
increased control over the ambient environment indeed characterises
the behaviour of both parents and other care-givers. Essentially,
the situation is being construed as a 'learning® context (in which
behaviour is seen as plastic, and open to manipulative influence)
rather than as a 'maturation' context (in which the caretaker merely
provides the opportunity for natural growth).
General implications for caretaking or intervention may be drawn.
The infant with Down's Syndrome is seen as acquiring all the skills
which characterise normal development in an uncertain and laborious
fashion, and in a manner highly dependent on ambient environmental
features. The deliberate manipulation of such features is seen as an
essential contribution to the enhancement of performance in specific
contexts, and, by extension, of development as a whole. The DS
infant is seen as in constant need of support. For this reason 'early
stimulation' in the first weeks of life (Brinkworth & Collins 1969) is
seen as the initial manifestation of such support, rather than as a
technique of 'once-for-all' intervention (in the manner of the
'Headstart' programme). This thesis has not been concerned with the
newborn infant, but would clearly argue that the handicap is a permanent
feature of behaviour, and not capable of total remediation. The
cumulative effect of any early intervention must not, of course, be
underestimated.
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With respect to 'stimulation', the role of environmental
support would not, at any time, be seen as the provision of
undifferentiated sensory 'experience*. Rather, its role would
always be determined ty a close analysis of the infant's current
behaviour. Intervention would be designed to combine with the
infant's own activity in a constructive fashion. Just as the
handicap manifests itself differently during development, so must
the role of support or intervention be adapted.
The problem of assessment is encountered here. This thesis has
clearly indicated the hazards of extrapolating from single 'tests* of
the infant's ability. Such a practice must inevitably lead to a
misrepresentation of the infant's behaviour. This conclusion (in the
context of infancy) is in agreement with that of Clarke St Clarke (1973b),
following a discussion of the practice of assessment for children and
adults:
"The assessment movement, from Gaiton and Binet onwards,
has depended on single-shot sampling of an area of
behaviour, and from this an estimate of capacity
inferred ... it is clear that In the severely subnormal
this approach can offer little useful long-term
guidance". (p.38)
The value of single assessments for screening purposes must not be
ignored. However, any usage which assigns a more general validity to
the results of a single assessment must be considered unsatisfactory.
It is not possible to obtain, in this manner, knowledge about 'status'
or 'capacity' from which performance in a wide range of contextscan be
inferred. If intervention in a specific context is to be carried out,
then the pattern and range of behaviour in that context should first be
determined.
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Finally it should be stressed that the decision to attempt
intervention must always consider whether enhancement of certain
behaviour is in fact desirable. Concentration on one area of
development might lead to reduced attention being given to other
areas. Decisions must be taken in the light of the social and
educational importance of different achievements, as well as an
analysis of their place within development as a whole. The status
of 'cognitive development' in such a scheme remains undecided.
Whether the cognitive development of the DS infant should be made the
focus of intervention remains an open question. It might be the
case that the most important contribution of research in this area is
to the conceptualisation of mental handicap and of the role of
intervention, rather than to the design of specific programmes of
'early education'. In either event, it will have been of importance
to have recognised the limitations of the 'slow development' model,
and to have begun the investigation of the complex differences between
the cognitive development of the infant with Down's Syndrome and the
normal infant.
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